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To the Korean peasant,
hardy and hospitable.

FOREWORD

Since the advent of written history at least some four millenia ago, the
world has been to a large degree a peasant world. There are still nations among
those newly independent since World War II with 80 percent of their populations
living in the countryside. And it has not been so many decades ago that the
major nations of Europe were composed predominantly of a peasantry and its con
comitant technology. The United States crossed the rural-urban divide of 50
percent living in rural areas in about 1920, Italy in the 19^0s, and Korea in
the early 19T0s. Were it not for the industrial revolution, which originated
in Europe and has extended its Impact around the globe, the world would still
consist of urban centers surrounded by vast oceans of countryside, villages,
and peasant-tillers. It is certainly no news to persons living in the United
States, where less than ten percent of the population is at present actively
engaged in raising the crops needed to feed its expanded population, and to some
of the rest of the world that the age of the peasant, the even pace of life in
semi-isolated villages, is gone forever.
There are some urban sophisticates who look back upon the rural past with a
feeling of relief that the coarse and provincial rural milieu is over and done
with. Karl Marx was certainly among these. In the Communist Manifesto he and
Engels fovind reason to praise capitalism for rescuing "a considerable part of
the population from the idiocy of rural life." Others, many of whom have had
little or no immediate experience in living from the soil, evince a nostalgia
for the scenery of the rural landscape which is fast disappearing in the en
croaching expansion of highways, cities, and suburbs. They may even be aware
of a flicker of reminiscence, as if the sense of the rural ecology existed ineradicably as an inherited trait. But speak to most urban scholars and tech
nicians of an intention to study the attitudes of the nation’s peasants, or to
survey the conditions of the villages, and one can easily sense an undertone
that might be expressed by the phrase, "Why do you want to waste your time doing
that?" Indeed, why not study the bureaucracy or the intellectual, elite instead?
The peasant is not a vanguard of change.
Aside from the utilitarian aim of contributing to the output of agricultural
production, which most presently less developed nations desire very much, a goal
that is certainly embedded in the reasons for this present study, there are
other somewhat less tangible reasons for studying the peasant. The long day of
the peasant began in such countries as Korea millenia ago, perhaps with the
domestication of such basic crops as millet, and that day has lasted through all
of Korea's recorded history to the present time when, to conclude the simile,
the late afternoon of his history draws on. Although not so quickly as it may
seem, but inevitably, the day of the peasant society is waning. For this reason
alone, it is important that studies be conducted to preserve the record of the
peasant, his views, his outlook, his values. The opportunity to do this is
gradually disappearing as developing nations vie with the already industrialized
nations to increase their status, their power and, it is to be hoped, the quality
V
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of life for their citizens by introducing modern technologies.
It is my conviction that the peasant is important in his own right, for him
self, and not alone for what he can contribute to the growth of his country's
wealth or for the potential turmoil that he may threaten under some extremities
through contributing to rural revolutions. While peasant attitudes and opin
ions have less impact upon the ultimate behavior of nations under the leader
ship of \irban political and social elites than do the attitudes of citizens in
an industrialized democracy, these opinions do have some impact, and the con
tents of the human psyche are by no means contemptible simply because they
cannot find outlet in national decision-making. Peasant resistance has toppled
many a well-laid plan of an ambitious urban elite. This is the spirit that
infuses the research reported in this book: The peasant is worth studying for
himself.
Some comment is required concerning the survey method of research used in
this study. If this were the only study extant on the Korean peasant it might
have been desirable to conduct research by means of anthropological techniques,
studying a village or several villages through participant observation. For
tunately, there are a number of such studies, albeit not enough at this crucial
time of Korean history, and a few other detailed studies done by Korean soci
ologists and economists, some of which are listed in the Bibliography. Our
study is supplemental to these other works. There is no intention of suggesting
that the techniques used to obtain the data reported here are in any way superior
to other techniques. The purposes of studies are not always the same, and while
a siirvey might obtain a wider range of attitude and opinion information, studies
in depth of Individuals through psychological techniques or studies of villages
through anthropological methods provide Invaluable contributions to the whole of
our understanding of the peasant. If this study contributes something to the
understanding of the contemporary Korean peasant it will have attained its modest
goal.
Any study owes a debt to countless persons, some whose work has been read and
pondered—the notes acknowledge only a portion of these innumerable influences—
and some whose contributions have been more personal. To Professors Chung-hyun
Ro, Jong-hae Yoo, Tae-dong Chung, and Suk-bum Yun, colleagues at Yonsei Uni
versity in Seoul, I am indebted for much good advice and valuable assistance.
Mr. Won-Taek Han prepared the initial translations of the questionnaires into
Korean, a most difficult iindertaklng. Several officials in the Ministry of Ed
ucation and the Ministry of Forestry and Agricultural Resources were most liberal
in allowing the use of their facilities. Above all, the ability to conduct this
research freely and without harassment is deeply appreciated. The research would
have obviously been impossible without the good-natured contributions of the
Korean peasants—village hospitality is not easily forgotten. Finally, Dr.
Chong-sik Lee has long been an inspiration for high standards of scholarship to
anyone interested in the politics of Korea.
My presence in Korea was the result of a Fulbright teaching fellowship with
out which no research could have been contemplated. The Social Science Research
Council, Joint Committee on Korean Studies, provided a grant that was crucial
for the preparation and printing of questionnaires, codings and key punching,
and all the other miscellaneous expenses of survey research. Yonsei University,
the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Hawaii freely provided
computer and other facilities. Carol Carstens typed a draft of the manuscript;

Foreword

vii

a final draft was prepared by Joanne Yamashlta. Janis Shirai was most helpful
in finding and correcting those minute errors that so easily escape the eye.
Finally, several editorial readers provided suggestions that strengthened the
manuscript significantly. To all of these people and institutions I am greatly
indebted. Any shortcomings of the research and its interpretation rest on my
own shoulders.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

The Peasant in the Modem World

In many developing nations of the world most people are rural dwellers who
partake hut little of the benefits of increasing productivity such nations
strive for. They are, however, greatly affected by the impact of change. What
effect does the process of change or, very roughly, modernization have on the
peasants in nations that are dedicated to industrialization? Do they see them
selves as condemned to the backwaters of the new national experience that these
nations are entering upon? If they do, is this a demoralizing perception, and
does it interfere with the modernizing efforts in the countryside? For many
less developed nations the experience of nationhood, the attainment of inde
pendence itself, is recent so that, suddenly plunged into the swift currents of
a modern national experience, the peasants find themselves beset by a multitude
of changes, buffeted by assiduous criticisms of their time-honored way of life,
and besieged by innumerable attempts to alter their customs and beliefs. While
the center for the proselytization of change is the city, most saliently the
capital city, urban decisions constantly impinge on the countryside which must
bend with the desires of urban reformers, adopt new world views in accord with
the advanced opinions of urbanites, or resist with stubborn and sometimes ef
fective peasant inertia.
These tensions, occasionally erupting into violent conflict, are occurring
throughout the less developed world, in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa,
the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. Some countries,
such as the highly industrialized nations of Europe, have already survived the
conquest of the countryside by the cities, and not without considerable violence
as the history of those countries reveals. Sir Thomas More, observing the
effects on the countryside of measures adopted there by a developing England,
commented acridly that those were times indeed when "sheep ate men." Languedoc
became a rural haven of reaction against the nationalizing propensities of the
French revolution. The Soviet Union has not yet emerged from the terrible days
of Stalin's destruction of the kulaks for the sake of rapid industrialization
not only of the urban environment but of agriculture as well. The United States
which has never had a widespread segment of its population that could be called
a true peasantry, has avoided some of the trauma of modernizing the countryside
and attained a high degree of industrialization and economic development without
encountering stubborn peasant resistance. For this reason, the United States
can hardly serve as a model of development for most of the world, and its poli
ticians are sometimes hard put to comprehend the obstinate problems that beset
political leaders elsewhere. But the experience of other modern nations might
be more germane to the travails of peasant societies. Japan was also a "typical
peasant society when it began its efforts to modernize, but even that nation did
not experience the complications of a world permeated by busy media. Yet it
1
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should be noted that development in Japan did not occur without ample unrest
and occasional rebellion in the countryside, conditions that have been well
documented and analyzed.^
While the 19^0s and 1950s were generally devoted to developing urban centers
and manufactures, symbols often more illusory than real of rapid advance and
prestige, the rural segment of the population, ranging from 60 to 90 percent of
the citizenry, was both neglected and exhorted to sacrifice for the good of the
cities. In their efforts to display modernization at the greatest possible
speed in a world in which they were being left rapidly behind by nations already
far along in the process of industrialization, leaders in the less developed
nations frequently advocated a lopsided form of development—that is, when they
were successful in breaiiing through centuries of inertia, governmental corrup
tion and inefficiency, and the economic drain of historical colonialism—placing
all their emphasis on the urban sector and ignoring and exploiting the rural
sector. To the peasant, who has his own views of the proper state of society,
the urban elites of the newly independent polities must have greatly resembled
a new style of colonial exploitation, sometimes more vigorous and effective than
that of the former colonial rulers who occasionally could be barred from pene
trating the "bamboo walls."
With the advent of the 19T0s, however, some nations hitherto self-sufficient
in foodstuffs found that the rural sector was not maintaining sufficient pro
ductivity to keep abreast of populations increasing in some extreme cases, like
the Philippines, at an annual rate of 3.5 percent. Capital that might better
have been spent in other forms of modernization was now drained from more pro
ductive uses to pay for imported foods. The brief effervescence of optimism
associated with the Green Revolution in the late 1960s gradually dissipated as
the problems of the rural sector were more fully and realistically appraised.
Lasting gains in agricultural productivity seemed further in the future than
originally anticipated. While the Green Revolution is still a viable reality,
naive optimism has been replaced by a greater sense of realism. In addition,
there is some realization that while fruits might still be gathered from the
countryside, greater efforts and more resources must be invested there as well.
Among the presently developing nations, an interesting case study is that of
Korea2 which, following the conflict that disrupted development throughout the
peninsula, has made impressive strides toward a more modern economy. As it
entered the 1970s, Korea seemed to have reached the verge of that economic con
dition that some economists refer to as the "take-off," a stage in the course of
modernization at which a nation seems capable of sustaining relatively inde
pendently the steady growth of its economy. Thus Korea is further along than a
great many countries striving toward development in spite of its many present
problems and the uncertainties of its economic and political future. In fact,
by 1973 only somewhat less than half of its population worked in the rural sec
tor, a division of national labor that marked Italy roughly during the mid-19U0s.
Korea, like Italy three decades earlier, could be expected to become an increas
ingly urban society, with a declining labor force working the land as manufac
tures came to dominate the gross national product. But in the early 1970s the
peasants still formed a significant proportion of the population, and rural
problems still exercised the minds of administrators bent on the goal of eco
nomic development. New programs were in the process of implementation with the
intention of increasing the morale of the peasant, his well being and.
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conseq^uently, his output. Thus the period covered hy the analysis in this book
was particularly critical for the peasant and the nation, holding some promise
of improved living conditions for the peasant, presumably in return for in
creased agricultural output.
Thg transition from a predominantly rural society to a contemporary urban so
ciety marked by increasing industrialization was a significant new experience
for Korea which hitherto had been economically Indistinguishable from its ruralbased neighbors in Asia. The peasant had always been the ubiquitous and ex
ploited "average" inhabitant of the peninsula, perhaps from time to time faring
slightly better than other peasant populations throughout the world, but gener3-lly faring much worse. Mongol, Manchu and Japanese invaders devastated the
Korean countryside. By the nineteenth century an increasingly reactionary
traditional regime pressed its demands more and more oppressively on the peasants
sometimes to the point of driving many from their lands into the precarious ex
istence of slash-and-burn agriculture. Viewing the rural landscape even in the
1970s, the cursory visitor could be plunged backward into history. Certainly
the straw-thatched roofs and the paddy fields of many villages seemed to be not
much different from what they must have been centuries ago, although now and
then a cement factory on the industrialized outskirts of an urban conglomera
tion like Taegu loomed into view to disturb the tranquil timelessness of the
countryside. Such a juxtaposition of the modern against the backdrop of the
ancient is aesthetically disconcerting; it must be somewhat disconcerting to the
economic reformer as well.
Yet the timelessness of the countryside, although probably a restful exper
ience for the visitor from a frenetic urban environment, is to some degree
spurious, for innovations have occurred from time to time in the countryside,
albeit at a much slower rate than in the societies of the industrial revolution.
The terraced slopes of many hills must have been introduced by some villagers in
a past age. More fundamentally, the development of rice culture and the char
acteristic crops of Korea were once innovations, and some intrepid innovators
may have accepted significant risks.

A Brief History of the Korean Peasant
The origins of the contemporary crops of the Korean fields have been lost in
the shadows of mythology, their introduction attributed to a supernatural nation
al father figure, Tan-Gun. Some archeological research tentatively suggests
that rice culture was introduced by the sixth century B.C., but certainly by the
second century A.D. rice was a flourishing crop on the Korean peninsula.3 it
can be conjectured that the benefit to those who grew the new crops was likely
to be shortlived, as the increased ability to feed a population was drained
through tax systems into developing towns and cities where the apex of society—
the courts, retainers, and armies—was supported by agricultural wealth. The
basic strength of these agricultural kingdoms, their foundation, certainly
rested in the countryside, for the countryside could survive without the court
and, barring invasion, could have enjoyed a higher quality of life without it,
while the court was dependent on the produce of the farms. Thus the fall of a
highly developed civilization at Angkor Wat did not seem to radically affect the
surrounding peasants. New hierarchies might be built on the peasant's shoulders
and then crumble or evolve, but the peasant would survive to form the support
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for yet another court, another regime. Although denied adequate rewards, the
peasant and his importance did not go unrecognized. Confucius had awarded him
a position in the social hierarchy below the mandarinate, to he sure, hut above
the artisan, the merchant, and the soldier. While this was prohahly small com
pensation during times of famine and heavy taxation following invasions or
threats of invasion, it may have contained some real Ideological effects miti
gating the economic realities during periods of better times. To this extent
the peasant of East Asia was better off socially than the despised serf of
medieval Europe. At least he was not a "villain."
The peasant's conditions fluctuated throughout most of Korean history. Dur
ing the Three Kingdoms when the formerly independent local units, the sijok and
pujok, had disappeared, the land was farmed by independent small peasants many
of whom, however, were eventually driven from the lands through taxes, corvee
and military service. The displaced peasants would voluntarily, or sometimes
under threat, place themselves in the service of the powerful.^ But times
changed on the peninsula, and peasant fortunes waxed or waned with dynastic
fortunes. Descendants of the slaves of Silla became the common people of the
eleventh century, whose new and improved status as peasants was the result of
their service in the dynastic war that produced Koryo. Now they were allotted
land, seed, and oxen. But the weight of restrictions inevitably grew. Rules
to hold peasants to the land were instituted; costume, housing, and marriage
were minutely regulated; and peasants were prohibited from buying or selling
land. They were unable to move from their registered residences.5 Nobles in
the kingdom of Koryo received private agricultural estates (cHonjangi nongjang,
or ahangwon) which provided them the income to live in the capital, the only
locus for social amenities for the nobility.° These estates had undermined the
revenue supporting Koryo and thus enabled Yi Song-gye to depose the king and
implement reforms which deprived the old elite of their land holdings.T Thus
in 1391j a year before Yi himself assumed the throne but while he already con
trolled the government, the new land reforms were instituted. Peasants were
allowed to retain the land that they already held, but no new lands were dis
tributed. The new classified field law, the Kwajon-pop, somewhat improved con
ditions, for it gave tenants a guaranteed status in society. But in fact most
of the arable land was in the hands of the government, so that peasants gained
little from this reform. Indeed, during the height of the Yi dynasty, under
Sejong, Sejo, and Songjong, the agriciiltural estates were cultivated mainly by
slaves, not by tenants, while tax and other onerous burdens were heavy.o In
any case, while the peasants were now tenants, unwritten traditions afforded
some protection for their right to cultivate.
The reign of the ruler canonized as Sejong (r. l4l8-lU50) was one of the
brilliant periods of Korea's social and Intellectual development such as the
invention of the modern Korean alphabet. It was also a period of interest in
agricultural innovation, some of which possibly improved the peasant's lot.
Compilations of books on agriculture were produced, such as Chong Cho's
Nongsajipsol (The Art of Farming) that may have stimulated the use of fertilizers,
thereby allowing fields to be cultivated year after year rather than having to be
left fallow for a season. This practice, of course, increased agricultural out
put. An irrigation project was carried out in Klmje district in Cholla province,
and waterwheels were introduced but never as widely used as in China.9
The Hideyoshi invasions toward the end of the sixteenth century were vastly
destructive to the countryside, devastating fields and displacing or killing
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many peasants, but the war did have the advantage of destroying the land rec
ords so that peasant entrepreneurs were later able to amass larger land hold
ings. Yet the peasant's burdens remained generally unrelieved. The practice
of taxing households for grain, services, and innumerable other items placed
most of the burden on the peasants, while the landlords generally escaped pay
ing the tribute tax. The Taedong-bop, or Law of Great Equity, was intended to
distribute the burden more equably by levying a tax on land only in the form of
grain and cloth payments. This law was first applied in Kyonggi province in
1608, but the government was glacially slow in extending these benefits else
where in the countryside.10 Kim Yuh, governor of Ch'ungch'ong province, spent
a lifetime in instituting this law throughout Korea. He levied taxes on land
amounting to a p'it (roll) of cloth and two tu of grain on each kybl of land,
thereby freeing the peasant from the accretions of miscellaneous taxes and the
tribute tax. Kim was not to witness the success of his effort, as evidenced by
an ex-censor's memorial to the throne a year before Kim Yuk's death in I658:
A farmer's agricultural production per year does not exceed ten kok of
grain; CwithU these ten kok, he Chas toll meet his military tax as well as
his corvee tax. Even if he has infant sons, all of them are enlisted as
military C-aged3 adults; therefore, he also has to meet their duties.
Then what is left for eating and clothing?
It was not until ITO8 that the Taedong-bbp was instituted in all but two prov
inces .
Kim Yuk's lifelong efforts on behalf of the Korean peasant served to increase
government revenues, for landlords were now taxed, as well as to alleviate
peasant poverty. But the peasant's condition improved only slightly, and in the
course of the nineteenth century his standard of living probably declined. The
Old Regime of Korea, like that of Ch'ing China, had seen its apogee and seemed
to degenerate steadily throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries despite
the sturdy efforts of a few modernizers and would-be reformers. Chong Yag-yong
(1762-1836), for instance, advocated communal ownership of land, with peasant
communities integrated into an hierarchical political structure. Less radical
reforms, based on fairer taxation, were recommended by other nineteenth-century
memorlalizers of the throne such as Yi Kyu-gyong, Ho Pu, and Kim Yun-sik.H
There is evidence that King Kojong himself was not unfeeling toward the peasants,
for he had been thoroughly imbued with the principles of kingship, including
frugality on the part of the monarch, concern for the welfare of the peasants,
and the maintenance of status distinctions in society, all good Confucian lessons
delivered twice a day in the Royal Lectures. In 1862 conditions pushed peasants
into a rebellion which spread from Kyongsang to Cholla and then to Ch'ungch'ong
provinces. The reputed cause of this rebellion, known as the Hong Kyong-nae
Rebellion, was taxes, and Palais points out that the peasants directed their ire
against venal officials, but they remained very traditional in their demands for
change.12
veritable exodus of peasants from their villages helped to reduce
the number of peasant households from 302,844 prior to the rebellion to some
192,867 following the upheaval. This decrease continued a trend that seemed to
have started shortly after I8OO. The total population is said to have decreased
from 7,561,403 in I807 to 6,755,280 in 1837.13 Considering the difficulties of
gathering census figures in modern nations, it is unlikely that the figures of
nineteenth-century Korea were accurate, but the record of a population decline
seems plausible.
Despite this rebellion and a similarly abortive uprising in I87I, little was

Introduction

1

done to alleviate the peasant's plight. In 1883 a model farm was established
outside Seoul with foreign seeds and breeding cattle, but no rural reforms
were forthcoming, a fact that Heydrich correctly attributed to a demoralized
and corrupt bureaucracy.The dire conditions in the countryside were manifest
even to the casual observer of Korea. Bonar noted that "any signs of wealth en
tail squeezing by the officials and the people consequently spend all they earn
on themselves in the way of clothing and food."15 Benjamin Weems provides an il
lustration of one corrupt official:
Three specific acts of this kunsu (county chief magistrate) of Kobu County
during 1893 were (l) taking advantage of the collapse of a river bridge
to impress several hundred thousand people as slave laborers; (2) impos
ing on the farmers a water tax amounting to about 20 percent of the rice
crop and appropriating the receipts himself; and (3) levying forced con
tributions of rice upon tenant farmers under the pretense of charity for
poor Buddhist monks and with the force of authority of the central gov
ernment . 1°
All land was owned by the monarchy which assigned it to government officials
who, in turn, leased it to tenant peasants. As a result, the peasants had to
pay taxes in kind both to the landlords and to the government. Because the
yangban amassed lands that were not registered, government revenues declined,
while the burden of support fell more and more heavily on the tenant peasants.
This oppressive system of exploitation was the major reason for the Tonghak
Rebellion which broke out in l89^ and almost swept the Old Regime away. It bore
some resemblance to several other rural revolts in Asia and elsewhere. Like
the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion, which scourged China from I85O to l86^, it originated
in the insufferable rural conditions and it unified its adherents through a
doctrine synthesizing new ideas from the West and traditional themes. The vacil
lation of the Tonghak forces, which enabled the Korean government to put them
down by the end of I89U, reminds one of similar vacillation outside Mexico City
of the peasant forces of Father Hidalgo who suffered the same consequences.
Some reformers looked with favor on neighboring Japan where modernization
was gathering speed following the Meiji Restoration and development was based
to a large degree on using increased farm output to support the new industries
in the cities. The growing strength of Japan, coinciding with the declining
fortunes of the reactionary Yi dynasty, created the condition for growing Japanese
influence in Korea, an influence that supplanted the former role of China in
Korea.Korea became a Japanese protectorate in 1905 and a colony in 1910.
Thus Korea fell under the control of the most economically progressive nation of
Asia, a fate that foretold mixed blessings, for the Japanese were intent, inso
far as possible, on modernizing Korean agriculture for the benefit of the mother
country. The rule of the yangban, a rule that was harsh during some periods of
the Yi dynasty, was now replaced by the rationalized bureaucracy of the Japanese.
Some modernization occurred; Japan introduced innovative agricultural practices^®
and, in retiarn, learned the utility of animal power from the Koreans, with the
result that the demand for cattle steadily increased in Japan.19 Yet conditions
in the Korean countryside probably continued to deteriorate.
Intent on increasing the productivity of Korean agriculture to feed its own
people, Japan did institute Improvements, some of these in farming techniques,
but each improvement caused a decline in the fortuines of the Korean peasants,
rather like the eerie results of the three wishes in W. W. Jacobs classic tale
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The Monkey’s Paw. By the Irrigation Association Order of 1917 irrigation kyes
were fomed, and the money advanced to these kyes by the colonial government had
to be paid by the tenant peasants and the landlords from the profits anticipated
through increased productivity. Membership fees remained unchanged, but the
price of rice fell precipitously, so that many members could no longer pay the
fees.20 in the 1930s roads were constructed, a much needed improvement in the
countryside, for it made markets more accessible to the peasants, but the roads
were built on land confiscated from the peasants who sought but received no
compensation.21 By 1929 there were at least twenty-four industrial schools
specializing in agriculture, and the famed College of Agriculture at Suwon was
training rural leaders. There was also a single missionary agricultural train
ing institute at the Union Christian College in P'yongyang.22
Such efforts
should have enabled peasants to increase productivity, and this seemed indeed
to have been the case. Lee showed that ordinary rice gradually increased from
17.3 to 20 bushels per acre,23 and Brunner noted increased yields and other
evidences of added resoiarces in rural Korea.2^ From 1910 to 1925 a ^2.0 per
cent increase in the production of rice and a 67.8 percent increase in cereals
were recorded, although some of this increase was the result of a 17.2 percent
Increase in the land farmed to rice and a h'o.3 percent Increase in cereal lands.
Lee also found that in the early 1930s some thirty million bushels of rice had
been exported to Japan but, as he pointed out, this traffic did not benefit the
Korean peasant. A classic colonial trade pattern, in which Korean agricultural
products were exchanged for Japanese manufactured goods, created adverse con
ditions that "will eventually drain all the wealth in any form from the Korean
peasants and farmers."26 In fact, as specified by Japanese government publica
tions, the Land Amelioration Project, which was formed in 1927, was intended to
increase the productivity of the Korean farms for the manifest purpose of pro
ducing more rice for Japan.
An increasing amount of land was also passing from Korean into Japanese hands,
as the avowed purpose of the Oriental Development Company was to displace Korean
peasants by Japanese immigrants. This policy was far from successful—Brunner
mentions that in the first seventeen years of Japanese occupation of Korea, only
some 10,000 Japanese farm families were actually settled there—but the fact
remains that land ownership changed from Korean to Japanese hands. While the
agricultural and residential lands actually registered under Japanese ownership
amounted to only some 6 percent, this was misleading since the lands belonging
to Japanese corporations under Korean charter were classified as Korean-owned.
According to knowledgeable assessments given by Brunner, the land actually owned
by the Japanese amounted to some 12 to 20 percent throughout Korea, with much
of this located in the more fertile South. In one county, an investigation sug
gested that 120,000 Koreans owned only some 32 percent of the assessed property
valuation, while 68 percent was owned by Japanese. Lee also suggested, without
providing figures, that the number of large Japanese landlords "is far greater
than that of Koreans."27 This change probably did not make much difference to
the peasant tenant, for in some areas where he made any distinction between
Korean or Japanese landlords, he sometimes preferred the Japanese. The latter
still demanded high rents, but it was not so necessary to ply them with those
additional gifts which Korean landlords expected periodically.
Tenancy increased during the Japanese colonial period, for this was a useful
mechanism for shipping more rice from Korea to Japan. Tenants paid as much as
50 percent, possibly as much as 60 percent of their crop each year; worse, these
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crops had to he delivered to the landlord even if he lived in the city. Ten
ants were also responsible for providing all the labor, usually all seeds and
fertilizers, taxes and irrigation charges, which brought their actual net share
down to about 20 percent of the crop.^o Some 73 percent of the tenants lacked
a written contract, and of those who possessed one, most were without the assur
ance of a fixed term. The tenant had little protection, and sanctions could
easily be applied to stifle any possible protest. In connection with the
Kwanghwa-do Treaty of I876 between Korea and Japan, a land survey had been con
ducted that showed only 1.8 percent of the peasants being landowners, of whom
many were absentee landlords who held over half the cultivable lands. Landownership improved during the first five years of the Japanese colonial regime
when of the total farm households of 2,55^,000 some 21.8 percent were landowners, another 38.8 percent were landed-tenant peasants, and 39.^ percent were
full tenants. But by 1938 the percentage of landowners declined to 19 percent,
with 55.7 percent being full tenants.29 Brunner called attention to the im
portant fact of population increase of U8 percent (or 5^ percent if measured by
households) from 1910 to 1925, which had the effect of reducing the size of the
holdings. Large landlords held over U9 acres, while medium landlords held from
12.25 to )+9 acres. The large owner-peasants might have had over 7.35 acres,
while a middle peasant would farm from 2.U5 to 7*35 acres. Small landlords were
those whose holdings were about 2.U5 acres, and the small peasants' holdings
were from less than an acre to 2.h^ acres. The number of households with these
holdings is shown by Lee from statistics of the Social .Section of the Home Bureau
of the Government-General in 1925 as follows:
Large landlords
Medium landlords
Small landlords
Smallest landlords
Large owner-cultivators
Medium owner-cultivators
Small owner-cultivators
Smallest owner-cultivators

6,866 households
22,9^^
39,^55
52,670
9^5^53
179jOl6
172,390
107,817

The part owners included the remainder of households, with distributions similar
to those of the owner-cultivators.
By far the greatest percentage of households
were, of course, tenants, and the statistics laconically provide a figure of
162,209 improverished households.30
The tax rate on land in 1922, omitting provincial and township rates, was
1.7 percent of the total assessed rural land value and 0.95 percent on urban
land.31 While this evaluation may not seem high, it has to be compared to the
income of the Korean peasant, which from 1925 to 1930 was about 1/5 yen per
person per day, a figure that was about six American cents.32 as in many other
agricultural countries, a modern system of taxation was imposed on a traditional
rural farming system to collect its pennies from the peasants. The peasants'
task, for which they were so poorly compensated, must have been arduous, for
Brunner quoted a survey conducted in Korea by John H. Reisner, the dean of the
College of Agriculture and Forestry of Nanking University, as follows:
The per-capita population per square mile of total area is approx
imately 205 persons, and the per-capita per square mile of cultivated
land is approximately 1,125. These estimates are based on government
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data and include total population. If 80 percent of the population are
farmers, then the density of the farm population would alone be approx
imately 900 persons per square mile. The soil must provide a living for
not only this dense farming population, but for an additional 225 per
sons who must get their living out of the farmers. Of course, ....
a mounting national debt pays for the time being for many of the modern
developments and improvements, but the bald fact remains that the carry
ing capacity of the soil is most heavily loaded, and, as far as one can
see from the conditions of the peasants, grossly overloaded. The rapidly
increasing population only aggravates the situation and makes a solution
of the problem more pressing and complex.33
Thus the basic question for the peasant under the conditions of Japanese oc
cupation and the economic difficulties that beset the world was whether he could
make a living from the land at all. Brunner provided some statistical assess
ment of this which concluded that in most cases he was probably not making a
living, the aggregate conclusions being as follows: "Of the owner-cultivators,
30 percent made a profit, while TO percent broke about even, showing a profit
or loss of 10 yen or less. Of the part-tenants, 95.9 percent closed the year
with a deficit. Of the full tenants, 96.9 percent failed to make ends meet."3
Many village families were therefore chronically dependent on charity. How did
rural families survive when their income so inadequately covered their expenses?
Through credit. Small amounts of money, somewhere from 60 to 300 yen, were the
typical debts of many farm families, borrowed at interest rates of anywhere from
12 to U8 percent interest annually. At 36 percent interest, peasants were un
able to extricate themselves from any debts of 100 yen or more, for these often
exceeded their annual income. Interest rates tended to decline under the Japanese,
but debts that might have been carried year after year for the interest during
the Yi dynasty were more frequently foreclosed. Likewise, cooperatives or
thrift kyes, sometimes formed in the villages, would lend at a lower rate of
Interest but only on security that the peasant could not provide. Brunner gave
an assessment of the average income and expenditures of sixty villagers in the
1920s:
Expenditures (in yen)
Receipts (Rice, sale of mats, etc.)
Food
Clothing
Interest
Fuel
Taxes
Seed, fertilizer, etc.
Church
Repairs, education,
travel
Total

120
30
30
25
15
10
8
30
268

209

Deficit 59 yen

These villagers were church members and hence in no way a representative sample,
yet Brunner suggested that they were not particularly badly off.
Thus through his taxes the peasant paid for the Japanese program of reforesta
tion, for the development of roads and ports, for some of the irrigation work,
and for subsidies to peasants and to village associations, while he benefited
minimally or not at all. The problem of surviving through the spring was tough.
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as attested to by frequent newspaper articles. For instance, Dong-A iVbo,
March 2h, 1932, described conditions in the countryside as follows:
The impoverished peasants are looking ahead to the seeding season, to
start on their beggars' march! Where will the floating exodus go?
Spring has come, every living thing is beginning to start a new life.
Yet the villagers of the peninsula are gloomy and melancholy. News re
ports from all parts of the co^antry are filled with stories of the death
and life struggles of peasant farmers. In spite of the sowing season
ahead, numberless impoverished peasants are drifting away from their vil
lages. Northern Korea is experiencing the greatest hardship the peasants
have ever encountered. The conditions are no other than a living hell.
The peasants in Bookchung county had not enough to maintain even their
bare lives since the early autumn months. They have been depending on
grass roots and tree bark for their sustenance, but even such stuffs
have now been exhausted. There is no other way for them than to go out
and beg. The number of those leaving the county has already been more
than three thousand. The rest of the inhabitants, over ten thousand,
must go away to seek a living somewhere else. Those remaining are sur
viving only by eating millet bran and legume pods. They live because
they cannot die. They are soon to start out, a roaming army, for the
maintenance of a bare existence.^5
Floods and droughts forced innumerable peasants from the countryside into other
occupations or into the cities, where they eked out meager existences, and
others migrated to Japan as workers or into Manchuria or Siberia where conditions
were sometimes better. That the conditions reported in the papers were not ex
aggerated was attested to by Governor-General Ugaki Issei, who also mentioned that
throughout the spring peasants were driven in search of roots and bark in their
effort to survive until the next harvest.36 McCune reported that those peasants
under the cruel sway of the annual spring hunger, when the diet might consist of
bark, roots, and edible weeds, probably consumed about thirty-eight calories
daily.37
To provide impetus to the modernization of agriculture, the Japanese con
ducted a land survey in 1939 which revealed that 68 percent of the paddy fields
were cultivated by full-time tenants, 52 percent of the farm families were full
time tenants, and 25.2 percent were part-time tenants. The tenancy rate was
somewhat higher in the South than in the North. The consumption of Indian mil
let increased in the 1930s, a sign of a declining standard of living for most
Koreans. McCune showed that a farm family's average amount of land was 3.6
acres, higher than the average acreage for farm families in Japan, but the
Koreans lacked subsidiary incomes. Moreover, this average was skewed by larger
holdings—some 63 percent of the Korean peasants farmed less than 2.k acres,
half less than 1.2 acres.3®
Emerging from the ineffective rule of the tottering Yi dynasty into the
modern era in which fertilizers, improved roads, and extended irrigation sys
tems were possible, the peasants were nevertheless provided an ill lesson in
the benefits of modernization. The great majority of villagers could not have
been much motivated to improve their planting techniques or to purchase the
necessary fertilizers because any effort on their part rarely led to an increase
in their well-being. Yet in spite of all the factors operating against the
countryside, there seems to have been a general increase in agricultural productivity under the Japanese, and the use of fertilizer became almost universal.
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What the peasant thought of all this and what his attitudes might have been
during this strenuous era of economic struggles has not been recorded. Per
haps it appeared to the average peasant as more of the same fate that had been
his lot whether the country was ruled by Mongols, Japanese or a Korean dynasty.
With this bleak background of historical experience, the Korean peasant entered
a new era of national Independence after World War II, perhaps bolstered by a
new feeling that the post-war world might hold in store more opportimities for
his own and his family’s development than had past centirries. Unfortunately,
new troubles lay ahead, first the division along the thirty-eighth parallel and
then the calamitous Korean war.

The Recent History of the Korean Peasant
Although peasant experiences in no other country can be identical to that in
Korea, there seem to be enough common attributes among peasants to form some
general propositions regarding their attitudes. These attributes commonly found
are summed up by Rogers as follows:
1.
2.
3.
U.
5.
6.
T.
8.
9.
10.

Mutual distrust
Lack of innovativeness
Fatalism
Low aspirational levels
Lack of deferred gratification
Limited time perspective
Familism
Dependency on authority
Localiteness (parochialism)
Lack of empathy

This list is reproduced not to illustrate what the Korean peasant is like, for
that assessment depends on the survey data to be reported, but to indicate the
general nature of the structured outlook that seems to characterize some con
temporary peasant cultures. Naturally, disagreement is possible with some of
these attributes; the notion of innovativeness is in part a function of the
time perspective, for over a period of a thousand years, many innovations have
appeared in the countryside. It is a modern attitude to see innovation as a
matter of months or a few years. But in light of the historical background
briefly recounted on the preceding pages, one might suspect peasant attributes
and attitudes in Korea to closely resemble the depressing list provided by
Rogers. As Erasmus points out in a reply to an essay by Huitzer, such attri
butes must not be regarded as a kind of "peasant character," but simply as an
underdog syndrome with many cross-cultural similarities.It was in considera
tion of a context such as this that Whitney Young of the Urban League in the
United States drew the parallel, striking to some, between the outlook within
an American urban ghetto and that in many rixral developing countries. Huitzer
puts the issue very well when he says that "the existing resistance among the
peasants can be interpreted as a resistance to minor changes within a social
system from which they have no expectations for essential betterment.It was
with such a legacy that the Korean peasant entered into the second half of the
twentieth century.
I would now like to emphasize a point that will be repeated later, for it is
important that in the study of human attitudes and behavior, the characteristics
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of the Individual must always be considered within the context of the society.
This point has been stated very well not only in recent sociological contro
versies concerning the relationship of attitudes and behavior, but by John
Dewey:
Thus Mill says in his discussion of the logic of the moral and social
sciences, "The laws of the phenomena of society are, and can be, nothing
but the laws of the actions and passions of human beings united together
in the social state. Men, however, in a state of society are still men;
their actions and passions are obedient to the laws of individuat human
nature." (J. S. Mill, Logic, Book VI, Ch. 7» Sec. l) Obviously what is
ignored in such a statement is that "the actions and passions" of indi
vidual men are in the concrete what they are, their beliefs and purposes
included, because of the social medium in which they live; that they are
influenced throughout by contemporary and transmitted culture, whether
in conformity or protest.^3
Dewey's statement can only be affirmed, and in the analyses that follow, much of
which will be concerned with individual peasant attitudes, the context in which
these attitudes exist and are engendered must always be borne in mind. It is
true that the peasant is often characterized by a low level of aspiration, but
where this is not simply the result of parasitical infection, from which much
of the rural Korean population suffers, or other physical ailments, it is most
easily attributed to the rational critique carried out by the peasant concern
ing the whole social environment in which he lives. Even more emphatically than
other analysts Joel Migdal makes the point of the social context in which peasant
attitudes are formed: "Even peasants in freeholding villages were part of the
larger society, and they sharply felt the pressures other classes generated.
Their inward-orientation can be imderstood, in great part, as an adaptive re
sponse to their relationship with these socially and spacially removed classes
which controlled the state, and to the insecurities of outside market participa
tion."^^
We will now turn to the conditions of the peasant in South Korea, with only
a few brief allusions to rural changes in the North. While it was still a tra
ditional rural society, the geography of the South was not particularly suited
to support the size of population that presently inhabits the coimtry, for only
some 20 percent of the total land area is arable. A few lush valleys, fully
cultivated, are broken frequently by hilly or mountainous areas. Often cultiva
tion continues in terraces up the sides of the more gentle slopes, and occasion
ally steeper hillsides will show eroded terraces that once were farmed but are
now, perhaps temporarily, abandoned.^5 Thus, with its geographical and climatic
limitations, Korea entered the mid-19^0s as a chiefly rural society: in 1920
some 85.5 percent of its population had lived in rural areas, a figure that de
creased only slightly to some 79.5 percent of the total population by 1955.^^
North Korea at the end of World War II accounted for only 33 percent of Korea's
food production, so that the South gained some advantage in its rural sector.
The partition left the North with about one-third of the rice paddy land and
about two-thirds of the dry field farming area.^T Overall, it could be said
that North and South Korea had insufficient agricultural resources to feed their
population,^8 although this assessment must be a relative one because, as has
been shown, exports had been enforced under Japanese colonial rule at the price
of leaving the population at the starvation level.
The improvement of agricultural productivity in the context of the
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developmental aims of "both the North and the South, was therefore imperative,
and rural problems were solved quite differently in the two sections, the South
adopting, by and large, a system of small, independent landowner agriculture,
the North, a full-scale system of collectivization.
Although the American military government moved to reduce rents to a maximum
of one-third of the annual crop in Korea, the new Korean Interim Legislative
Assembly, mostly representing landlords, was reluctant to reform rural society.
Dr. Arthur C. Bunce, a professor of agriciUtural economics at Iowa State College,
was the author of a land reform program offered by the U.S. Department of State
Economic Mission to Korea in March 19^8. The plan called for compulsory sale
of privately-owned land at a standard price of three times the value of the
annual crop, less any encumbrances on the property. Peasants could purchase
this land in accordance with priorities that had to do with the ability of fam
ilies to work the land. Peasant purchasers paid a mortgage to the National Land
Reform Administration. The former owners were compensated by negotiable bonds
issued by the Farm Loan Bank which they liquidated in fifteen annual install
ments. Inflation was buffered by tying the value of the bonds to one-fifth of
the annual crop yield. Some former landlords, of course, also purchased land
up to the maximum allowable and attempted, not always successfully, to farm
themselves. A peasant's life takes practice before one becomes inured to it.
Buyers of former Japanese holdings were limited to two chongbo (U.9 acres), and
by mid-191+8 85 percent of the 1,^+00,000 plots of land formerly held by the Jap
anese had been redistributed.
The National Assembly continued to stall on redistributing Korean-held lands,
and Cho Pong-am was dismissed from his position as Minister of Agriculture when
he attempted to speed action on a land reform that would have greatly favored
the peasants. Ultimately a more conservative bill passed the assembly, but its
abrogation brought about a conflictive special session and a new bill, promul
gated on June 22, 19^9, provided for purchase of all land not farmed by the
owner and a redistribution of holdings to three ahongbo, whether cultivated by
the owner or not. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was put in charge
of administering the law, and land committees were established at various gov
ernment levels. Now former landlords were to receive I50 percent of the average
annual production of the farmland, and the peasants were to pay 125 percent of
the same base, allowing them to purchase the land in ten annual installments of
12.5 percent of the land's produce. Yet by the end of the year redistribution
had moved slowly, and it was the Korean conflict which broke out in the follow
ing year that hastened redistribution. In effect, this thorough reform con
tinues to prevail and sets the conditions of the countryside, making rural Korea
a sphere of small. Independent peasant farmers. Overall, the bad old days of
the Yi dynasty and the colonial period were effectively replaced once and for
all, and the centuries-old tradition of landlord domination was rooted out in
the course of a decade. 1+9
After the land reform and the ravages of the war that swept over the peninsula
in the early 1950s, agricultural productivity generally improved. Rice produc
tion increased from the pre-World War II high of three million tons in 1937 to
about l+.l million metric tons in 1967 on slightly less land.50 The annual
growth rate for farming (omitting fishing and forestry) from 1959 to I969 was
3.8 percent, a quite respectable showing for a developing economy. The total
contribution to the GNP fell to 28.1+ percent because of relatively greater
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growth in the nonfarm economy, but it was still a respectable contribution.^^
The United Nations suggested that this relative decline of the agricultural
share in the GNP obscured the more fundamental fact that agricult\iral output
had in absolute terms increased by over 75 percent.52 Much of this increase
might be attributed to larger inputs into the agricultural sector and par
ticularly to the increased supplies of fertilizer by the government through the
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation.53
In spite of this performance by the agricultural sector, the peasants did
not reap the benefits to which they may have felt themselves entitled. There
was a deterioration in their terms of trade, partly because the increased pro
ductivity of agriculture did not keep pace with that of other economic sectors.
It was also apparent that productivity did not keep pace with the increase in
population which forced Korea to spend about 30 percent of its trade export
revenues on importing food. The United States provided agricultural commodities
to help meet food shortages, but this worked to the peasants' disadvantage by a
reduced demand for Korean agricultural products.5^
The capital Invested in agriculture can be roughly determined by the average
farm household's assets which in the 1970s were about 915,000 won. Figuring
some 2.5 million farm households, this represented some US $5 billion.55 on
the basis of this capital investment, however, the peasants generally just
managed to maintain themselves above the subsistence level. While the average
annual income of a farm household doubled between 1962 and 1968, it reached only
some US $753 in 1968 of which about half was in cash and about one-fifth came
from activities other than farming. This may seem a reasonable income for a
developing nation, but after deducting the costs to the peasant in seeds, fer
tilizer, pesticides, wages, irrigation charges, interest payments, and taxes,
he was left with something closer to US $100. Furthermore, this meager income
was for an entire household which averaged about six persons.56 in 1972, just
before this survey, rural household income was 83 percent of urban income but
without taking into account the larger size of a rural household. Efforts were
made to eliminate this gap by I98I. In fact, by 197^t the ratio of rural house
hold income to urban household income was lo4.7, but the ratio of income for a
rural worker to an urban counterpart was only U6.57 These figures do not, of
course, discount expenses.
The relative poverty of the peasant was partly the result of governmental
choice. The agricultural share of the national income fell from i+0 percent in
1963 to 26 percent in I969, although the latter figure might have been affected
by the bad crops of I968, and this decline outpaced the slight decrease in ag
ricultural employment.58 This share of the national income fell further to
about 20 percent by 197^.59 Also contributing to the peasant's relative poverty
was the advantage held by the industrial over the agricultural sector. While
the supply of agricultural goods remained relatively Inelastic (notwithstanding
the gradual increase in productivity noted earlier) and the demand for food re
mained price inelastic, any increase in agricultural production worked to the
peasants' immediate disadvantage. But since the supply of and the demand for
manufactured products was elastic, producers had greater control over their sup
ply and demand and could adjust production rates and prices of goods for their
benefit.80 It should also be pointed out that the nature of Korean agriculture,
namely a large number of small landholders, approached the condition of a per
fect market in which no one peasant could significantly affect the supply.
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In any case, the peasant did not operate in a free market, for the prices of
rice and foodstuffs were controlled by the government which favored the cities
over the countryside. This was generally the government's policy throughout
the 1960s, although the military government was cognizant of the need to improve
the peasants' lot. It provided agricultural credit at low interest and in
creased the available amount thirty times over the pre-196l average. It also
offered to relieve the peasants from perennial debt by taking over their highinterest loans outstanding to private lenders.Indeed, one of the slogans
of the new government had been "Agriculture First." But this did not mean that
the countryside was to be favored over the city. Citing the need for safe
guarding the full effect of currency devaluation, the president in I96U dis
continued subsidies and liberal credit policies and sought to emphasize the
development of new lands, technological improvement, and market efficiency.
The new emphasis did engender growth in the industrial sector, but it also had
the effect in the elections of reducing the president's rural support.This
certainly proved that in assessing political candidates, Korean peasants chose
q.uite rationally in terms of their economic and social interests.63
Control over the price of rice was in the hands of the government which
sought throughout the 1960s to keep the price relatively low for the benefit of
urban workers. In some ways governmental actions were beneficial to the peasant.
The institution of a buffer stock operation, which was applied to several com
modities, most notably rice, tended to stabilize the price of rice and to increase
demand slightly. The government purchased rice during the large harvests,
stored it, and released it to supplement market stocks when demand pushed the
price up later in the year.^^ While the price was controlled to the advantage
of the cities, the government did increase the rice purchase price from 19^5
through 1970 as follows:
6.2 percent increase
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This policy of higher prices for rice led to a purchase price in 1970 of US
$280 per ton which was twice the C.I.F. (cost, insurance, and freight included)
price of imports! Support prices for rice continued to increase about 9 per
cent a year through the year of the survey, although the increase was more
modest in 1973.^5 The government was still supporting peasant incomes in 1976
when it raised the purchase price of rice 19 percent.a negative effect of
this policy was to keep some 100,000 hectares of land under cultivation in rice
that might have been better suited to other crops.
Farm income in 1970 was
about 60 percent (in real terms) higher than in the preceding year. Most of
this increase was a result of the price of rice, for about half of the peasants
income (in 1970 as well as in I870) was accounted for by rice sales.6» From^
1970 a determined effort was made to stimulate agriciiltural production by main
taining more favorable prices for the peasant. Among the reasons for this were
the continuing efforts to make Korea self-sufficient in foodstuffs, efforts
dating back at least to the Nathan Plan of the 1950s.69 The government claimed
that agricultural products were the "key parameter in maintaining price stability,
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due to their dominant role in the economy." The Economic Survey 1971 also pro
vided an idea of the substantial emphasis given agriculture by the Korean gov
ernment. In 1970 the primary sector received k6 billion won in loans and
investments, albeit a 6.1 percent decrease over the preceding year. Most of
this went to the agricultural sector, with 13.6 billion won for improving ag
ricultural production, 7*9 billion won for raising agricultural productivity,
billion won for agricultural price stabilization, 1.8 billion won for flood
control, 2 billion won for workers’ self-help projects, and 1.6 billion won for
extension and experiment services.70 in 1976 the government allotted I56.5 bil
lion won in loans and investments to agriciilture and forestry, 8.2 percent above
the amount in the previous year. Twenty-six billion won in loans provided peas
ants with new farm implements, such as powered tillers and threshers.
This represented a change in government policy to one favoring agriculture
and a reemphasis on making Korea an agriculturally self-sufficient society with
in a decade. Connected with this program was a new movement initiated from
above, the Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement), which was in its first years
when the survey reported in this book was conducted. This was, of course, not
the first effort to improve the peasant’s standard of living. The Japanese had
been quite interested in increasing the productivity of the agricultural sector,
although they were little interested in the standard of living of the Korean
peasant. A Community Development Program was begun in 1958, but it was not
effective and was terminated in favor of "direct support for agricultural pro
duction. "72 During the exciting years of democratic ferment, I96O-I96I, there
was a National Construction Service which was a labor intensive reconstruction
program for the countryside. Yet despite a good deal of initial enthusiasm,
the program was not successful and faded out."^3
In North Korea the solution of agricultural problems took the Communist road
toward collectivization, a road pursued rapidly and completely after collectiv
ization was decided upon in 1953: the percentage of private peasants shrank
from 66.h in 1953 to 16.6 in 1956 \mtil it was completely eliminated on
December 1, 1959*'^^ It is quite possible, as was the case in other Communist
nations, that the collectivization program was not fully supported by all mem
bers of the regime, and Paige suggests that it might have caused conflicts lead
ing to the elimination of the opposition to some of Kim’s policies in the years
1953 to 1955Collectivization had certainly generated ample friction between
the Soviet Union and its East European allies, and agricultural policy was the
chief immediate reason for Marshal Tito’s defection from the Soviet bloc. Kim’s
pronouncement on agriculture was quite orthodox: "The final solution of the
peasant and agrarian questions is possible only when the distinctions between
town and country and the class distinctions between the working class and the
peasantry are obliterated."76
In any case, the failure of several previous community self-help programs
did not raise the peasant’s hopes when he was presented with yet another
program in the form of the Saemaul movement.
The movement accepted the
existing organization of the countryside and by no means looked to any radical
alterations there. Rather than collectivization or a move toward larger farms,
the progrm intended to rely on the small peasant. There is a good deal of evi
dence that the small peasant is potentially more efficient than a large peas
ant. 77 There is also some indication that by spreading small amounts of capital
thinly over the whole agricultioral population rather than concentrating expensive
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machinery on a few farms, agricultural productivity will increase most rapid
ly.
In fact, agricultural improvement is a most complex problem that can ill
afford to concentrate solely on the increase of farm productivity, for there is
also the need to link the countryside to the "agroindustries" that provide im
proved seeds, fertilizers, tools and machines, feed grains and pesticides, and
to the consumer industries. There is also a need to initiate small industries
in the smaller cities and market towns, allowing farm families to supplement
their incomes. Thus the Saemaul movement was coupled to many other economic
and social efforts presented in South Korea's Third Five-Year Plan. Since the
new program was to be largely one of self-help, it could be viewed as a response
to the criticism by the United Nations that "reliance placed on local autonomy
to rehabilitate the presumed dynamism of the rural society did not take into
account the fact that stagnation of rural communities could be due as much to
their dependence on a paternalistic government and on bureaucracy as to their
apathy and isolation from the external world."T’9
The Third Five-Year Plan coupled the improvement of the countryside, which
stressed village initiative, to a general approach to the economic problems of
agriculture: agricultural production was to be aided through seed improvement,
the increased use of pesticide and fertilizer, the expansion of irrigation
facilities, farmland rearrangement (for many peasants held more than one parcel
of land, and some of the parcels were far from one another), and the promotion
of farming mechanization. Some emphasis was also to be placed on the growing
of cash crops, such as tobacco, ginseng, and silkworms, raised by some one-fifth
of Korean farm households.®® All of these policies were to supplement the con
tinuing "optimum agricultural price policy," which began in the 1970s,
and
were to attain a projected growth rate in the agricultural sector of U.5 per
cent during the plan period, with rice having top priority. This was not, in
fact, an unrealistic goal, for it has been shown that even under less favorable
conditions the agricultural sector had experienced a sizable increase in pro
ductivity. The technological aspects of these agricultural improvements were
lodged in the Office of Rural Development.
There were several ways of increasing the rural standard of living, e.g.,
through decreasing production costs, decreasing the number of peasants on the
land, or increasing the price for agricultural products, but some of these so
lutions to the farm problem were not feasible. In particular, so many people
migrated to the cities in the mid-1970s that the cities were unable to employ
them, while the rural areas suffered from the loss of labor and the inevitable
transfer of rural wealth.It was hoped that increasing the rural standard of
living would reduce some of this strain on urban facilities. Meanwhile a sig
nificant milestone was passed in the 1970s. During the late 1960s the farm
popiilation had tended to stabilize at about l6 million. Then, while the eco
nomically active population in the farm sector expanded J.O percent, the
economically active population in the farm sector began to shrink. It declined
2.3 percent in 1970 when it represented 51*0 percent of the total economically
active population. Shortly thereafter the proportion of the population engaged
in farming fell below one-half. The Third Five-Year Plan looked forward to re
ducing this percentage even further.®3
Since the Saemaul movement takes us up to the time of our survey, it is use
ful to note some of the particulars of this program through the year in which^
the survey was conducted. The launching of the program was suggested by Presidenl
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Park Chung Hee in a speech to a provincial governors' conference on April 22,
1970, when he requested them to "prepare new rirral development programs which
will be attractive enough to win the interest and enthusiasm of our farmers
and fishermen, so that they may learn the wisdom to help themselves and co
operate with each other to create self-supporting communities for themselves."
This emphasis on agriculture came to be spelled out in the Third Five-Year Plan,
and the government promised to provide more support to the co\mtryside than it
had in the past. Early discussion of the impending Third Five-Year Plan spoke
of two trillion won (about US $1 billion) to be spent for various rural develop
ment programs during the Five-Year Plan, and for 1972 300 billion won was to be
set aside for the effort. The ideological crux of the program was to advance
national solidarity by eliminating the social and cultural imbalances between
urban and ruraJ. communities. Since part of the movement was unabashedly ideo
logical, the "spiritual revolution" aspect of the Saemaul movement was to be
conveyed through the Ministry of Education which would introduce pertinent
materials through all schools. Among the slogans to be promulgated were selfhelp, self-reliance and cooperation. Some 9,000 schools were initially selected
throughout the country to extend the message of the Saemaul movement and to co
operate with a designated village in their vicinity. Saemaul schools in the
summer of 1972 were to be composed of "60 percent enlightenment, 20 percent case
study, and 20 percent agricultural skills." The winter schools, however, were
to place 60 percent of their emphasis on techniques and skills. Silkworm cul
ture and the new rice, IR 667, were to be encouraged.Each class featured a
^5-minute lecture followed by a 20-minute film. Among the rallies that were
organized was that of the Federation of Future Farmers of Korea (agricultural
high school students), held in May, 1972 at Suwon where many pledged to devote
themselves to practical farming upon their graduation. About half of the book
let published for use in the peasants' winter schools, which furnished the
opportunity for this survey, was devoted to practical advice on farming and im
provement of techniques and half to "spiritual" or ideological messages.
In addition, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs devoted a portion of
the program to stressing the values of austerity, simplicity and fraternity.
While it is debatable whether the rural inhabitants needed to be reminded of the
lessons of austerity, there was some latitude for the operation of this concept
in the form of decreasing expenditures for wedding ceremonies and funeral serv
ices, which had tended to produce a competitive atmosphere and to drain the
villages financially. After the survey had been taken, these festive expenditures
were simply banned by the government in the spring of 1973, thus making official
the voluntary effort to encourage "no bouquet, no entertainment, and no mourning
dress." The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs was also concerned with the
birth control program which, to judge by the results of this survey and the
national census statistics on the birth rate, had considerable success. The
generation of news and media coverage was the task of the Ministry of Culture
and Information.
While these ministries tended to emphasize the ideological content of the
movement, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was more directly concerned
with increasing productivity and consequently village Income. Among the major
projects outlined for the movement were the following:
1. Increase in production: 8,275 metric tons of various grains, 3,3^1 metric
tons of profitable farm products, 28 metric tons of cocoons, 1,157 metric tons
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of fishery products, i+3,500 metric tons of vegetable compost, ^+7,000 head of
oxen and cows, 12 million cultivated fresh water fish.
2. Elimination of insect damage: 1,227 hectares.
3. Reclamation of arable land: 26,000 hectares.
Cultivation of low hills: 600 hectares.
5. Afforestation of "Unification Hills": 12,533 hectares.
6. Afforestation of fruit bearing trees: 7,595 hectares.
7- Repair of rivers and ponds: U,023 hectares.
8. Methane gas systems: 10,000 units.
The collective village projects recommended by the ministry included:
1. "Unification" rice: 11,885 places.
2. Cultivation of barley: 375 places.
3. Cultivation of soybean: 109 places.
it. Model villages to be mechanized: 17.
5. Training for farming equipment and tools: l6,000 persons.
6. Raising of oxen and cows: 31,000 head.
7. Fish farming: 12 million fish.
8. Methane gas systems: 6,500 places.
About half the nation's 3i+,668 villages were selected by the Ministry of Home
Affairs to undertake improvement projects in 1972. The rest were not included
because they had failed to meet accomplishment standards in the experimental
stage of the Saemaul movement, which lasted from October 1970 through May 1971.
However, U,517 of the omitted villages joined the movement voluntarily, raising
the total of Saemaul villages to 21,117 with 1,980,000 households. While there
is doubt that all these villages joined without pressure, most of them probably
did. At the same time, there were reports of coercion, and Hahm reported that
"at least, so far as a basic village is concerned, analytically and for practical
purposes alike, we cannot deny the existence of the compulsory character of the
Saemaul Movement. At the early stages of the New Community Movement, it is a
well-known fact that instructions of the government were often enforced on the
spot and lower-echelon servants were at a loss to explain the excessive force
used by the government."^5
The Home Ministry had some US $27 million in order to help villages accom
plish various tasks with additional money and labor. These projects included
construction of farming roads, expansion of village lanes, replacement of straw
roofs with tiles or slate, provision of potable water supplies, communal wells,
repair of river banks, repair of sewage systems, opening communal laundries,
methane gas systems, communal bathhouses, building of "New Community Plazas,"
planting "New Community Trees" and building collective villages which could
benefit through mechanization.
The villages that had been selected to participate in the program organized
Saemaul committees to conduct the projects selected for their villages. These
were to be guided by coordination committees formed at higher levels, such as
the myon, town, city, county and province. Such committees were composed of
local government chiefs, school and police superintendents, chiefs of farm and
fishery cooperatives, doctors, local judges, rural representatives, and volun
teers. They were to provide the general plans for regional development and to
extend administrative, technical and financial assistance to participating vil
lages. At the top of the organizational hierarchy was the General Coordination
Committee, headed by the Minister of Home Affairs and included the vice ministers
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of the Economic Planning Board, Home Affairs, Education, Agriculture and Forestry
Commerce and Industry, Construction, Health and Social Affairs, Communications,
and Culture and Information, the assistant to the Minister without Portfolio in
Charge of Economic Affairs and the chief of the Rural Development Office. This
was the controlling organization for the movement. By the end of the experi
mental period in May 1971, the government had provided i+.l billion won, or about
one third of the total funds necessary to construct some 362,970 projects through
out the nation. The villages themselves furnished the work, labor and purchase
of material necessary to complete the projects, or about 8.1 million won of mate
rials and services.
To buttress the movement with a cadre, some l6,000 leaders were graduated
from Saemaul schools in all provinces. Following a three-day orientation, each
leader returned to his assigned village. Advanced training for the program was
to be provided at a Saemaul training center at the Agricultural Cooperative Col
lege in Seoul. Persons who attended these schools were "Intellectuals, success
ful farm producers, clergymen, ex-school teachers or government officials,
village chiefs, and farm cooperative chiefs."86
Villages were divided into groups in accordance with their accomplishments
during the movement. Group A included communities with competent leaders and a
demonstration of willingness to carry out their projects. Specifically, they
were those villages that had completed more than 70 percent of the projects they
undertook, such as modernizing roofs, expanding village lanes, repairing sewage
systems, and reforestation work. Group B villages were those with potential in
the form of sound financial backing but without much evidence of enthusiasm.
Group C villages lacked both finances and enthusiasm.
This was the essence ot the Saemaul program when the government first formu
lated it. While it originated at the apex of the government hierarchy, rarely
a providential sign, and attempted to generate enthusiasm at the local level,
there was some evidence that it occasionally accomplished this purpose.87 Vil
lages, including one I studied following the national survey, did make percep
tible efforts to improve their conditions, and these accomplishments were
evident throughout the countryside in the form of dikes along the rivers, bridges
sewage improvements, improvements on village roads, and some afforestation. In
other cases there was evidence of resistance to the program. There was evidence
that the government pressure to exceed goals, which marked the initiation of the
movement, compelled peasants to adopt certain projects rather than allowing them
to make their own choice. Hahm suggests that "up until now, the Rural Community
Guidance projects have been characterized by their tendency to implement nonrelative [relevant?i educational programs without predetermining farm desire and
direction of learning spirit."88 Moreover, there was some bias in the improve
ment generated geographically; for instance, tiled roofs were certainly more
numerous along the major highway between Seoul and Pusan than back in the hinter
lands, an example of obvious governmental efforts to display improvements in
places where they would be conspicuous. Through 1973, however, when the national
survey was taken, this was the major rural event throughout Korea, and it prob
ably colored the responses of Korean peasants, raising hopes in some, and per
haps providing another example of official enthusiasm and little returns to the
peasant in others. In the short run, at any rate, there was some evidence that
the Korean government was indeed committed to a program of genuine improvement
of the countryside, provided that it did not have to drain its resources in
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order to bring this result about.

89

At the time of the survey reported here there were 18,500 so-called basic
villages (or self-preparatory villages), some lit,500 assistance villages (or
self-aid villages), and some 2,100 self-sufficient villages (or self-reliant
villages), categorizing thereby all the villages in Korea, from the least to the
most developed. The basic villages were to be aided by improving their environ
ment by opening farming roads and providing improved irrigation. Self-aid vil
lages were to work on the expansion of roads, tile roofs, reforestation, and
the improvement of river systems, for which wages would be paid. The projects
of the self-reliant villages included improved irrigation, methane gas facil
ities, the introduction of manufacturing of simple commodities, electrification,
and sanitary water supplies. Unlike North Korea, which had a head start in
electrification thanks to Japanese initiative during the colonial period, and
furnished electricity to the South until the borders were sealed, the South
still had a long way to go in providing electricity to its villages in the 1970s
when as many as 79 percent of them were still not electrified.90 To stimulate
the self-reliant villages further, the Home Affairs Ministry planned to provide
them with interest-free 200,000 won loans on a three-year repayment basis. This
money was to go to the village development committees and to be used in accord
ance with village needs.91
The Korea Herald of April 17, 1973 reported that by March 1973 56 percent of
the 223,9^+1 projects of the Saemaul movement were completed. The government's
motives in the Saemaul program were many and complex. There was definitely an
intent to narrow the gap between city and countryside and to extend more bene
fits to the villages than during the great emphasis on industry in the 1960s.
Presumably this would stimulate productivity in the countryside and alleviate
the chronic food deficit that the South had suffered. In addition, there was
also the desire to create a stronger sense of national unity and to generate
support for the government of President Park Chung Hee. The need for this was
sorely felt during and after the declaration of martial law and the formulation
of a new constitution in the fall of 1972. Moreover, there must have been an
idea of competition with the North which had its own agricultural problems and
was conducting its own efforts to resolve them. During the 196OS Kim II Sung
had declared that "the entire peasantiy should be urged to display voluntary
enthusiasm and devotion in labor, and to take part more earnestly in communal
labor in the interests of the collective and of society."92 Kim had proposed
the Chollima work-team movement in an effort to increase the productivity of his
collective farms. Naturally, leaders in the South were well-informed of the
efforts of the People's Republic. As in the South, the flow of guidance and
directions was hierarchic; party and government directives were introduced to
the farm villages through the medium of the county, the lowest party and ad
ministrative unit, "which directly guides the farm villages. 9
Some coercive measures were probably conducive to improvement in rural areas
in connection with the Saemaul program, for instance, a new law requiring medical
students after graduation to serve for one year in Saemaul rural areas under the
supervision of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. However, the general
tenor of the program through 1973 tended to emphasize the achievement of estab
lished goals, thus making the results more important than the process.9
Since
the program's success would eventually come to be measured by how much peasants
evinced voluntary motives of "self-help" and perceived their conditions as

Intvoduation

23

improving, the status of the program through 1973 was still moot, a conclusion
that will be supported by certain of the data reported in Chapter 3. While
Saemaiil symbols were given wide publicity in Korea from the initiation of the
program in 1970, symbols have a way of turning sour if unassociated with real
perceived gains.
One problem in developing initiative and self-motivation is the gradual
induction of citizens into participating in the decisions that affect
their lives. No nation has adequately solved this crucial problem, and the most
difficult transition of all is that from a history of authoritarian rule to one
of increasing democratization. This problem certainly affected the Korean peas
ant in 1972-1973, and there was evidence that the government's choices were
toward more rather than less authoritarianism. The announcement of a new con
stitution in 1972 was the most significant political event talked about through
out Korea.
The move toward increasing authoritarianism is evident in a review of provi
sions of the new constitution. A major aspect of these October Revitalizing
Reforms, as they were referred to in the Korean press, was an extensive consti
tutional revision. The former constitution stressed the separation of power
between the National Assembly and the President of the Republic. The new Yushin
constitution, however, vested predominant power with the President who, according
to Article 53, had the power to "take emergency measures which temporarily sus
pend the freedom and rights of the people prescribed in this Constitution, and
to enforce emergency measures with regard to the powers of the Executive and the
Judiciary." These measures were not made subject to judicial review. Article
59 provided the President with the power to dissolve the National Assembly,
elections to follow within thirty to sixty days. The election of the President
by secret ballot and without debate was made the prerogative of a National Con
ference for Reunification, themselves elected through direct and popular election
In addition, the Conference was to elect one-third of the National Assembly.
The rationale for these measures was given as the necessity for unity in the
face of the potential complexities of the reunification talks, which were still
showing progress in 1972. Such national unity, according to defenders of the
constitutional changes, was unlikely to result from a democracy based on a
Western tradition which was seen as unsuited to the history, the traditions, and
the international pressures experienced by Korea. Thus the Yushin constitution
was hailed by its supporters as defining a "Korean democracy" and a "nationalist!
democracy."
Chapter II of the new constitution, "Rights and Duties of Citizens," enumer
ated rights consonant with the prescriptions of John Locke and other Western
democratic political thinkers but, as in all constitutions, the reservation was
made, "except as provided by law."95 Some laws restricted these rights con
siderably, particularly because martial law was in effect during the tense months
that followed the promulgation of the constitution. Prison sentences of three
years were the sanction against certain comments critical of the new order.
These events were perceptible in the countryside in the form of suspicion and
reticence on the part of some peasants. The purposes of a stranger visiting the
villages were subject to some nervous speculation. It was obvious that 1972 and
1973 were times of uncertainty. The direction that democratic processes had
seemed to be taking earlier had received a sharp change and, some would aver, a
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setback. Critical allusions to the changes were sometimes loudly applauded at
the formal political meetings during the election campaigns for the National
Assembly in 1973. It would thus probably be accurate politically to place more
emphasis on the uncertainty of the period than on the high rate of over 90 per
cent of voter approval of the Yushin constitution. Moreover, insofar as the
Saemaul movement was perceived as related to the constitutional reforms, some
of the uncertainty about the new political order may have affected the move
ment 's impact.96

Part I

TEE NATIONAL SURVEY

Chapter 2
TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS, HYPOTHESES, AND
DESCRIPTIVE ATTRIBUTES OF KOREAN PEASANTS

Some Teohn-toaZ Points
It is unfortunate that the history of the world's cultures is written in
terms of the Great Society, with hardly an indication in some of the cultural
and historical chronicles of what was occurring in the Little Society. The
meager descriptive apparatus of the older histories, insofar as they touched on
the countryside at all, consisted mainly of such terms as "famine," "flood," and
"rebellion," or in times of relative plenty, of indifference. The Introduction
provided some historical context to the condition of the Korean peasants who
were never in authority, were forever dominated by others (and in the rare
event one of their own rose to the pinnacle of power, he no longer remained a
peasant), and had almost always been in a state of subjugation.^ In modern
and transitional societies, these conditions have not much improved and, com
pared to his urban counterpart, the peasant seemingly occupies a sort of back
water of cultural lag. Karl Marx was neither the first nor the last to point
out the reasons for the peasants' seeming lack of Impact on the culture of the
Great Society, but he did put it into a strikingly concise formulation:
The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live
in similair conditions but without entering into manifold relations with
one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another in
stead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. . . . Their field of pro
duction, the small holding, admits of no division of labour in its
cultivation, no application of science and, therefore, no diversity of
development, no variety of talent, no wealth of social relationships.
Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient; it itself
directly produces the major part of its consumption and thus acquires its
means of life more through exchange with nature than in intercourse with
society. A small holding, a peasant and his family; alongside them an
other small holding, another peasant and another family. A few score of
these make up a village, and a few score of villages make up a Department.
In this way, the great mass of the French nation is formed by simple ad
dition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of
potatoes. In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions
of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their
culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposi
tion to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a
local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity
of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political
organization among them, they do not form a class. They are consequently
incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name.^
2
The peasant, then, constitutes a group that Dahrendorf calls a quasi-class, a
large group of persons in a common situation who have not yet arrived at a form
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of organization that can break down the communications harriers that still exist
in the countryside, in spite of modern communication systems and the emphasis,
in such countries as Korea, on roads. Peasant interests generally remain latent
interests because organization that would raise them to the level of manifest
interests is difficult to form.^ This is a social and historical condition that
makes the peasant the underdog par excellence. Throughout the history of all
traditional societies it has been the peasant who has provided the resources
necessary for the political and social system. So vital to the continuing exist
ence of society and yet so removed from the accoutrements of the Great Culture,
the peasant, when the light of literature or poetry occasionally illuminates his
life for us, is often treated as a member of another race, scarcely human,
scarcely to be distinguished from the oxen which he might be fortunate enough to
own to plow his fields. While the percentage of peasants initially possessing
above-average Intelligence must have been as great as that of any other social
group, lack of schooling, constant manual labor, and the process of social con
ditioning certainly have made this appear otherwise.5 On rare occasions only,
such as in the Chinese classic Shui-hu chuan (Water Margin) and the unique English
poem by John Lackland, Piers Plowman, does the peasant appear in a more favorable
context.
This study attempts to cast some light upon the contemporary status, conditions
and attitudes of the Korean peasant, mainly by describing peasant values and at
titudes obtained from a national sample of responses to a questionnaire. Since
this study deals with a single period it lacks a certain dynamism that would have
resulted from several studies over a larger period of time. The nation is in a
state of rapid change. Traditional culture and economy are being very quickly
replaced and more and more evidences of a modern industrial society are dotting
the countryside as well as the cities, making Korea a transitional rather than
a traditional society. This process is not a phenomenon since World War II but
dates back to the period of Japanese colonialism, particularly in the North.
Abutting the fields of ageless villages, many with traditional thatched roofs,
may be large, technologically modern factories. Most of the factories are at
the fringes of urban conglomerations, but others rise like islands from the midst
of an enveloping sea of rice paddles.
In addition to this descriptive purpose, however, analysis will be devoted to
the problem of hypothesis testing. The status of this hypothesis testing must
be clearly understood. The analysis covers only one "slice of time" because
there is little or no comparable information from the past, and many parameters
that affect rural attitudes must therefore be considered as constant. This means
that a hypothesis, such as that persons with a predisposition to change as evi
denced by certain attitudes also exhibit innovative behavior as indicated by the
planting of new rice strains, may or may not be supported. If the hypothesis is
supported, a clue to innovative behavior is provided; if it is not supported,
however, it would be incorrect to conclude that attitudes do not contribute to
modernizing behavior. While the conclusion is warranted that such attitudes ap
parently do not contribute to modernizing behavior at present, it may also be
that they do not make a contribution because of social Institutions over which
the peasant has no control. Later studies might in fact show that the hypothesis
has been supported, provided that the peasant could anticipate an improvement in
his standard of living as a result of his modernizing behavior. There is ample
support for the sensitivity of peasants to economic conditions.° Since urban
society and government control many of these economic factors, we can at best
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test hypotheses against that economist's backdrop of "all other things being
equal." It would be well to reconsider John Dewey's statement, quoted in the
Introduction, to remind ourselves that human attitudes, although ultimately the
attitudes of individuals, are nonetheless the products of the society in which
they arise. Under different circumstances, different conjunctions of attitudes
may well arise. There is certainly more than a grain of truth in the viewpoint
of some economists that it is the anticipated rewards that motivate the peas
antry much more than it is the individual attitudes of the peasant, whatever
these may be."?^ While it would be well not to exaggerate this proposition, it
must always be borne in mind when faced with some of the negative findings that
occur not infrequently in connection with the seemingly most obvious hypotheses.
To some degree it will be possible to draw some comparative material from so
cieties either somewhat farther ahead than Korea on the road to economic develop
ment or from those somewhat farther behind. But there are imposing problems
here, too, for the variables that relate to one culture may not be the important
variables relating to the Korean condition, and the questionnaire used in this
study has not been applied, with the exception of some portions of it, to peas
ants in other societies. Thus in the hypothesis-testing portions of the analysis
there is also an element of the strictly descriptive.
This leads to another methodological question concerning the choice of a
questionnaire survey technique as against several other methods, some of them
quite different. In some countries the use of a questionnaire consisting of
closed responses would not be advisable because illiteracy would have precluded
the administration of such an instrument without numerous interviewers. In
Korea, on the other hand, the literacy rate is high, and only among older per
sons, especially women, is illiteracy a problem. About 95 percent of the popu
lation of Korea is literate, and while that does not mean that everyone regarded
as literate is capable of reading and comprehending the daily paper, it does
make it possible to use questionnaires. These questionnaires were at about the
same level of difficulty as the booklets written for peasants by the Ministry of
Education. They were, moreover, administered under conditions in which problems
could be discussed and explained.^ In other societies it would have undoubtedly
been better to conduct personal interviews, using open-ended responses that could
be recorded and coded later, but this technique has other inherent difficulties.
Another chief methodological alternative is that used by the anthropologists,
and a number of fine contributions to the understanding of Korean peasants have
been made by anthropologists such as Brandt^ and Osgood.Living in a village
and conducting daily research into the detailed interactions and behavior of
villagers is of unquestioned value, and I have great admiration for the scientific
acumen and the diligence of those who conduct research in this fashion. There is
little doubt that the findings of these investigations are of great value, but
their major shortcoming is the risk involved in generalizing peasant behavior in
one village to other villages or regions. For example, Brandt conducted his
research in a Korean fishing village and, while rice ms also grown by the vil
lagers, there is a possibility that fishing villages might differ in some respects
from predominantly rice-growing villages. Osgood's study may have been conducted
in a village and at a time (shortly after World War II) in some ways unusual.
Therefore the questionnaire technique, with its shortcomings such as the closed
nature of the responses and the formal atmosphere engendered by the process of
answering questions presented in a "document," is not an alternative but rather
a supplement to the anthropological technique of village studies. Rather than
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advocating a replacement of these valuable investigations, I would recommend
that more of them be conducted, particularly in this crucial period of Korean
history.
At this point the critical reader is likely to respond, "if there are so many
weaknesses in the methodology of the study, why bother with it?" The reported
substance of the results themselves will have to serve as the chief answer to
this query, but it is advisable at all times to be aware of the shortcomings of
our study and the methods it employs. To emphasize these is not to suggest that
the study is thereby rendered nugatory, but to put the reader on his guard
against placing undue faith in results reported quantitatively. All human ob
servations are plagued by Inaccuracies, as the good Bishop Berkeley proved
through impeccable logic two centuries ago.
The choice of methodology is also constrained by problems of time and costs
that are faced by all researchers. The opportunity for a national survey oc
curred while I was a lecturer at Yonsei University in Seoul. The Saemaul move
ment was in its first stages, and the price support for agricultural products
had been rising for some years. In 1972 the President of the Republic of Korea
proclaimed a new constitution (the Yushin Constitution) which had been in prepar
ation for some time, and to preclude the possibility of protest demonstrations
in the universities, these were closed through much of the remainder of the fall
term. The so-called revitalization {yushin) program was combined with the Saemaul
movement, and it was at this point that the opportunity to conduct a rather largescale peasant survey came about.
The Ministry of Education had planned to use the schools, closed during the
mid-year academic break in January, for the purpose of promulgating the Saemaul
movement at rural winter schools throughout Korea, and this was the administra
tive apparatus that made possible the nationwide distribution of questionnaires.
The questionnaires, some 2,000 of them, were distributed in a "random" way to
these winter schools throughout Korea through the facilities of the Ministry of
section in this chapter on peasant attributes will make clear
Education.il
how widely representative the responses were. This method of distribution af
forded the additional advantage that each school was in the charge of a leader
whose level of literacy was as high as or higher than that of the peasants who
attended these schools, who would be able to explain the requisite directions if
the need arose or interpret a question that might be ambiguous to the respondents.
The questionnaire, in the original. English, and the instructions provided to the
Saemaul winter-school leaders are included in Appendix A.
Although the respondents in this study are not a true random probability
sample of Korean peasants, the winter schools seemed to offer a representative
group, since the schools were aimed at the largest possible proportion of peasants
and not at any select group, such as village chiefs. Some 2.5 million peasants
attended these schools during the course of the winter making it possible for all
heads of household to attend, presumably on a voluntary basis. Since a true ran
dom sample would have been prohibitively expensive to obtain, the best available
alternative to the method of distribution used here would probably have been a
cluster sampling of my'6ns, villages within myons, and random individuals within
the selected villages, an alternative that would also have required substantially
more resources than were available.
While I am convinced that a true random sample would not differ in important
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ways from the respondents reported here, there is no way to support this convic
tion in terms of prohahility. Therefore, the statistics, used to assess the
significance, or lack of it, of the findings reported in their applicability to
a population, are not in a technical sense appropriate.^2 Given the problems
of cost, time, and situation, the most appropriate research method seemed to be
the questionnaire method selected, and the most appropriate means of distribution
appeared to be the opportunity offered by the administrative apparatus estab
lished by the Ministry of Education. One thousand four hundred thirty completed
questionnaires were obtained from winter schools throughout Korea. There is some
reason to believe the respondents are fairly comparable to a random sample of
peasants from the population. In terms of amount of land owned, religion, and
several other attributes, these l,i+30 respondents seem comparable to national
averages. For this reason, statistics sometimes have been used as though the
respondents represented a true random sample of the population, and these sta
tistics will be interpreted with caution. They should be regarded as illustra
tive. It may be generally assumed that where relationships exist between
attributes, that these relationships may also exist, with a degree of error, in
the population of Korean peasants as a whole.
The construction of the questionnaire posed many problems. Surveys have in
deed been conducted along the same lines in other countries, but nothing com
parable to the questionnaire devised for this study has been developed for use
in rural Korea. There was therefore the problem of selecting apt questions for
Inclusion in the study and the very difficult task of translating these, since
most of them had been devised for use in other cultures. In a few cases,
questions had to be omitted when a smooth Korean translation could not be de
vised.
Among the innumerable decisions made in the translation was the appro
priate form of "I." We opted for the Korean tj- , indicating social equality
between speaker and hearer.Since there were many sources for the questions
finally selected for inclusion, citation to these will be made in the course of
the discussion of the hypotheses. A questionnaire is, of course, an instrument
containing a large number of questions, selected on the basis of their contri
bution to hypotheses. A single question will occasionally be designated to
stand for a concept of importance in testing these hypotheses, but more often
and more adequately several questions will be selected to assess the pertinent
concepts. The concepts involved in the hypotheses presented will therefore be
discussed in terms of the clusters of questions that were selected to represent
them.15

Concepts

Table 2.1 presents the concepts that were to be represented by the items on
the questionnaire. The complete questions are presented in Appendix A. Some
comments should be made, however, on some of the questions and their related
concepts. The question on religion drew the greatest number of "no responses,"
which probably reflects the complex nature of religion in Korea rather than a
real reluctance to respond. The query on the president of Korea, in the concept
"political knowledge," ought to have been replaced with another national figure,
for although villagers may have been out of contact with events in the capital
in earlier years of the century, almost no peasant was so parochial as to be
unable to recall the name of President Park Chung Hee.
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There are two questions concerning health which called for a personal assess
ment. It would have been desirable to verify these subjective assessments with
an actual physical examination that would have also benefited the peasants.
Table 2.1
A Conceptual Key to the Questions in the National
Korean Peasant Survey Questionnaire
A. Demographic Background Questions
SEX
(I-1)'‘
SIZERES
(1-2)
AGE
(1-3)
EDUCATE
(l-lt)
MARITAL
(1-5)
CHILDGIRL
(1-6)
CHILDBOY
(1-6)
CHILDTOT
(1-6)
RELIGION
(1-7)
MILITARY
(1-9)
DURRES
(I-IO)
B. Economic Questions
WETLAND, DRYLAND
PARCELS
DISPAR
OTHERINC
HIRE
ROOF
OTHRWORK
OX
DEBT
DEBTINC

(l-ll+)
(I-IT)
(1-18)
(1-19)
(III-I)
(III-7)
Ull-ll)
(III-12)
(Ill-llt)
(III-15)

C. Contact with Urban Environment
TOWNLIVE
(l-ll)
DURTOWN
(1-12)
TWNVISIT
(1-13)
D. Contact with Communications Media
(l-2i|)
NEWSPAPR
(1-25)
RADIO
(1-26)
AGLISTEN
(I-2T)
MOVIE
(1-30)
PAMPHLET
(l-i+1)
NATIONAL
(l-i+2)
INTNATON
E.

.itical Knowledge
AMERPRES
PREMJAP
PRESKOR

(1-43)
(1-44)
(1-45)

Concern with Farm Problems
(1-28)
DISCUSS
(1-29)
MEETING
(I-3U)
CONCERN
(1-35)
PROBDISC
Membership and Service in Organizations and Government
(1-22)
OFFICIAL
(1-23)
DECISION
(1-31)
FOURH
(1-32)
MEMBER
(1-33)
POSITION
Health
ENERGY
SICK

(1-20)
(1-21)

Influence
INFLUNCE
MOREINFL

(1-39)
(l-l+O)

Questions concerning
SAESCHL
LRNSAE
SAEPSYC
SAEENVR
SAEPUBUT
SAEFARM
SAEMNGMT

Saemaiil
(III-21)
(III-22)
(III-23)
(III-21+)
(lH-25)
(111-26)
(III-2T)

Attitude Toward Farming
(Il-l)
FAEMDRDG
(II-2)
FARMSTNG
(II-8)
WORRY
(II-9)
STANDING
(n-15)
ENJOY
(II-16)
DEPRIVED
(11-22)
DISADVTG
(n-23)
MOVECITY
(11-29)
LESSEE
(11-26)
UNINTST
(lI-i+3)
BESTPLCE

'^The Roman numeral shows the section of the questionnaire, the Arabic numeral
the niimber of the item in that section.
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Table 2.1—Continued
MEETPEOP
FAEMRING
AGSCHOOL

(II-b9)
(H-55)
(III-8)

L. Propensity to Change
(II-3)
RELLYWOR
(II-IO)
CHANGE
(11-33)
LERNWORK
(H-39)
CONTENT
(11-35)
BRTHCONT
(11-46)
PLANS
M. Trust
FRNDADVT
VILADVN
HONEST
INGRAT
TRUSTKNO
PUTOWN
N. Personal Efficacy
LUCK
HELPLESS
ABLE
ADVANCE
CANTINFL
INFGOV
CITYCOLD
PROTECT
EXPRESS
DONTCARE
PLANS
EDENJOY
COMPLEX
O. Village Morale
VILPEACE
POLITE
VILADVN
MOVECITY
VILCOOP
KNOWALL
ATHOME
VILCRIT
LACKLEAD
VILLOOK

(II-4)
(11-20)

(11-51)
(II-5T)
(II-61)
Ul-64)*

(H-5)
(11-17)
(II-18)

(11-19)
(11-24)

(H-31)
(II-3T)
(11-38)
(II-40)

(11-45)
(11-46)
(II-4t)
(11-52)
(II-6)
(11-13)
(11-20)
(11-23)

(II-2T)
(11-30)
(11-34)
(II-41)
(11-59)
(11-63)

P. Cooperativeness
CONCERN
PROBDISC
IMPROVE
DONATE
PASTDNTE
SHUNCOOP
PROMOTE
WHOLECOM
MINDBUS
PUTOWN
CARES
Q. Personal Morale
PROUD
FAILURE
RESPECT
EXPRESS
GOODLUCK
HELPLESS
ABLE
FINDFRND

(1-34)

(1-35)
(1-36)

(I-3T)
(1-38)
(II-7)

(lI-4o)
(11-54)
(II-60)
(11-64)
(11-12)
(ll-ll)

(11-25)
(11-32)
(II-40)
(n-58)
(11-17)
(II-18)
(11-62)

R. Isolation, or Alienation
(11-12)
CARES
(11-23)
MOVECITY
(11-37)
CITYCOLD
(II-40)
EXPRESS
(11-48)
PROMOTE
(II-60)
MINDBUS
S. Authoritarianism
DISAGREE
WIFEOBEY
RESPAUTH
LEADRARE
LEADFIND
LEADSHAR
TOOEDUC
FAMCNTRL
T. Future Orientation
EXPECT
FAILURE
LUCK
HELPLESS
PLANS

(II-14)
(11-21)
(11-28)

(11-44)
(11-50)
(11-65)
(H-53)
(11-66)
(11-26)

(H-25)
(n-5)
(11-17)

(11-46)

*k printing error omitted response categories for this item, which was dropped
from the analysis.
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Table 2.1—Continued
Familism/Traditionalism
(11-35)
BRTHCONT
UI-42)
FAMILY
(II-14)
DISAGREE
(11-21)
WIFEOBEY
(11-28)
RESPAUTH
MUDANG
(in-9)
(III-18)
LASTNAME
Attitude toward Government
(11-1+5)
DONTCARE
(11-31)
INFGOV
(11-28)
PROTECT
(II-21+)
CANTINF
(H-52)
COMPLEX

W. Dependent Variables,
tions and Output
YIELD
YIELDING
WEED
INSCTCID
UREA, PHOSPHT,
and CALCCYN
COMCROP
THRESHER
PLOW
TONGIL
TONGILYR

Innova(1-16)
(III-IO)
(III-2)
(III-3)
(III-4)

(in-5)
(III-6)
(III-13)
(III-16)
(III-17)

Korea, like most rural communities of the world, is beset by many parasitical in
fections, some of which cannot but affect the attitudes and outlook of peasants.
For instance, liver and lung flukes infest most of the rivers and streams of
Korea, and some 60 percent of the school children in the area of one reservoir
were found in 1973 to be infected. In the past it had been shown that infesta
tion with hookworm, as in the American South, was responsible for the "lack of
ambition" among many peasants, and it is surprising that little attention has
been paid to this causal relationship.!^
Among the questions under the concept of familism or traditionalism is one
asking if the respondent calls upon a mudang when there is illness in the family.
It might be objected that this question is paternalistic, and there was some
discussion as to whether to include it. While there was no intention to ridi
cule practices such as the mudang kut, a shamanistic ritual to drive out sick
ness, some respondents might have been hesitant to answer this question frankly.
I might add here parenthetically that the mudang kut is conceivably superior to
a few Western medical practices I have come into contact with. As usually hap
pens in a survey, it became evident after the survey was complete that another
response choice on medical advice would have been more appropriate, since many
peasants treat themselves by applying to the town pharmacist.!T
Part II of the questionnaire consisted of sixty-six attitudinal questions,
with responses based on three distinctions: agree, uncertain, and disagree.
Experience in other cultural levels suggested that these distinctions were suf
ficient, and in the rural milieu to have extended the number of categories to
the seven of the typical Likert scale (strongly agree, agree, slightly agree,
and so forth) would have been of doubtful utility.!^ Table 2.1 shows that the
concepts tapped by these attitudinal questions included attitude toward farming,
propensity to change, trust, personal efficacy, village morale, cooperativeness,
personal morale,isolation (or alienation), authoritarianism, future orienta
tion, familism (or traditionalism), and attitude toward government. Some over
lap will be noted, with a single question appearing under two or more concepts.
It would be expected that personal morale must have some affinity to the concept
of alienation, and traditionalism certainly implies something about the propen
sity to change. This, however, is no disadvantage given the multivariate approach
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adopted for the analysis of the questionnaire, namely, factor analysis, through
which innumerahle variables can enter a single analysis. It would certainly be
nuch more disadvantageous to select single questions to stand for concepts be
cause then there would be no way to check an item's validity by comparing its
relationships with other cognate items. In survey research there is a tension
between the length and the comprehensiveness of a questionnaire. On the one
hand, the questionnaire should be short enough so that respondents do not find the
instrument a tiring experienceon the other hand, it should be comprehensive
enough to allow the researcher an optimum number of attributes in adequate depth.
Our questionnaire was an effort to balance these somewhat incompatible aims.
While attitudes could be designated, according to hypotheses to be^presented
shortly, as either dependent or independent variables (as "cause" or "effect")
in the problem of agricultural Innovation and modernity, most of them were con
sidered independent variables, predicting to innovative behavior of various kinds,
as will be explained in more detail. The two most important dependent variables
in this study were those Indicating the peasants' reports on yield and increase
in yield. Other kinds of personal farming innovations were also listed under
this heading (see Table 2.1, W) as were those showing a concern with village im
provements and the desire to cooperate (see Table 2.1, P).

Hypotheses

The hypotheses that formed the basis for the questionnaire and the concepts
it contained were drawn from a vast literature, and some concepts with their
associated hypotheses replicated research that had been conducted in rural areas
in other parts of the world. Much has already been written on modernization or
innovation, and some of it reports on surveys such as this one. Many of these
other surveys, however, have been carried out in areas where the socioeconomic
conditions are not so far along the path to industrialization as those in Korea
where only half^ or slightly less, of the economically employed population is
engaged in agriculture. Korea is in a unique stage of transition, and it is
debatable whether this might have the effect of increasing the number of "innova
tive" responses and peasant morale or the opposite effect of demoralizing the
peasants who sense that the stream of change is leaving them far behind and
making them a residue of tradition, as it were, ultimately dispensable for the
future of their country. Some of the concepts, particularly that pertaining to
attitudes toward farming, have not been widely used in research of this natiire.
In the following pages the major hypotheses and some of the support for these
will be set forth.
There are two main types of dependent variables of interest in this research.
One set quite obviously consists of innovative farming techniques. Questions of
this type include those in Table 2.1, W, Innovation. In a sense, the questions
about yield and increase in yield are the most interesting, because while the^
others are indicative of innovative behavior, the ultimate test of the effective
ness of innovation must lie in the yields obtained by the peasants. Thus it
does not follow that adoption of various innovations necessarily leads to an
increase in crop yields, althouth this presumably is the goal of innovation.^ It
is the yield and the increase of that yield (in terms of the peasants' perceived
profits) which provide the necessary social reinforcement for Innovative behavior.
The chain of events would be the causal attributes and attitudes that lead
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peasants to adopt innovations, the innovations leading to an increase in output,
and the rewards of an increased output that reinforce the causal attitudes and
attributes. The last link in this chain is the "feedback" of the systems analyst
It is easy to see that the weak link in this chain has been the social reinforce
ment of innovative behavior. Through the manipulation of prices, governments
have often insured that the rewards for innovative behavior will be meager,
therefore making it irrational for peasants to innovate.
A second set of dependent variables is concerned with the peasants’ willing
ness to participate in village Improvement projects, one of the major aspects of
the Saemaul movement intended to improve the quality of village life. The ques
tions intended to assess actual cooperativeness among peasants are those from
Part I of the questionnaire, listed in Table 2.1, P. While villages could
possibly be developed and the quality of life improved through coercive measures,
the literature of development amply attests to the failures of community develop
ment efforts that have not enlisted the voluntary support of villagers. With
out such support a community movement can be adjudged a failure, for when coer
cion is removed, such projects generally fall into disrepair and the commiinity
development program ceases to have any import. While some tangible improvements
probably resulted from the brief enthusiasm of the rural development programs of
1958 and the democratic interlude of I961, these efforts ultimately failed be
cause they never succeeded in providing continuity through enduring village co
operation. Thus the relationship of villagers’ attributes and attitudes toward
village cooperativeness will be assessed in some of the proposed hypotheses.21
It will be seen that we use Rogers’ definition of innovativeness. In order
to be considered an innovator, a peasant need not invent or be the first in his
village to introduce a practice but only that he had adopted a practice regarded
as progressive. Modernization is both the sum of the innovative practices and
techniques adopted by the peasant as well as his progressive attitudes. Modern
ization in outlook is associated with attitudes commonly accepted as progressive
by urban Industrial societies; the acceptance of birth control might be an ex
ample. While it should be stressed that we have no intention of valuing the
modern outlook over the traditional one, the hypotheses generally suggest that
modernization and innovation may lead to higher outputs and more positive out
looks overall. This result may or may not be supported. Like Rogers, I regard
modernization as a complex phenomenon, not as a single dimension and certainly
not as a single variable, and the technique of factor analysis used in Chapters
3 and 5 is admirably well suited to the recognition of the complexity of these
data. Of course there may be several possible social conditions in which tra
ditionalism may be warranted as being rational and perceived by the peasants
as rewarding.
Let us now spell out the hypotheses used in our study.
(1) Age is positively associated with personal innovativeness. Except Insofar
as the Saemaul movement has penetrated the countryside, age is not associated
with village cooperativeness. Cooperativeness is a traditional rural pattern,
but the young might be influenced by the Saemaul movement to emphasize this trait
One would expect age to be positively associated with propensity to change, nega
tively associated with traditionalism. One would generally expect age to be
related to an increase in conservatism and a growing tendency to cling to tra
ditions, a relationship that has frequently been found in voting studies. Rogers
points out that in more modern villages, the leaders are often somewhat younger
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than their followers, while in traditional villages they are usually older.
Galtung goes so far as to state emphatically that no meas\ire of modernization
can he valid that does not correlate positively with age.23 There is reason
to be more reserved than this, however, because if it is accepted that peasants
will rationally innovate provided they receive adequate rewards, then factors
other than age may be more important in generating innovative behavior.
(2) Education is positively associated with personal innovativeness in be
havior and attitudes. This seems to be the generally reported association in
a number of studies, although for at least one chief reason this relationship
in a rural context may be moot. As Galtung says, "it is not education as such,
but what is taught that counts.In Korea as well as in most presently de
veloping societies, schools teach a curriculum that is divorced in every pos
sible way from the problems of agriculture. While this phenomenon is widespread,
it may be particularly marked in Korea where the Confucian tradition has for
centuries geared education to the aim of attaining mandarinal status in the gov
ernment bureaucracy. The contemporary peasant may still regard education in this
light, and to determine this several attltudinal questions relate to the issue
of whether education is desirable for peasants. Thus, while the hypothesis will
be tested as stated, there is some reason to suspect that it may stand in no par
ticular relationship, either positively or negatively to farm innovativeness,
because the educational system is divorced from peasant Interests and oriented
to urban concerns. In all countries it is an urban elite that dominates the cur
riculum and the ends of the educational process. It is interesting to note that
education seems to be a source of egress from farm life, according to statistics
of educational attainment and employment, as shown in Table 2.2. Although peas
ants are to be found at all levels of educational attainment, most are to be
found at the lowest levels.
(3) Protestantism and Catholicism are associated with personal innovativeness
in behavior and attitudes, but there is no relationship between religion and co
operativeness. This hypothesis is based on the principle that a change in re
ligion from those associated with Korean tradition, such as Confucianism and
Buddhism, marks an individual with a propensity to change in other ways. Such
an individual tends to be more receptive to changes in other role areas of his
life. This is not to say that Buddhism is necessarily a conservative force, for
Buddhists have been reinterpreting their role in social and political develop-^
ment since World War II and some have adopted modern and reform-oriented positions
Many precepts of Korean Won Buddhism, a reform movement of
century, stress
"a life of reliance on self-ability" and "public interest." ^ But in a general
sense, and in the special case of Korea, it is expected that a change to a Western
religion may well imply a desire to change to a Western concept of progress.
Among the Korean elite, at least since the end of the nineteenth century and even
prior to that, the pronouncement that one had accepted the ideas of progress and
science has sometimes been symbolized by adopting a Western religion. The motiva
tions leading to contacts with missionaries, and the frustrations involved in
these cultural contacts, are poignantly presented in Younghill Kang's autobiograph
ical classic. The Grass Roof. By becoming a Christian, one seemed to renounce the
stagnation of Korean society and the conservatism of its regime, and some indi
viduals probably also hoped that the spread of new religions throughout Korea^
would bring a new spirit of reform. There is little doubt that the missionaries
stimulated this belief and in some instances acted to introduce innovation.^ For
example, the raising of potatoes, a new crop in Korea, had originally been intro
duced by Korean Christians, who in the face of persecution fled into the mountains
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¥here the potato rather than rice hecame their sustenance.
Missionaries were
also influential in extending education to women and founded the first education
al institutions for girls at the end of the nineteenth century.
(U) Military service is positively associated with personal innovativeness
and cooperativeness. Among Korean social institutions, the militaiy unquestion
ably harbors many of the attitudes associated with reform and innovation. Gen
eral arguments have been advanced that military regimes may often be more oriented
toward progress than civilian regimes, but there is some reason to believe that
military regimes, whatever their original motivations might have been, are no
more successful in accomplishing economic development than other regimes faced
with the same problems. While there is no need to debate this controversial
issue here, it is possible that service in the armed forces has expanded the
Korean peasant's outlook beyond what it would have been had he remained in his
village. The recruit, however unmechanized his home village might have been, is
inevitably confronted with a technically impressive array of weapons and machines,
and he learns at least something of their potentialities. His service also takes
him to other parts of the peninsula, and with the expansion of his geographical
horizons, his social and cultural horizons are probably widened too. This hy
pothesis assumes that cooperation needed to carry out military functions is
transferred into civilian life, making it more likely that those who served in
the military are also among those who participate willingly in village projects.
(5) Contact with urban environments is positively associated with personal
innovativeness. It does not affect cooperativeness, or it may even decrease the
propensity to cooperate. Like in the case of the military, although perhaps to
a lesser degree, a relationship with a more urban life ought to inculcate atti
tudes and behaviors directed toward change and innovation. Rogers, citing several
studies, uses "number of trips to an urban center" as his measure of cosmopolitan
ism.^"^ There is also some evidence, although much of this is impressionistic,
that it is the more progressive individuals who leave the farm for the city,
hence causing a drain of leadership capabilities.
(6) The amount of land farmed is positively associated with innovativeness and
yield per majigi. The number of parcels farmed is negatively related to
yield and innovativeness. These hypotheses are argued from the position that the
larger the farm, the more likely a peasant is able to introduce innovations and
the more he attends to his business of farming. One of the problems encountered
in the Korean countryside is that land is sometimes divided into several parcels,
so that a peasant might have to spend a good deal of his day's labor in traveling
from one plot to another. The traditional rationale for this land division is
that it allows more villagers to farm some good land. A peasant might have sev
eral parcels of particularly fertile land and one or two that are less desirable. ^
While no one is completely satisfied, no peasant is entirely dissatisfied either.
There is also a likelihood that while the maximum limit on riceland is not high,
larger farms may indicate a wealthier peasant. Because, as Rogers argues, of
ficials who advocate change tend to interact with wealthier clients, it may be
the richer peasants who tend to adopt innovations most rapidly.30 jt should be
understood, however, that unlike the rural situation in some other developing
nations, the Korean countryside is relatively homogeneous. Extreme wealth and
poverty are not as evident in the country as before the land reform.
(7) The status of a peasant's health is positively associated with innovative
ness and cooperativeness. This hypothesis is self-evident; it is unlikely that
one plans for change and the future in a condition of sickness or lack of phys
ical energy.31
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(8) Increasing contact with the media fosters innovativeness and cooperative
behavior. This hypothesis has been researched on many occasions, and the result
seems borne out that the more media contact, the more an individual becomes pro
gressive. However, there are different forms of media contact. Rogers states
that illiterates may listen mainly to music and entertainment while literate
listeners are mostly interested in news and infonnation.32 To check this aspect
of the hypothesis, questions about interest in national and international affairs
were added to the questionnaire. The frequency of listening to agricultural
programs was also ascertained because the Saemaul movement, a matter of current
Interest in 1973, was then being propagated through the media. While the hy
pothesis is intended to be general, the questions also focused on contact with
media having specific reference to agriculture; thus it was not how many movies
an individual attended, but how many government movies or slide presentations on
agriculture the peasant viewed.
(9) Memberships, meetings, and official positions tend to make individuals
progressive, innovative, and more cooperative. Of particular interest here were
the U-H clubs which were very popular in the Korean countryside after their intro
duction in the 1950s. Chung mentions 18,8tU clubs throughout Korea by the end of
1962, with a sizable membership of 5^8,695-^^
(10) Influence and the desire for more influence makes an individual more
likely to participate in village cooperation and be more innovative. These attri
butes would seem to relate to self-esteem and leadership, or a desire for more
leading roles.
(11) Positive attitudes toward farming are positively associated with a desire
for village cooperation and personal innovativeness.
This is posited as a
crucial independent concept, for if persons have education, interest in the media,
and good land but lack the motivation for channeling their personal energies
into farming as their occupation, they possess little motivation for innovation.
In a certain sense, the attitude toward farming represents occupational morale,
and if this is lacking, progressive innovations can hardly be anticipated.3^+ It
is also possible that given certain other attributes, such as education and ample
land, attitudes toward farming may be a critical intervening factor predicting
to the dependent concepts of farm yields. Peasant attitudes toward farming have
not often been explicitly researched as a factor in modernization. The questions
that were used to elicit these attitudes were derived from a scale developed by
A. M. Myster.35 This scale was intended to measure attitudes toward farming both
as a vocation and as a way of life, but the two separate aspects of the scale
proved to be highly Intercorrelated. On the whole, the f\ill scale from which
some of these questions were drawn has acceptable reliability and evidence of
validity. The results of the analysis corroborated Myster's results; among all
the scales and attitude sets used in the research, the attitude-toward-farming
questions were the most reliable, clustering on a single dimension or factor.
Another question was asked regarding whether one would rather have his sons attend
an agricultural or another kind of high school. This question not only seems to
elicit attitudes about farming but also expectations about the future viability
of the occupation: Would you want to commit your childrens' future to farming?3
This is a critical question for a peasant who perceives alternatives.
(12) Propensity to change is positively related to innovative behavior and
cooperativeness. This hypothesis suggests that attitudes affect behavior, a
proposition that is not undebatable. Besides, as mentioned earlier, it should
be remembered that attitudes affect behavior depending on social conditions.
(13) Personal efficacy is positively associated with innovative behavior, but
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it has little effect on cooperative behavior.
(lU) Trust has a positive association with cooperativeness. It has little
effect on personal innovativeness. The second proposition may be debatable, for
it probably takes a measure of trust to adopt innovations on the basis of some
government official's claim that certain practices lead to increased output.
Moreover, accepting Saemaul slogans enthusiastically entails some trust of gov
ernment goals.
(15) Village morale is positively associated with cooperative behavior. It
has little effect on personal innovativeness. To the extent that village morale
represents "need affiliation," it may even depress innovativeness, for a peasant
may hesitate to adopt new ideas that could make him appear deviant among his
peers. 37
(16) Personal morale has a positive association with personal innovativeness.
It may have a positive relationship with cooperative behavior.
(17) Alienation is negatively associated with personal innovativeness and with
cooperative behavior.
(18) Future orientation is positively associated with personal innovativeness
and with cooperative behavior.
(19) Authoritarianism is negatively associated with personal innovativeness.
This argument is spelled out in some detail in several books on political and
economic development. It is one of the chief attributes analyzed by Hagen.
However, since the concept was devised originally in the context of European and
American culture, there is some difficulty in applying it to Korea. There is,
in fact, some reason to hypothesize that, given the traditions of Korean villages,
the relationship between authoritarianism and cooperativeness might be positive.
As Castillo suggests, the authoritarian patriarch might decide for new agricul
tural ideas.39 This hypothesis is therefore probably questionable.
(20) Familism, or traditionalism, is another concept that provides problems
of ambiguous relationships. On the basis of Banfield's "amoral familism" the
inclination is to posit a negative relationship between familism and personal
innovativeness and cooperativeness. However, Galtung found familism connected
to preference for the nuclear rather than the extended family and higher among
young persons with at least minimal education. These persons were also more
mobile.^0 Thus familism was related more strongly to behavior, some of it modern,
than it was to attitudes, except for attitudes specifically concerning the family.
On the other hand, insofar as familism in Korea is a traditional attitude, it
might be expected to be related to other traditional behaviors. Among these tra
ditional behaviors would be a propensity to cooperate. Village mutual assistance
had already been observed by the earliest visitors to Korea.Lee states that
"the habit of working in company with villagers is so persistently practiced that
it may be said to characterize the life of Korean farmers."^2 Given the ambig
uous nature of familism, the very tentative hypothesis is advanced that familism
is negatively related to personal innovativeness and cooperativeness.^3
(21) A positive attitude toward government is positively associated with per
sonal innovativeness and village cooperativeness. The hypothesis is based on the
argument that since it is the government that is propagating the Saemaul move
ment, which aims at the ultimate transformation of the Korean countryside, a
positive attitude toward the central government also makes the peasant more re
ceptive to its messages. The notion of political accountability takes some time
to develop. Traditionalism would thus seem to diminish the acceptability of more
positive attitudes toward government.
(22) Debt contributes to a lack of innovativeness and village cooperativeness.
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Debt is expected to relate to a whole body of deleterious attitudes and behaviors,
particularly if the peasant perceives his debt as increasing. On the other hand,
some debts might be contracted in order to purchase modern equipment, a possibil
ity easily assessed in the analysis.
(23) Clan villages tend to be less capable of stimulating personal innovative
ness but may be better able to bring about cooperativeness.As Osgood remarks,
"at its best, the clan is the source of invisible security, at its worst it turns
all eyes backward on the past, limiting opportunity for complete individualism
and demanding greater personal courage of him who would originate something new
or change the age-old customs."^5
These are the chief hypotheses that were built into the questionnaire. Ad
ditional subsidiary hypotheses and some considerations of intervening variables
will appear in subsequent chapters. Of some 2,000 questionnaires distributed to
peasants through the Saemaul winter schools, l,ii-30 were returned completed. Had
the respondents represented a true random sample of the population, roughly 95
percent of such samples would have fallen within less than 3 percent from the
true value of the population. In other words, 1,U30 questionnaires are a rela
tively adequate number on the basis of which to make inferences about Korean
peasants. Since ample reservations have already been made with regard to the
randomness of our sample of respondents, it might be well to conclude this chap
ter on a more upbeat note, calling attention to the fact that survey research in
Korea, focusing attention on individuals as separate and independent units, makes
more sense than it would in a more heterogeneous society such as India, Burma,
or Indonesia. Korea is, in fact, a homogeneous society by comparison with most
other less developed nations of the world, and this fact ought to contribute to
the external validity of the analytic results.
In the following section, the responses on the questionnaire
in a descriptive manner so as to suggest the attributes held by
The hypotheses will be tested in Chapter 3, and comparable data
villages related to the hypotheses will be discussed in Chapter

will be treated
Korean peasants.
from two Korean
5*

General Attributes of Korean Peasants

Korea is a relatively homogeneous country, with no sizable minorities. Even
the Chinese do not comprise a significant ethnic minority, as they do in some
Southeast Asian countries, and there is only a scattering of other non-Koreans.
The nation is divided into nine major provinces and, as Table 2.3 shows, peasant
respondents in our sample were located in all of them, including thirty-seven
individuals in Cheju-do, an island some distance to the south of the Korean
peninsula. While there are differing character traits attributed to individuals
from various areas in Korea, it is unlikely that any of these differences would |
be perceived by an outsider, except for the difference between the Seoul sophisti
cate and the provincial from elsewhere in Korea. The folklore of differing char-;
acter traits is intrinsic to all cultures, but there is no sharp division among
persons from different regions such as, e.g., in Burma where several quite dis
tinct cultural groups coexist. Although linguists can discern some local dif
ferences in the Korean language, these distinctions are minor compared even to
those existing in Germany. Korean is mutually comprehensible from one area to
another. Certainly there are fewer differences in most outlooks among the
peasants than probably exist between peasants and the urban population.
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Table-2.3

Respondents by Province of Origin
Province

Number

Percentage

Kyonggi

191

13.it

Kangwon

171

12.0

North Ch'ungchong

157

11.0

South Ch'ungchong

186

13.0

North Kyongsang

157

11.0

South Kyongsang

166

11.6

North Cholla

l'?k

10.8

South Cholla

211

lit.8

37

2.6

Cheju
Total

l,i*30*

100.0

*One thousand three h-undred seventeen -were male and 113 were female
respondents.
There were some differences among respondents between the provinces, accord
ing to several dependent variables of innovative behavior. For instance, the
yield reported from the various provinces was rather similar, with the modes for
yield ranging from six to thirty sok. Five provinces—Kyonggi, South Ch'ungchong,
South Kyongsang, North Cholla, and South Cholla—generally reported eleven to
thirty sok, while Kangwon, North Ch'ungchong, and North Kyongsang reported modes
from six to twenty sok. In South Ch'ungchong, several peasants reported
yields in the upper ranges, from thirty to over sixty sok. In reporting a yield
increase, however, provinces were somewhat similar, ranging from a low of 66.2
percent in South Cholla to a high of 82.5 percent in South Ch'ungchong.
There were some differences in technological innovations, such as the use of
weedicide, with North Kyongsang and North Cholla reporting 60.1 and 66.U percent
use of weedicide over hand-weeding. Of course, many of those using weedicide
also hand-weeded. Kangwon registered a low of 28.7 percent using weedicide, so
that the respondents from the various provinces did differ in adopting technology.
Insecticide was in such general use, however, that the main distinction was
whether the peasant used it before or only following an attack by insects. Al
most 90 percent of the peasants in all provinces said that they used insecticide
before their plants were attacked. Plows were not yet in universal use, and
about four-fifths of the peasants in all provinces did not own any. Threshers,
however, were more widely used. North Ch'ungchong, South Ch'ungchong, and
Kyongsang had over TO percent of the respondents owning threshers, while in the
remaining provinces about half the peasants owned them.
Tongil rice was planted by over half the farmers of four of the provinces—
Kyonggi, Kyongsang, North Cholla, and South Cholla—with the last-named having
the highest percentage, 6k percent. Less than half of the respondents in the
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other provinces had planted Tongil, with the lowest percentage being in Cheju.
The number of thatched roofs, picturesque to the foreigner but less desirable to
the peasant, had gradually given way to corrugated or tile roofs. Yet quite a
few thatched houses remained in the villages, and about one-third of the respond
ents from Kangwon, South Ch'ungchong, North Cholla, South Cholla, and Cheju con
tinued to have their homes thatched.
There were no sizable differences in the various provinces of willingness to
donate time to village projects. The expression of willingness was quite gen
eral, ranging from a low of 62.k percent in North Kyongsang to a high of 76.5
percent in Kangwon. Kangwon is sometimes said to be the most backward province,
so that it is possible that the tradition of mutual help has lasted longest
there. While the Saemaul movement attempted to stimulate village projects on the
basis of village cooperation, tradition was undoubtedly an aid to this moderniz
ing effort. The impression to be gained is that considerable support for village
improvement existed in the countryside. This view is supported by the evidence
of donations of time in the past, showing little difference among peasants of the
various provinces. In North Cholla, where the responses were lowest in this cate
gory, 59-1 percent reported having donated some time while in most of the other
provinces the figure was 70 percent. Well over two-thirds of the peasants said
they were from villages that had cooperative arrangements with neighboring vil
lages .
Finally, there were marked differences as to whether peasants wanted to see
their sons continue in agricultural high schools. Only in Kyonggi (53 percent)
and Kangwon (60.6 percent) did more than half the peasants want to see their sons
continue the profession of farming. In all other provinces, peasants were more
negative about this, with South Ch’ungchong and South Cholla expressing over 70
percent negative responses. Table 2.h summarizes these regional differences.
On the basis of the responses, no salient patterns can be discerned. For example,
it did not seem to make much difference how a province rated on the dependent
variables, yield and increase in yield, the decision whether to send sons to
agricultural schools did not seem to rest on these considerations. Kyonggi, for
instance, which rated rather higher than some other provinces and at least with
the norm on others, indicated a greater desire to see sons attend agricultural
school, but in North Cholla, which in some respects appeared to be the most pro
gressive province, the feeling was negative about agricultural school. Moreover,
the desire to donate time to village projects and the past behavior in doing so
were not associated with any other perceptible patterns, although it should be
remarked that the least progressive province, aside from Cheju, also registered
the highest tendency to cooperate. These are of course all relative assessments,
within the Korean context, and a cooperative spirit would seem to prevail.
The respondents indicated a high degree of stability in residence. Only some
lU.9 percent (213 respondents) reported living in their present village less than
five years. While 53.6 percent had never lived in a larger town or city, ^5-9
percent reported having lived in a more urban locale, although all of these were
for periods of less than two years. Only one respondent reported living in a
town or city for more than two years.
Some i+1.9 percent of the respondents had held some official position at one
time. About the same percentage (4l.6 percent) had held some office in an or
ganization. This might seem to be a high percentage, but village life provides
possibilities of this kind beyond what is usually imagined. We must disagree

h3

Teahnioal Considerations

iri jj
B

TOOHOS9V

+

+

o

OiaHJOOO

0

+

000000

t

O

I

1

I

EH

g

w <!
U *H

o >0) ^G
p
iHaisvd

The Attributes of Peasants by Province

aivNoa

OOOOOO

0

+

TIOMOJi
“

dooa

I

oo

0000000

o

o

o

+

+

to
ct3
a
0)

+

OOOOOOOO

I

•H

■p

000000

+

aaHsaaHi

+

000

aioiosMi

ooooooooo

WOTd

0

aioioaaA
OMicnaiA
aaaiA

+

0

+

0

0

+

+

0

+

oo

0

ooooooooo

+

oo

+

o

+

+

+

pin
O 0)
O 4^
a
o
^
O qzJ
^
(D •H

<

Q)
P
<
n

-H

nd

s
P
o

to ^
(D
to
<D

^ ^ §
C (D O

•H
cd CO
p
(V
p
o
p
•H
P • cd
<v •H
bO P
P P
!>
<D
bO 0)
P > H
P
O
f> > Ch
P o
p Q)
<u (V P
p p P
p
p <P
p p O
p p
o > CO
p (D (D
p S 1
O
II to P
o II
<D
bO
cd
Jh

O
P

'
•

0>
(D x! bO
> tiO
CtJ .H ^

(D

bO
a
rC
o
bO

>o

<v
o

a
•H
J>

o

•H
tiD
d
)0
h
W

Cl

>o

So
c
cd

o
XI
-p

o

s

^
>
2
5
cd

bO

>o
a
bO
)P

cP
o

-p
p
0
CO

bO
P
cd
to
bO
P
)0
.b
W
cP
-P

o

bO
p
cd
to
bO
P

>o

W
P
-P
P
o
CO

cd

rH
rH

)0
P
o
p
p

o

p
1—1
tH
JO
P
o
p
-p
p
0
CO

{>, cd
H

d
^
^
p
a;
W)

^ to

p
•o
(U
p
o

rC
-p
^
§
o
q_,

<D
>0) p u
S M (U
_ u
O- O
to E-I (D
O p
II CO Ch
^ -H
+ M id

i+1*

Chapter 2

with Marx's famous conment, cited at the beginning of this chapter, that vil
lage life has "no wealth of social relationships." In some respects the fabric
of modern \irban life may be more drab. Besides a lijang, or village chief,
there is likely to be a Saemaul leader and several persons heading various com
mittees within the village.Such committees—as in Kae-il, a village to be
reported on more fully in Chapter 5—might be in charge of combating superstition
and various other village projects. There are other village-level organizations
such as the kye, some of which have little bearing on agriculture and play only
a small role in village-level affairs. Others, such as the wu kye, might prorvide credit by lot, so that members will have enough money to purchase an ox. °
Observed closely, the Korean peasant in the 1960s and 1970s was not quite a po
litically apathetic individual. There were numerous opportunities for participa
tion, although his influence did not generally extend beyond the village level.
Media contact among these peasants was considerable, with almost all reporting
that they read the newspaper daily (73.9 percent) and owned a radio (97-8 percent).
This might seem a remarkably high figure, setting off these winter-school re
spondents from other Korean peasants, but this is not so because the literacy
rate in Korea is quite high. Moreover, there is a very active provincial press,
aside from the large number of papers published in the capital and the larger
cities. Only among older Koreans is illiteracy still a problem. Higher educa
tion for women was not common earlier in the century, except for the few who
attended Ehwa University and several other women's colleges founded by mission
aries. The Korean alphabet, a most remarkable system invented during the reign
of King Sejong with the aid of Chinese linguists, was a great boon to those who
wanted to teach themselves to read and write, and some older peasant women, in
their forties and fifties, used it to become literate. In rural households in
1931, for example, only 22.5 percent of the Korean farm women could read Korean,
compared to 57 percent of the men, and only 3.6 percent could read Chinese com
pared to over a third of the men.^9 These percentages improved during and after
the Japanese occupation, although there is still some educational disparity be
tween rural men and women. It was, of course, known that the radio had already
become ubiquitous, and the figure cited earlier suggests just how widespread
this media form is. Not only in Korea but in the Philippines and other less
developed nations, the radio has furnished a cheap and modern form of communica
tion fundamental to the process of nation-building.
Most respondents (86.9 percent) believed that it was possible to improve con
ditions in their villages, and most (67.8 percent) were willing to donate some
of their time for this purpose, while others (26.9 percent) advanced a more
tentative "maybe" in response to this query. Most peasants (67*5 percent) had
already participated in village projects. Once again, a preconception was ver
ified, for village cooperation, while sometimes exaggerated, had been a long
standing tradition. Heavy farm tasks enlisted five or more neighbors in a form
of cooperative labor called pwn-asi. For a day's work done for a neighbor, a
peasant could claim the same amount of time later. The host was responsible for
providing the best available food. Heydrich was told that this system was "a
real democratic assembly line system" in which everyone competed.90 As a formal
arrangement among neighbors pwn-asi has declined, but the spirit of cooperation
is still in evidence.
Table 2.5 reports the age distribution of these respondents. The age distri
bution did not, of course, resemble the general population because there were
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Table 2.5
Respondent's Age
Age Category

Number

16-25
26-29
30-39
U0-U9
50-59
60 and over

96
158
596
U60
101
15
Total

1,U26*

Percentage
6.7
11.0
ill.7
32.2
7.1
1.0
99.8*

*There were four "no responses."
fewer persons thirty years or younger. Many of these younger peasants did not
yet have their own farms and thus did not have the incentive to attend the
Saeraaul winter schools, while some may have been in the military service. It
will be seen later that age explained very little innovative behavior. Perhaps
Korea had had a money economy long enough so that older peasants responded to
market conditions and changed their farming practices if they saw an advantage
in doing so, making age a less Important factor in rural modernization.
The educational level of these peasants is given in Table 2.6. The level of
education in Korea seemed to be considerably higher than that in many another
less developed country, attesting to the transitional status of Korea as it has
moved closer to industrialization. As explained in the note to the table, these
peasants were much more responsive to this question than those in the two vil
lages STirveyed in 1973 where there was a substantial minority of "no responses."
Table 2.6
The Education of Korean Peasants
Level of Education
Elementary
Junior High
Senior High
College or university
Graduate school
Total

Number
32k
328
553
216
3

1,U2U*

Percentage
22.7
22.9
38.7
15-1

0.2
99.6*

*There were six "no responses" for this question in the national
sample. Comparison with a village study done later, in which there
were substantial "no responses," suggests the direction here of some
bias toward at least a higher degree of responsiveness. Since the
interviewers were students from a nearby agricultural college, it is
possible that some degree of "face" was involved on the part of the
respondents. A good guess, therefore, would be that Saemaul attend
ance was increased with education.
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Since the land reform the maximum amoimt of farmland a peasant could own had
heen three dhongbo (one oKongho equals 2.^5 acres). The mode of the land farmed
was 1,500 to 2,999 pyong (3,000 py'6ng equal one ohbngho), while most farms
ranged from 1,500 to 5,999 pyong. Most peasants generally agreed that they did
not want more land and, given the technology of rice farming, farms of the size
of those in the modal categories were probably optimal for Korea's labor-intensive
farming. These peasants grew mainly rice, although many also owned some amount
of dryland. The distribution of land owned is shown in Table 2.7. On this land
the mode for yield was eleven to twenty sbk of rice, with the categories for out
put ranging from six to thirty sok. Yet, as Table 2.8 indicates, the distribu
tion ranged up to sixty sok and above, probably because some farms in the South
were able to harvest two crops of rice in a season. Some 1,031 peasants (72.1
percent) reported an increase in yields as against only 5 percent reporting a
Table 2.7
Farmed Land of Korean Respondents, Wetland and Dryland
Wetland
Number of
Peasants
Percent

Pybng
Less than 899
900-1, i*99
1,500-2,999
3,000-5,999
6,000-8,999
9,000 or over

138
208
i*lt5
3I+7
62
28
1,228

Total

Pybna
Less than 899
900-1, i*99
1,500-2,999
3,000-5,999
6,000-8,999
9,000 or over

9.7
li^.5
31.1
2i+.3
U.3
2.0

Dryland
Number of
Percent
Peasants
U27
291
327
171
21
5
l,2it2

85.9*

*The remainder did not respond to the question.

Table 2.8
Yields of Korean Peasants, in sbk
(one sbk equals about 5 bushels)
Number of
Peasants

Sbk
Less than 5
6-10
11-20
21-30
31-hO
in-50
51-60
61 or over
Total

Percentage

89
21U
311
2U9
121
71
70
96

6.2
15.0
21.7
17.4
8.5
5.0
h.9
6.7

1,221

85.it

29.9
20.3
22.9
12.0
1.5
0.3
86.9*
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decrease. There were heavy rains in August of 1972 which flooded some regions
of Korea and destroyed the crops of some peasants. Whether agriculture is
modernized or traditional, the weather is still a major factor related to out
put, and modern science has not altered this situation much. Unlike peasants
in some other countries, Korean peasants keep meticulous records of their fi
nances and their agricultural production, and the responses may thus have been
fairly accurate.51 On the other hand, depending on the context in which they
were questioned, peasants may have tended either to exaggerate their output or
to understate it. The same reservation must be stated concerning the amount of
land farmed, for while it is illegal to own more than three ohongbo of rIceland,
there are probably many peasants that have surreptitious arrangements of owner
ship unreported to the authorities.
Several questions were asked in order to assess political knowledge. Few
respondents (9-5 percent) were unable to give the name of the American president
at the time of the survey, fewer still (l.2 percent) the name of the president
of Korea, Park Chung Hee, although 29.9 percent did not correctly identify the
Japanese premier. The last figure may possibly have been influenced by reasons
other than lack of knowledge. Twenty-five years after Japanese colonial occupa
tion ended, feelings against Japan as a former oppressor still ran deep.52 in
any case, the great number of correct responses showed that a more subtle series
of indicators of political knowledge ought to have been Included and so, reluc
tantly, these responses were dropped in the later analysis.
A large minority of peasants (39-3 percent) were in debt, and 150 of them re
ported that their debts had increased over the previous year. As has been shown
before, debt has been the nemesis of the Korean peasant although conditions are
now at least as favorable as they have ever been for him. Later in 1973 and,
unfortunately, after our village survey had been completed, the government moved
to eradicate at least one source of debt in the countryside by banning any osten
tatious exhibition of splendor and limiting the cost of gifts that could be
offered in weddings, funerals, and village festivals. On the one hand, it might
be regretted that these rare occasions of color and pageantry were to be elimin
ated from the drab routine of the peasants' existence. On the other hand, it
provided an excuse, possibly sought by some peasants, for marshaling their small
savings against the pressures of their neighbors to provide a respectable show
ing when burying a parent. In fact, expenses of this type were cited in the
village survey as only a minor source of debt there. From a strictly economic
rationale, the elimination of this form of expense was quite likely beneficial.
But because one of the ends sought by the Saemaul movement was an increase in
the cultural as well as the economic level of peasant life, the disappearance
of pageantry was deleterious. The traditional market days, which had featured
gambling and heavy drinking, were also discontinued in 1973 by order of the
central government.
Table 2.9 reports in aggregate figures the technological adaptations of the
Korean peasant. It is an impressive showing, with high rankings in the use of
insecticide, weedicide, and several kinds of fertilizers. Almost half of the
peasants grew various kinds of commercial crops, two-thirds had threshers, and
their homes had been improved by the addition of slate, tile, or corrugated
roofs.53 Almost half of them grew the Tongil rice.
Twenty-five had begun grow
ing it in 1970, 102 in 1971, 577 in 1972, and seven were planning to plant it in
1973. This does not mean, of course, that they had switched entirely to the new
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Table 2.9
Technological Adaptations of the Korean Peasant
(percentages show responses in the "innovative" direction)

Innovation

Number of
Peasants

Percentage

680

h8.0

Insecticide

1,220

85.3

Urea

1,232

86.2

Phosphate

9^*3

65.9

Calcium cyanimlde

152

10.6

Commercial crop

70U

1+9.2

Thresher

891

62.3

1,025

71.6

Weedicide

Roof: tile, slate or
corrugated

1+8.5
69k
Tongil, new rice
(25 in 1970 or before. 102 in 1971, 577 in 1972, and 7 in 1973)
65.0
930
Attended Saemaul school
rice strain which was still in an experimental stage. The success in rice out
put that was anticipated by the introduction of Tongil did not come about in
1972, as we have seen, for the weather conditions in much of the planted areas
were adverse, providing too much rain prior to harvesting. In any case, the
table provides a good indication that Korea was not a nation of primitive peas
ants but had gone some distance toward modernizing its agriculture, and the
peasants themselves undoubtedly deserve a large share of the credit for this.
This also shows, by the way, that Marx was wrong in his proposition that science
is inapplicable to peasant small-holdings.
A large number of the respondents already had attended a Saemaul school,
probably during the summer; they were, of course, attending one at the time of
responding to the questionnaire. Interestingly, some U1.5 percent of the re
spondents had first learned of the Saemaul movement over the radio, and another
20.5 percent had read about it in the newspapers. This attests to the growing
importance of the media in the countryside. An additional large percentage
(19.2 percent) had been informed of the program by an official, probably a
myonjang, or county official. Only a few (U.8 percent) had first learned of the
movement through a pamphlet or a friend. While some studies of modernization,
such as Rogers', suggests that most Innovations in traditional agriculture come
about through interaction with one's peers, this may be no longer the case when
conditions have advanced to the stage where most persons are literate and read
the papers or listen to the radio to the extent done in Korea. Face-to-face
communication, while still significant, is probably not now the predominant way
that peasants learn of new developments in Korea.
Finally, several interesting results should be pondered for the possible
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significance they may hold for future developments in the countiyside. Over
whelmingly (79.8 percent), these peasants would have liked to have more influence
in the operation of their villages. The increase in organizational skills,
literacy, and agricultiaral skills generated a desire to participate more than
they had done in the past. These respondents had obviously not sunk into apathy
but had developed notions of how their conditions could he improved. They would
have probably liked increased opportunities of putting their ideas and goals
into effect. Another interesting result, already noted by province, was the
small number (38.0 percent) who would have liked their sons to attend an agri
cultural high school. While conditions in the countryside had improved per
ceptibly, they still had not achieved by 1973 the economic well-being possible
in the city. This is shown by the one response that was almost unanimous in
the attltudinal section of the questionnaire: 1,131 peasants agreed that "the
standard of living of peasants is below that of most other persons in Korea."
There was still the perception, undoubtedly accurate in 1972 and 1973, that
peasants had simply not done as well as other sectors of the population. To
succeed, the Saemaul movement will have to provide the conditions necessary to
allow peasants to raise their living standards to that of their urban compatriots.
Until then it is unlikely that most peasants will want to see their sons follow
in their own profession. Moreover, this attitude has a very special relation
ship to some of the ends that the Saemaul movement is trying to achieve, as we
will see in Chapter U.
Responses to the question on influence suggest that the peasant would have
liked it, if at all possible, to increase his social power. It has been sug
gested that social power is a process with positive feedback in system terms.
If one attains a little, the inclination will be to try to attain more, and from
a position of some power, a position of more power will be easier to attain.53
If the Saemaul movement works in accordance with its original intent, it might
have this effect but might then also displease some of its urban initiators.
In any case, there were some improvements in the years following this survey,
and in 197^ farm income for the first time reached IOU.57 percent of urban
income. By 1975 the income of peasants and fishermen had reached 106 percent
of the income of urban workers. According to government soiirces, which in this
case were probably accurate, the drain of resources from the countryside into the
manufacturing sector, characteristic of the 1960s, had been reversed.5^

Chapter 3
THE ATTITUDES AND THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF ATTITUDES
AND ATTRIBUTES OF KOREAN PEASANTS

The Attitudes of Korean Peasants.^
The ultimate purpose in assessing attitudes is to predict behavior. It is
probably true that under certain conditions modernizing behavior is accompanied
by attitudes and propensities inclining people in an innovative direction.
Those having propensities to change, high self-esteem, and a sense of personal
efficacy should, other things being equal, be those whose behavior will include
the adoption of modern techniques. But one of the chief problems in attitudinal
research lies in that all-embracing phrase, "other things being equal." In the
case of peasant agriculture, "other things" are rarely ever "equal," for the
peasant has little control over the economy in which he operates. He has little
control over the prices he receives for his rice and foodstuffs. If the markets
offer high prices for his produce, he is likely to adopt methods that promise
him an increased output. If the prices for crops are depressed in relation to
the goods and services that he must purchase, there would seem to be less in
centive for increasing his productivity for the market. While other factors
encourage or inhibit the peasant in his farming techniques, the market undoubt
edly affects the practices of the peasant in Korea, for that country is well on
its way toward a money or market economy. Few Korean peasants are strictly sub
sistence agriculturalists. They generally grow farm products for the market in
exchange for other products and necessities.2 In traditional Korea the family
might have made most of the items used in the household, but while some handi
craft remains, it is now a residue of the past. Few peasants any longer make
the traditional white cloth used for ceremony and mourning. Many of the peas
ant arts associated with times past have now disappeared, and the market fur
nishes most of a peasant family's needs. The fact that corrugated, slate, or
tile is used for roofs more generally now than in the past attests to the degree
to which the market is relied upon.
There is some doubt, therefore, concerning the actual relationships of at
titudes toward behavior and particularly modernizing behavior. While these
doubts must be maintained in the ensuing discussion about attitudes, conditions
in 19T2-1973 when the survey was made were, or could have been, contributive to
efficaciousness, self-esteem, and positive morale. The Saemaul movement did
promise some improvement of the peasant's condition and, insofar as the relative
income of peasants had actually increased by 197^, there was at least some sub
stance to government promises. These years would seem to have been years of
hope in the countryside and, if attitudes are capable of affecting behavior at
all, they would seem to have been operative during this initial era of the
Saemaul movement. In spite of a history of disappointments with government
promises which had not borne fruit, it was in this period, if in few others,
"all other things" might truly have been considered "equal."
50
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There are several reasons why skepticism is warranted in any report of the
attitudes of Korean peasants. In an effort to provide at least some opportunity
to compare the results of this study with several other surveys conducted among
peasant populations questions were taken, sometimes with necessary modifications
from other interview schedules. Moreover, hecause some questions had never been
asked of peasants and were regarded as interesting and potentially revealing,
such questions were devised or taken from sources that were not focused on
either the Korean milieu or on peasants. All of these questions had been for
mulated in English, a language quite unlike Korean in syntax and idiom. It
would be presumptuous to suppose that even the most painstaking efforts at
translation resolved all the problems of transferring the meaning of the English
into the Korean of the interview schedules. For the full text of the Korean
translation see Appendix A (3).
To this preliminary and obvious difficulty in assessing opinions among Ko
rean peasants must be added the likelihood that meaningful attitudes in one
culture may not be meaningful, or meaningful in the same way, in another culture
This problem exists over and above the translation difficulty. Since some of
the questions were derived from studies of other cultures, there was the pos
sibility that the Korean peasant might not, for instance, view his community or
village in the same way as peasants in the Philippines or farmers in the United
States. Some, but certainly not all, of these problems might have been resolved
in the process of translation.
Moreover, the questionnaire was applied not to individuals having a high
degree of sophistication in arranging their attitudes into consistent and struc
tured patterns, but to individuals who might not have given much thought to
some of their attitudes. Attempts to discern ideological patterns in the at
titudes of American voters, for example, encounter the problem that in reality
most voters have not given much thought to patterning their attitudes about
goals, issues, and candidates. For this reason it becomes very difficult for
most individuals to delineate any kind of tightknit pattern for their numerous
attitudes. Any pattern that may be presented among a sample of American voters
is very likely to be a loose one. It seems likely that among Korean peasants
patterns that are present in the attitudinal data would be tenuous. To state
this fact is not to disparage the respondents. There are many rational reasons
why Korean peasants would be unlikely to attend to the structure of their at
titudes or to bother whether these were mutually consistent. Peasants are
pragmatists, and there are few compelling reasons to expect them to arrange
their propositions and thovights as might an ideologist. It takes time to
arrange thoughts logically, and it is not likely that many of us suffer much
from "cognitive dissonance" because of this inconsistency. Indeed, it is prob
ably presumptuous of the social scientist to anticipate a well-structured system
of attitudes.
Finally, there is reason to doubt the usefulness for some piirposes of ascer
taining attitudinal structures. We might find evidence of attitudes toward
modernization, but whether these attitudes are allied to behaviors that could be
characterized as modern is not simply a function of attitudes but also of the
social structure in which the peasant lives and works his land. Under some con
ditions, we might predict that attitudes toward modernization will indeed lead
a peasant to adopt certain innovations, like spending more on fertilizer or
diversifying his crops. But these conditions may not exist in the particular
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region or coimtry under review, in which case some of these attitudes will he
stillborn, so to speak, leading to no perceptible differences in behavior. It
is not only the individual and his propensity to reform that brings about in
novative behavior and activities that ultimately lead to increased productivity.
The social and economic structure within which he lives rewards an action or
renders it unfeasible and makes innovative activities rational rather than selfdefeating. To review individual attitude patterns, therefore, is to look at
only one side of the equation of modernization. The other side is the social
aggregate and the interrelationship of classes, prices and social influence
over which the peasant has little or no control. This criticism of attitudinal
surveys has been cogently argued in a number of books and articles, and it is
an argument that is very apt.3 However, this is no reason to dispense with
attitudinal surveys altogether. The results of such s\irveys and the patterns
that may be uncovered are certainly of interest in themselves.
We will now discuss attitude results on the basis of percentages agreeing
or disagreeing with the attitudinal statements. These attitudes will be pre
sented in terms of clusters on the basis of a priori face validity. Indeed, in
a factor analysis of attitudes, the first cluster, attitude toward farming.
did show a remarkable interrelationship among the separate responses.
The
other clusters, with the exception of village morale, were less coherent. This
chapter also will report the empirical patterns among behavior, attributes, and
a number of attitudes selected for their saliency in the research cited in note

U.
Referring to Table 3.1, some thirteen items were developed into a grouping
called "attitude toward farming." The items in this table were selected from
among a large number of scale items developed by A. M. Myster.5 Although such
a cluster of attitudes may be potentially related to the propensity to adopt^
farm improvements and innovations, it has never been studied systematically in
the rural population of a developing nation. The place of these attitudes to
ward farming in the context of innovation and the improvement of rural conditions
is not difficult to surmise. Although the Korean Third Five-Year Plan was in
tended to benefit the rural sector, as opposed to the heavy emphasis on the
industrial sectors in the previous five-year plans, most of the development ef
fort was to come from the peasants themselves. Those who enjoy what they are
doing, who perceive their occupation as rewarding, psychologically if not eco
nomically, and who would rather remain in the countryside than cast off their
rural heritage for urban novelties, will be more likely to favor innovations
and the cooperation that is probably essential to the improvement of their vil
lages. This, at any rate, is one direction hypotheses based on this group of
attitudes might take. There are other possibilities, however, which also find
some basis in the literature on rural populations, and it is possible, although
less probable, that it is the peasants most satisfied with their present way of
life who are the most conservative, traditional, and inimical to change. How
ever, the essence of previous findings elsewhere would suggest otherwise:
Innovating behavior and cooperativeness, as means of improving the conditions
of oneself and his fellow villagers, demand individuals with higher morale, and
high morale is presumably associated with liking one's daily work.
The table clearly shows that Korean peasants were not dissatisfied with farm
ing as an occupation. If the transition to an industrialized society affected
the peasant by devaluing his occupation, leaving him psychologically trapped
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Table 3.1
Attitude Toward Farming
Disagree

Agree

Uncertain

Farm work is drudgeiy.

30.6%

6.9%

62.0%

The standard of living of peasants is below
that of most other persons in Korea.

79.1

6.8

13.8

A peasant has more worries than persons who
do other kinds of work.

1+3.6

10.7

1+5.3

Farming reduces one's social standing.

29.2

8.9

61.0

Work on the farm is really enjoyable.

63.2

13.6

22.2

Farming deprives one's children of an
adequate education.

73.6

1+.2

20.6

The disadvantages of farming outweigh
its advantages.

22.9

13.1+

63.0

I would move to the city if I knew for sure
that I coiild earn more money there.

53.0

10.1

36.7

Farming requires less education than most
other work.

1+3.1

I+.9

51.6

Farming is uninteresting work.

13.7

11.5

73.8

The farm is the best place for children.

38.8

17.6

1+2.9

Farming offers little opportunity for
meeting other people.

1+1+.1+

8.6

1+6.3

I think that peasants are an interesting
group of people.

57.2

17.1

25.2

in the past while events swept on toward a more enviable future, such an effect
was certainly not perceptible among these attitudes. These respondents seemed
basically satisfied with their work, a result perhaps somewhat more surprising
considering the fact that with constant media contact these peasants were well
aware of social changes in the cities.
Yet there were some reservations perceptible among these attitudes. Peasants
did not regard the fami as the best place for children, and this attitude may
have stemmed from the difficulty of educating children in the rural areas as
compared to the better schooling Koreans perceived as associated with the cities.
Interestingly, a factor analysis (a technique explained in Appendix C) of peas
ant attitudes showed one pattern combining the notions that the farm was the
best place for children with the attitude that young people were getting too
much education and could learn more by working than by attending high school.
In addition, there was the almost unanimous realization that the peasant's
standard of living was below that of others. This perception was probably
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realistic, although peasants might have been better off economically than the
recent immigrants into the cities, all of whom had come from the land. In
spite of this, even the poorer urban immigrants preferred the city to the farm,
according to surveys conducted in Seoul.6 When such a perception of rural liv
ing standards is accompanied by the desire to increase influence, the possible
beginnings of a peasant political movement can be sensed in the Korean country
side.
Associated with the assessment of the rural standard of living was the pro
pensity of peasants to move into the city, provided that they could be siure of
more money. While the tendency was by no means overwhelming, it was distinct
enough to invalidate the hypothesis that sentimental "love of the land" held
the peasant back from improving his life chances elsewhere. The Korean peasant
seemed quite capable of assessing his condition and adjusting his life according
to a rational calculation of the market.
A second set of attitudes, propensity to change, is provided in Table 3.2.
Certain items seemed, on the basis of their face validity, to be obvious aspects
of a favorable predisposition toward change, while two others had a more tenuous
relationship to such a grouping and demand further explanation. The feeling
that a person could learn more by working than by attending secondary school
suggests an individual not in favor of new experiences that might enable him to
accomplish his task more effectively. Birth control was evidence of a change
already accepted or resisted, and a person who favored limiting family size
might have also been predisposed to adopt other, possibly less radical, changes
in his farming techniques and way of life. Korea, like other societies permeated
with the Confucian social ethic, has regarded children, particularly boys, as
highly desirable. There is a traditional positive evaluation for large families
as preparation for security in one's old age and for the secular immortality
afforded by ancestor worship. In spite of this, Korea has been quite successful
in its program to limit the size of families. The birth rate, previously a rel
atively high 2.5 percent a year, had fallen to 1.8 percent at the time of this
survey, and the government anticipated lowering the rate still fiirther."^ Since
accepting the practice of birth control necessitated that the peasant eschew a
portion of his traditional belief system, it was expected that such a break
through would make further changes even easier. The relationship of the propen
sity to change to the adoption of actual innovations and the attribute of co
operation with others in the village toward common improvements wo\ild seem to
be rather direct.
The percentages show that birth control had wide acceptance in Korea. A
factor analysis Indicated, however, that there was little or no spillover between
this attitude and other attitudes assessing change. One other attitude that
seemed to be associated with birth control was that "a person should always con
sider the needs of the family as a whole more important than his own." This
makes sense, for one possible motivation for birth control might be that fewer
family members would make it easier for a peasant to provide for them econom
ically. Although the attitude toward birth control was something of a real
breakthrough from the mores of the past, it appeared to be Isolated from other
change factors. Another reservation must also be expressed. The attitude to
ward birth control need not correlate with small families; some large families
result from the attempt, after several daughters, to produce at least one son
who can continue the family traditions. This could occur even though the
parents were for birth control.
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Table 3.2
Propensity to Change
Agree

Uncertain

Disagree

I'd want to know that something would really
work before I'd be willing to try it.

53.5%

19.0%

26.7%

If you start trying to change things, you
usually make them worse.

35.9

2it.8

38.7

A person can learn more by working three
years than by going to high school.

lit.2

11.5

7U.0

The secret of happiness is not to expect too
much out of life and to be content with
what comes your way.

81.5

8.0

9.7

Parents should limit the number of children
they have.

87.8

it.8

6.5

It is important to make plans for one's life
and not just accept what happens.

81.6

5.1

12.9

Otherwise the attitudes pertaining to change suggest an ambiguous and rather
complex pattern. On the one hand, peasants were quite clear about the need to
plan rather than accept whatever happened, but on the other hand they were not
adverse to being content "with what comes your way." Perhaps the clearest in
dication of the feeling toward change was in the response to the second state
ment, "If you start trying to change things, you usually make them worse." The
answers suggested the existence in the countryside of considerable conservatism
regarding change. Together with the idea that to be willing to try something
new, one ought to really know whether it would work, the impression is that the
long history of rural conditions had imbued the Korean peasant with at least
careful attitude toward change. Whereas great changes can occur in the city
environment where economic misfortune may not necessarily mean oblivion, change
in the countryside could easily mean disaster for a peasant family hovering just
above the subsistence level. Given the rural history of Korea and other peas
ant countries, such a conservative stance is rational. In light of these results,
it might be tentatively assumed that change is possible in the countryside to the
degree that peasants can be sure that returns to them are forthcoming and that
the danger of failure is remote.
Trust, shown in Table 3.3, assumes an important role in predisposing villagers
to working together. One of the barriers to improving the rural environment in
some societies is the existence of mutual suspicion and the feeling that any
improvement emanating from one's own efforts will not be reciprocated by others,
so that it is just as well, say, not to help construct the bridge over the creek.
Research in southern Italy indicates that the lack of trust, a syndrome of
"amoral familism" in the colorful conceptual term of Banfield, negates efforts
toward community development and projects beneficial to the whole village.
Trust also plays a vital role in predisposing the peasant to accept on the word
of others, e.g., that the growing of a new rice strain, such as IR-667, will be
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Table 3.3
Trust
Agree

Uncertain

Disagree

It is not good to let your friends know too
much about your life, for they might take
advantage of you.

19.0%

19.i*%

60.6%

Everyone in my village tries to take advantage
of you.

lU.l

20.U

61*.9

Most people are honest.

55.1

19.7

21+.1*

Most people will repay your kindness with
ingratitude.

22.9

17.0

59.5

You can only trust people you know well.

U8.U

11.7

38.8

beneficial. On the other hand, even if this innovation were perceived as pos
sibly beneficial, distrust might lead the peasant to suspect that any increase
in his productivity might only mean an increase in the monetary outlay that he
must provide for seed, fertilizer, insecticide, and other items. Risk is always
involved in adopting an innovation, for the promise of future productivity might
not materialize, leaving the peasant worse off than had he relied on time-tested
methods. Hence trust in an administrator or extension worker would seem to be
Important in convincing a peasant to change his techniques. This is, of course,
a generalized view of trust, and some of the items included in the questionnaire
were focused on particular others, such as fellow villagers. An assumption im
plicit in some of the hypotheses concerning trust is that coercion is not very
effective in increasing productivity in peasant-type agricultural sectors. In
part, this argument may be presented as a normative choice—it is morally better
to stimulate voluntary effort than to rely on force. Galtung, for example, pre
sents this point of view.® But there is also considerable evidence that coercion
without some spontaneous motivation on the part of peasants is ultimately selfdefeating. Peasants are past masters at presenting a fait aoaompli of indif
ference or noncompliance to regimes in the face of enormous pressures. It is
their traditional political modus operandi.
The obverse of trust would be alienation, or personal isolation, the tendency
to regard oneself as isolated from others and surrounded by selfishness and selfseeking. At least one study on Korea has revealed the extent of personal isola
tion existing in a Korean village, contradicting the bucolic idyll of tightknit
village communities.9
A dozen items pertaining to personal efficacy. Table 3.^, indicate a person's
perception of the ability to control the environment and to get along effectively
with others, whether peers or persons occupying a different role. A personally
efficacious individual might be expected to accept change, for instance, on his
own initiative, or at least to adopt new techniques when these have been con
vincingly demonstrated to him. If it were feasible to coerce peasants to adopt
more modern techniques, it might make little difference whether or not rural
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Table 3 • ^
Personal Efficacy
Agree

Uncertain

Disagree

Success is more dependent on luck than on
real ability.

11.3%

I feel helpless in the face of what happens
in the world today.

11.7

26.1

61.3

I am able to do things as well as most other
people do.

81.0

9.0

9.4

There is little chance for advancement in life
unless a man knows the right people.

57.1

15.4

26.5

It is only wishful thinking to believe that
one can really Influence what happens in
society.

1+4.7

19.7

34.7

The average citizen like me can have an
important influence on government
decisions.

70.1+

17.3

11.8

People in big cities are cold and impersonal.
It is hard to make friends there.

1+3.0

22.9

34.0

Persons like myself have little chance of
protecting our personal interests when
they conflict with people who are richer.

44.1+

27.9

26.8

I find it easy to express my ideas to others.

51.5

18.0

29.9

I believe that most public officials don't
care what people like me think.

30.5

24.5

44.4

The more education a man has, the more he is
able to enjoy life.

66.6

11.1

22.0

Sometimes politics and government seem so
complicated that a person like myself
can't really understand what's going on.

31.0

25.4

42.7

7.2%

80.5%

persons felt efficacious. Coercion may have diminishing returns, even though
peasants may be relatively powerless to resist coercion over short periods, but
in the long run they can stall through inertia any efforts to drastically change
the countryside. In Korea, at any rate, some coercive efforts have been made
with respect to certain innovations and changes, but much choice has necessarily
been left to the initiative of the individual farm family. It follows that those
peasants with a sense of personal efficacy would be expected to be most innova
tive.
The results of the survey indicate that the Korean peasant possessed a fairly
high degree of personal efficacy. Thus when compared to a population such as

58

Chapter 3

that of the United States, the Korean peasant did not seem to be mired in hope
lessness. In the classic study The Ameriaan Voter, done in the fifties, the
authors found 35 percent of the respondents reporting low or medium low "sense
of personal effectiveness." A study more comparable to a peasant population by
Daniel Lerner showed over 50 percent of the populations of Middle Eastern coun
tries reporting "personal impotency."^0 Thus Korean peasants seemed to have a
psychological ability to cope with the complexities of the environment and a
fairly firm belief that a person could successfully meet present and future
challenges. There seemed to be reservations, however, in cases in which the
peasant came into conflict with wealthier persons or when he might not have
known the "right people." Several of the questions, therefore, probably pro
vided a realistic assessment of peasant attitudes as to what is possible in act
ing in society. While Korea has not developed the well-structured client re
lationships that exist in some other countries such as the Philippines, there
is certainly some tendency, resting on a firm historical base, to consider
influence as a matter of personal relationships rather than personal skills
alone. Indeed, the land reform removed the necessity to ply the landlord with
gifts in the course of each year, a necessity that caused a considerable drain
upon the tenant's resources. With this reservation in mind, the picture that
emerged was not of a sense of rural powerlessness. The Korean peasants respond
ing to this questionnaire evinced a fair degree of personal efficacy.
Patricia Bartz has commented on the sense of spaciousness in the Korean land
scape that obscures the fact that the country has one of the world's highest
densities of population on its arable land.H Part of the illusion is also the
result of the tendency of Koreans to cluster into villages. Although fields may
be distant from the village, a peasant's house is not located to be easily acces
sible to his lands but to be a part of the village. Many projects proposed by
the government in connection with its plans at Improving agricultural productivity
are essentially projects that both benefit and must be undertaken by the whole
village. If river embankments are to be strengthened against floods, it is the
villages that must accomplish this. To some degree, the individual villager
must be willing to contribute to the community welfare as well as toward his
own well-being in order that rural conditions be improved and the rural-urban
gap reduced. It is by no means coincidental that the most recent effort to
tackle the rural-urban disparities is called the "new village movement." It is
just this lack of concern for the community as opposed, in many cases, to the
nuclear family that has dogged development efforts in other countries. The
psychological syndrome that produces this negative behavioral effect is well
delineated in George M. Foster's "image of the limited good," wherein village
improvements not directly beneficial to one's own welfare are regarded relatively
disadvantageous.^^ Since villages have some importance in the future of rural
improvement, it seemed important to posit a dimension that would tap village
morale. The items regarded as important in this dimension included several that
are suggestive of the village as a good place to live, or an individual's feeling
that he is "at home" in his village. These perceptions of village closeness
might be associated with village leadership and cooperativeness. Indeed, another
cluster, cooperativeness (Table 3.8) was hypothesized that associated items
attesting to an individual's willingness to contribute effort to his fellow vil
lagers' well-being, his realization that their well-being was to some extent
correlated with his own and, negatively, items exemplifying isolation and indi
vidualism.
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The Impression derived from the respondent's answers to the items in Table
3.5j village morale, is that in general there was a sense of satisfaction with
village life. In most cases, however, there was an ample minority that evinced

Table 3.5
Village Morale
Agree

Uncertain

Disagree

My village is very peaceful and orderly.

he. 91

IT.1%

3l+.7%

Almost everyone in my village is polite and
courteous.

1+2.6

21.3

35.0

Everyone in my village tries to take
advantage of you.

lU.l

20.1+

6I+.9

People in my village work together to get things
done for the village.

69.5

11.1

18.3

Life is better in villages where you know
everybody.

82.2

6.1+

11.0

I feel very much "at home" in my village.

1+3.9

20.T

3I+.I+

People in my village are too critical of
others.

3I+.I

22.8

1+2.6

My village lacks real leaders.

72.2

8.5

17.6

No one seems to care much how my village looks.

2I+.5

18.8

55.7

Uncertain

Disagree

Table 3.6
Cooperativeness
Agree
It is only human nature to be reluctant about
cooperating.

18.8%

ll+.3%

65.9%

A person should be expected to Join only those
organizations that will promote his own
interests.

23.1

11.8

61+.8

Each of us can make real progress only when the
community as a whole makes progress.

82.1

5.5

11.8

A community would get along better if each
person would mind his own business.

50.0

7.7

1+1.8

No one else cares much what happens to you.

5I+.I+

10.8

3I+.0
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a negative assessment of the village. Obviously, conditions in the village were
not bad, but they did not appear to be Idyllic either. The possible contribu
tion to cooperation on joint projects within the village and the peasants' sense
of village morale seems obvious enough. In the face of this generally high
morale, however, there was one strikingly discordant note. A high percentage of
respondents seemed to believe that their village "lacks real leaders." If this
perception revealed an actual state of affairs in the rural areas, it might sug
gest why the various movements to improve the condition of the countryside had
generally limited results. A later section of this book will compare two vil
lages, one exhibiting improvement and completed village projects and the other
with little improvement to boast of. The chief difference between them may well
have been the more vigorous leadership in the more progressive village. For this
reason, one of the major efforts in the initial stages of the Saemaul movement
was to develop village leaders. The problem in accomplishing this vital task
has lain in the perceived legitimacy of these leaders among their fellow peas
ants, and tangible retiirns to the villagers for their efforts will undoubtedly
contribute to this legitimacy.
The responses to questions on cooperativeness. Table 3.6, seemed to indicate
that the Korean peasant was not reluctant to cooperate in promoting the good of
the community. But with the positive tendency to cooperate, there also appeared
some potentially negative responses. There was a sense that others in the vil
lage should mind their own business, which might suggest that while not reluctant
to cooperate in village improvements, the peasant did not want to be prodded in
to participating. This would seem to suggest indirectly that if the peasant is
to cooperate with others in improving the village, he wants to be sure that the
improvements are in fact real ones and not simply wasted industry on his part.
That "no one else cares much what happens to you" suggests that the villages
may be less than the secure havens of traditional lore. Apeasant's fate is in
his own hands. Together with some of the responses on the propensity to change.
Table 3.2, this response gives rise to the question whether the peasant's pro
pensity to change might be increased if he were able to rely on the aid of others
in emergencies. That is, given a feeling of greater security, the acceptance of
greater risks might increase.
Responses to questions on personal morale, listed in Table 3.Tj yielded rather
mixed results. Peasants did not seem to lack skills, including skills of com
munication, but several responses reflected a negative personal morale. These
respondents appeared low on a number of items that might roughly be conceptual
ized as self-esteem. Since 113 respondents were women, we studied the dif
ferences between males and females and found that women were somewhat less likely
than men to answer positively some of the questions having to do with personal
efficacy, including particularly a tendency to find it more difficult to express
their ideas to others. But while women were slightly less efficacious than men,
there was no difference on the first three items in Table 3.7- It is natural to
suspect that this mutual lack of self-esteem, common to both rural men and women,
was the result of a comparison of their peasant status with that of other social
groups. There were additional clues suggesting that this may be the case, e.g.,
the strong perception that their standard of living was not as high as that of
other groups in society. Improving the quality of peasant life, one of the chief
aims of the Saemaul movement ought also to increase their self-esteem which, in
turn, should contribute to the peasants' ability to accept innovation and work
for the further improvement of their villages.^3 The results on personal morale
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Table 3-7
Personal Morale
Agree
I feel I do not have much to be proud of.

63.8%

I'm sometimes inclined to feel that I'm a
failure.

Uncertain

Disagree

16.2%

l8.i+%

72.0

9.0

17.6

I wish I could have more respect for myself.

58.8

li+.l

26.2

I find it easy to express my ideas to
others.

51.5

18.0

29.9

I am the kind of person who gets his share of
good luck.

12.2

36.6

50.5

I feel helpless in the face of what happens
in the world today.

11.7

26.1

61.3

I am able to do things as well as most other
people.

8l.O

9.0

9.1

Real friends are as easy to find today as they
ever were.

57.8

12.2

29.0

in Korea might be compared to studies in the United States where Morris Rosen
berg, for example, found in a large sample of respondents some i+8 percent re
porting high self-esteem, 40 percent medium self-esteem, and only 12 percent
low esteem. It is evident that on similar measures the Korean peasant differed
markedly.
While it was not regarded as feasible to use certain standard questions re
garding authoritarianism, which may be culturally specific, eight questions were
included in the questionnaire that seemed to pertain to authoritarianism. Some
additional related questions are listed in Table 3.8 pertaining to the concept
of familism. A certain degree of authoritarianism was evident; for example, a
sizable percentage of the respondents seemed to agree with the statement that
children should not be allowed to disagree with parents. There was, however,
a markedly liberal attitude toward leadership; for example, a wife’s disobedience
would probably have been unacceptable behavior under any circumstances in tra
ditional times. The authoritarianism of the rural areas was probably being
eroded with the social change that had taken place in Korea since 19^5* There
has been some support for hypotheses that authoritarian attitudes are barriers
to initiative, trust, and the desire to innovate voluntarily, but it would be
difficult to compare the results of this survey with similar surveys in other
countries. I would only like to point out that in the United States authori
tarianism has been shown to be highly related to education. Among respondents
of high education, only 21 percent were found to be "authoritarian" according
to one study, while among respondents of low education, usually high school and
below, U8 percent could be so characterized.^^
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Table 3•8
Authoritarianism
Agree

Uncertain

Disagree

Sometimes children should be allowed to dis
agree with their parents.

28.7%

9.0%

61.6%

A good wife is one who always obeys her husband.

30.6

8.2

60.8

Obedience and respect for authority are the
most important things for children to learn.

50.3

12.0

37.3

A good leader rarely has to talk to others when
he is making a decision.

25.0

11.0

63.8

A good leader tries to find out what all the
members of a group think before he makes a
decision.

91.5

It.8

3.It

lit. 6

30.1

The good leader tries to share his responsi
bility with the other members of a group.
A leader is a better leader if his men are
somewhat afraid of him.

30.3

8.5

60.6

Most young people are getting too much
education.

l6.lt

10.lt

72.9

Table 3-9
Famllism
Agree

Uncertain

Disagree

Parents should limit the number of children
they have.

87.8%

A person should always consider the needs of
his family as a whole more important than
his own.

77.0

12.2

9.1*

The family should have the right to control
the behavior of its members completely.

lt9.3

8.3

ltl.8

Sometimes children should be allowed to dis
agree with their parents.

28.7

9.0

61.6

A good wife is one who always obeys her husband.

30.6

8.2

60.8

Obedience and respect for authority are the most
important things for children to learn.

50.3

12.0

37.3

It.8%

6.5%
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While "familism," Table 3-9 contained some questions also listed under auth
oritarianism, there were two additional specific questions on the role of the
family, indicating the importance of that social institution to the respondents.
The peasants were divided, however, on whether the family as an institution
ought to "completely" control the behavior of its members. The effect of famil
ism on the propensity to accept innovation is debatable. On the one hand. Banfield specified a strong concern for the family and a corresponding lack of
concern for the village as deleterious to cooperation and modernization. Galtung,
however, discovered that familism was not detrimental to the propensity to adopt
certain innovative practices if these could be perceived as contributing to
family welfare.
Two questions in Table 3.10 dealt with an orientation to the future, and the
responses attested to the general sense of optimism with which the peasant re
garded the future. Such a result is most encouraging since most studies have
shown that peasants in transitional or modernizing villages have the highest
morale and expectations for the future, while those in backward villages, vil
lages left behind by the course of change, are the most depressed and pessi
mistic. l6 uot all of the changes witnessed by the Korean peasant since World
War II had been pleasant, and thus it was all the more striking to find him so
sanguine about the future. The analysis of the data gathered in two Korean vil
lages will provide some further insight into this characteristic.
Table 3.10
Future Orientation
Agree

Uncertain

The young man of today can expect much of the
future.

86.9%

6.6%

It is important to make' plans for one's life and
not just accept what happens.

81.6

5.1

Disagree
5.9%
12.9

Table 3.11
Attitude to Government
Agree

Uncertain

Disagree

I believe that most public officials don't care
what people like me think.

30.5%

24.5%

44.4%

The average citizen like me can have an im
portant influence on government decisions.

70.4

17-3

11.8

Persons like myself have little chance of pro
tecting our personal interests when they
conflict with people who are richer.

44.4

27.9

26.8

It is only wishful thinking to believe that one
can really influence what happens in society.

44.7

19-7

34.7

Sometimes politics and government seem so com
plicated that a person like myself can't
really understand what's going on.

31.0

25.4

42.7

6k
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Finally, several questions in TaMe 3.11 pertained to the respondents' at
titudes to the government, and where these questions specifically related to
the government rather than society as a whole, the peasants tended to regard it
as fairly responsive. Insofar as these answers represented actual attitudes
toward the government, it could be surmised that the peasant would be influenced
toward change by such government-sponsored programs as the Saemaul movement.
It should also be noted, however, that as many as 20 to 25 percent of the re
spondents said they were uncertain. This fact gains in significance when com
pared to responses to all other questions of a political nature; as shown in
various tables, such questions elicited the highest percentage of "uncertain"
responses in the entire questionnaire. Not enough questions about the government were asked to provide a full picture of the relationship between peasants
and the official institutions of society. The questions were limited, first, by
the need to keep the questionnaire sufficiently short and, second, by the sen
sitivity of political topics at the time of the survey. It was a time of un
certainty, anxiety, and hopes. The Yushin constitution had just gone into
effect, the reunification talks with North Korea still seemed viable, and politi
cal discussions were constrained. Arguments of political issues were subdued
even within the tabangs, or tearooms, traditional arenas for political argument,
for fear of violating the new restrictions on political discussion, which might
bring a prison sentence of three years. Under these circumstances, it seemed
best to ask a number of relatively noncontroversial questions about politics
rather than risk suspicions about the purpose of the questionnaire.

'
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The Korean peasant is, of course, alert to the risks of certain political at
titudes, and questions on politics sometimes elicit almost unanimous approval
of what is regarded as the "official position," either because the official po
sition is accepted, which is less likely, or because the official position
constitutes the safest answer. Thus several interpretations are possible for the
results on the political questions. On the one hand, the positive attitudes
toward the government were the result of acquiescence, either because of fear of ,
the consequences of being outspoken or because government propaganda pervaded
i
the countryside. On the other hand, the political aims and preferences of disi
affected urban intellectuals, whose opinions were generally those most likely to i
be heard and heeded by the international news media, may not have fully repre
sented the opinions of their rural counterparts. For example, the village
respondents reported on in Chapter 5» when asked how aware urbanites were of vil- j
lage problems, responded "a lot," l6.h percent, "a moderate amount," 38.6 per
cent, and "very little," h2.1 percent. Although this question was not asked in
the national survey, it may well be that peasants perceived the Park government
differently than their urban compatriots.
The percentaged results on the attitudinal portion of the questionnaire pro
vide a picture of a Korean peasant who was neither steeped in traditionalism
nor depressed about the future. He seemed to be efficacious and willing to
cooperate with other villagers. Some of the authoritarianism of the past still
lingered, and the peasants seemed to see their situation more from the point of
view of how society might view them rather than from intrinsic shortcomings that
they recognized themselves. While there was a tendency toward some conservatism
in the face of change, it was certainly not pervasive. The chances for the
Saemaul movement to succeed appeared good, provided that it could help the peas
ants see an improving quality of life.
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Rather than heing demoralized in the face of the future, these peasants
looked forward to the future with a degree of optimism. Their qualities of
trust and cooperativeness portended an improving future. This picture fits with
results that have come from several studies on villages that were hackward,
transitional, and relatively more advanced in their acceptance of modernity.
They have shown that demoralization occurs in the villages least affected by the
impact of the modern industrial world. Thus as a society some distance on the
road to eventual economic development and modernity Korea had not produced,
according to this survey, a demoralized countryside but, by and large, a rural
society that could accept, perhaps initiate, changes that it perceived as eco
nomically beneficial to itself.

A Factor Analysis of the Attributes and Attitudes of Korean Peasants
The previous section gave a descriptive assessment of Korean peasants on a
variety of attributes and attitudes. This assessment suggested optimism with
respect to the peasant's ability to meet the challenges of social change. This
section will combine salient attitudinal items with a host of behavioral and
other questionnaire items to determine the disposition of the major hypotheses
enumerated in Chapter 2. It is, therefore, descriptive to the extent that it
presents the pattern of relationships among seventy-eight attributes of the
peasant respondents, and the structure uncovered will support or reject the
hypotheses concerning innovativeness. The methodology used in this section is
fully described in Appendix C.
Cursorily speaking, the factor results were not fully encouraging, for the
number of factors extracted was large. This Indicated that the structure of
interrelationships of the variables and attributes was loose, and a full exoner
ation of the numerous hypotheses on modernization and the relationship of in
novative attitudes and behavior is unlikely. On the other hand, as the analysis
of each factor proceeds, it will be apparent that some vindication of moderniza
tion theory was obtained. In addition, although there may be some skepticism
about factor analysis as a technique, one or two factors, while trivial, made
obvious sense. For example. Factor 2 of the rotated matrix might have been en
titled an Age Factor, for loaded on (correlated with) this dimension was the
variable age which was related to marital status and the number of children.
There was also a negative relationship on this factor with membership in U-H
clubs, indicating that this is an attribute of the younger peasants. The at
tempt to relate physical energy to any other variable failed, but it was hearten
ing to see on the rotated Factor 13 that energetic individuals also experienced
little illness. While both these results are in themselves trivial and, as it
happened, stillborn in their relationship to any other variables of interest,
they do indicate that the respondents were answering questions rationally.
These results somewhat supported the less obvious results on some of the more
interesting factors that will be discussed. In multivariate analysis the analyst
hopes to find certain obvious results, for if these do not appear any less ob
vious or even untoward results would be dubious. The trivial provides reason
to have some faith in the nontrivial.
Preceding each discussion of the chief factors from among those extracted
and rotated, the higher loading variables and attributes as well as the size of
their loadings will be indicated. Variables that correlated with any factor at
0.30 or above were regarded as significantly related to that dimension or
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pattern, although some lower correlations were also reviewed when these seemed
at least suggestlve.1'7^ Like the pro duct-moment correlation coefficient itself,
the amount of variance each attribute contributed to a factor may be approxi
mated by squaring the factor loading so that a relationship of 0.30 indicated
that some 9 percent of that item's variance was associated with the pattern
depicted by the factor.

FACTOR 1
OFFICIAL*
AGLISTEN
DISCUSS
MEETING
PAMPHLET
MEMBER
POSITION
CONCERN
PROBDISC
IMPROVE
DONATE
PASTDNTE
INFLUNCE
NATIONAL
AGSCHOOL

Leadership
0.h6**
6.h2
0.50
0.32
(0.29)
0.33
0.39
0.60
0.65

0.U7
0.50

o.Uo
0.50
(0.25)
(0.26)

*For convenience, items are noted by their short designations.
full questionnaire items are given in Appendix A.

The

**In cases where the signs + and - of the correlation would make in
terpretation ambiguous, they have been changed to conform with the
text. Thus the wording and coding govern the sign of the correlation,
and changing the positive or negative sign of the factor correlation
simply reverses the direction of the coding.
The most important dimension emerging from the analysis of the major attitudinal and behavioral items of the questionnaire was a cluster of items easily
identified as a leadership pattern. This pattern depicts individuals who may
have been, or were at the time, officials who were members in several organiza
tions other than the farmers' cooperativesand who were likely to have held
some office within these organizations. Providing credibility to their re
sponses , individuals exhibiting such a leadership pattern were not merely pas
sive officeholders but seemed to have actively engaged in discussing village
problems with others. They agreed that they would donate time for village
projects in the future and said that they had done so in the past. There is
evidence that they were attuned to the media, listening to radio coverage of
agricultural problems and reading pamphlets. Although only slightly associated
with this dimension, some interest in national affairs was also evident but not
any tendency to extend this interest to international affairs. This may not be
a fully accurate interpretation, for one of the topics of keen interest in the
Korean co\mtryside during the course of this survey was the reunification talks
that were still proceeding, though haltingly. These were probably regarded,
however, as national rather than international events. These peasants averred
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that they exercised influence in their villages, and they did not seem to de
sire or perceive a need for increased influence. Finally, there was a tendency,
albeit slight, for the pattern to include the desire for an agricultural high
school education for their children.
Notable in connection with this pattern of leadership was the absence of any
attitudinal variables. Efforts to ally the variables present on the factor with
any of the attitudes toward farming, village life or change were unsuccessful.
Village activists apparently held a variety of attitudes, both pro and con, but
these did not importantly relate to the pattern of leadership. While this re
sult was disappointing, what was perhaps even more disappointing was the fact
that none of the possible evidences of innovative farming practices entered
into the pattern either. While leadership of this sort could have been vitally
related to the success or failure of village projects, there is no warrant for
assuming that such individuals were better peasants than nonleaders. Nor did
they enjoy through their efforts and association with the farm media any in
creased output for their crops. While a leadership pattern, such as it appears
to be, would seem to be an Important factor in community development, the re
turns to such an activist were by no means apparent. Perhaps leadership is its
own reward, and there are those who enjoy position without any further return
than prestige. The results did not show that persons rating high on this di
mension were in fact innovators; while they may have led others in common im
provements for the village, there was no evidence of their being the more in
novative or successful peasants. Leadership emerged in this analysis as inde
pendent of innovative propensities and measures of success as peasants. We
might conclude that in 1973 it was not among leader activists that the causal
patterns for Innovative agriculture could be located, even though some of the
pertinent Innovative attributes were present on this factorial pattern.
In addition, and in spite of contacts with radio and pamphlets, it is of
some surprise to note that none of the questions concerning the Saemaul move
ment elicited a response associated with the leadership attributes and variables.
The two factors on which Saemaul responses were loaded saliently contained no
association whatever with other behavioral or attitudinal traits. This would
indicate that the movement had not fully defined itself in the minds of the
peasants, for if anyone were to grasp its messages it would have most likely
been leaders, active in their communities and alert to the national media.
Either the movement had not had time to affect the villages, or it had failed
to stimulate its peasant targets.
There is much to be said for the first alternative, for the movement had been
in existence no more than a year before this survey, but there are other pos
sible conjectures. It would be easy to hypothesize, for instance, that peasants
have become resistant to national messages, whenever they are left with a choice,
and will not begin to amalgamate messages until they discover some good results
forthcoming. Without tangible benefits connected with a movement such as Saemaul,
a psychological resistance to absorbing new outlooks concerning national goals
will be encountered. It must again be cautioned that this is pure conjecture,
not based on any positive results of this factor analysis, but nonetheless con
sonant with the negative results and suggestions of programs in other peasant
societies. When a set of opinions and attitudes does not relate to any other
pattern, there are imdoubtedly reasons for this result.
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FACTOR 3
WETLAND
DRYLAND
YIELD
PARCELS
HIRE
OTHRWORK
TORGIL

Land

0.86
0.30
0.82

O.liO
(0.28)

(-0.2T)
(0.22)

This dimension represents a distinct result that has to do with the size of
holdings. It will be recalled that by law no peasant may hold more than 3.0
chongbo of wetland, but within this limit there are variations in the size of
holdings. A person with holdings pressing these limits will obviously be less
likely than others to have to rely on other work than his farming, as this pat
tern shows. Moreover, it will be generally those with the larger holdings who
will be able and find it necessary to hire others from time to time to aid with
the planting, transplanting, and harvesting. It is not so obvious that the size
of holdings would have anything to do with the yield, which in the questionnaire
was the average yield per majigi and not total yield. Nevertheless, the result
is convincing that peasants with the largest legal holdings of wetland obtained
the largest yields per majigi. It would probably be spurious in 1973 to have
related these larger yields to the planting of Tongil, since that new rice var
iety did not enjoy the success in increasing yields that had been predicted,
both because of inexperience in the techniques of its culture and the inclement
weather conditions during the 1972 harvest. There is some corroboration of this
conjecture in the fact that this pattern does not include the response of "in
creased yields." In addition, the pattern includes the response that fields
were broken into more than one parcel which, most likely, attests to the fact that
these peasants had, on the average, more land than others. Yet fragmentation of
holdings is generally regarded as an evil that should be ultimately eliminated
by the consolidation of holdings. What does this result indicate? It certainly
does not suggest that parcels should be consolidated in all cases. It may sug
gest that peasants with more than one parcel are likely to have holdings among
their parcels that are better than the average of the farmland around their vil
lages. If a single parcel of wetland is a particularly good piece of land, this
would undoubtedly raise the overall average yield. If true, one would antici
pate some resistance to efforts at land consolidation, althoiogh peasants have
generally supported such measiores.
It is disappointing, in a sense, to discover a dimension related to higher
yields of agricultural output but unrelated in this pattern with any of the
attitudes and outlooks generally associated with modernization and more effective
farm practices. This dimension seems to be physical and economic, rather than a
pattern bringing together a variety of behaviors and propensities that would help
to explain the higher output per maC'lg'L. There is absolutely no contribution to
this pattern of any of the forms of village activism, no contributions by atti
tudes, and no association with any of the innovative behaviors pertinent to farm
practices, except for the very small association of planting Tongil. Moreover,
there is not even any indication that the apparent well-being and success sug
gested by this pattern provided any attachment to farming as a way of life; there
is no evidence here that sending one’s sons to an agricultural school was an aim.
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Instead there emerges a bald relationship between the aggregated size of hold
ings and the relatively higher yield obtained.
Cross-tabulations revealed not only the tendency to raise Tongil as the size
of the farm increased, but weedicide was also strongly related to plot size,
with smaller plots being more generally handweeded only. Thus the size of the
farm was an important consideration in the case of several innovative farming
techniques.
It is interesting that in countries practicing extensive farming rather than
the intensive agricultural techniques of rice farming, the yield per portion of
land likely decreases. It seems that the larger farm areas in Korea, where the
limit is approximately the amount of land that can be farmed by a single family,
are more productive than smaller plots. Since larger landholdings enable a
peasant family to devote itself to farming rather than taking on other work with
farming as a part-time occupation, the labor it expends on the land has an ob
vious payoff. Perhaps the upper limits of landholdings might be increased
slightly, although many peasants seemed to feel that two or three chongbo was
about as much land as they could manage.Some increased productivity could
most likely be obtained by amalgamating smaller holdings and increasing the
landholdings of some peasants with little land, while other peasants would quit
farming and devote themselves full-time to other work. It was in order to make
other work available in the countryside that the Third Five-Year Plan called for
a decentralization of factories.

FACTOR 6

Debt

WHOLECOM
AGSCHOOL
DEBT
DEBTINC

0.33
0.59

-0.39

-0.71

Factor 6 contained a small number of items related negatively with debt and
the increase of debt, as seen in the table. The pattern includes the notion
that each peasant will benefit and progress only if the entire community does
so, an attitude slightly related to the factor; it is the first attitude that
has figured into any pattern so far. In Table 3.6 the attitude that "each of
us makes progress only when the community as a whole makes progress" was re
garded as evidence of cooperativeness. The factor suggests a relatively posi
tive attitude toward farming and optimism concerning the future for young per
sons. This seems to relate to the tendency to choose the agricultural school
over other kinds of education for sons. This attitudinal tendency was apparent
ly related to sound financial standing, as indicated by the negative relation
ships to debt, but there is no evidence that these persons were any wealthier
than their neighbors. It is of some interest to note that other items are
missing on the pattern that in other circumstances might have appeared. There
is no indication that lack of debt had anything to do with innovations or yield
but that it related only with the tendency to stay with farming as an occupation
and to see one's sons in the same line of work.
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FACTOR 7

Dryland

DRYLAND
OTHERINC
COMCROP
OTHRWORK
TONGIL

0.6T
0.73

0.38
0.U2
-0.35

Several associations appear on Factor 7j Dryland, which ought not to he sur
prising. While Factor 3 showed a slight tendency for peasants having larger
wetland holdings also to have larger dryland holdings, the factor here concerned
only larger dryland holdings. Holders of dryland would probably specialize
somewhat more in commercial crops, as appears here, and might also under some
circumstances derive much of their income from work other than farming, since
dryland is normally easier to cultivate than wetland rice. The negative re
lationship, or a tendency not to raise Tongil, is also an obvious relationship
because Tongil is a wetland crop. While some peasants with high factor scores
on such a pattern were probably associated with the land in a way different from
their fellows who farmed mainly wetland, or both wetland and dryland, this seemed
to be unrelated to attitudes.20 Peasants in the circumstances of Factor 7 were
not attitudinally different in any discernible respect from other peasants.
This suggests that while attitudinal patterns may differ among peasants, this
difference is unconnected with occupational differences and certain other at
tributes among villagers. Their common situation as villagers seemed to make
their outlooks more or less homogeneous, answering to some extent the query
whether villagers not actually peasants or only part-time peasants see themselves
as peasants.

FACTOR 8

Villagers Take A(

POSITION
VILADVN
VILLOOK
WEED
UREA

0.3k

0.56
0.1+5
-0.1+0
-0.39

Persons who seemed to have some negative attitudes concerning their respective
villages—e.g., that others tried to take advantage of them and that no one
cared how the village looked—also tended to hold some sort of unofficial po
sition in organizations and not to use at least two types of innovation, namely
the most common fertilizer and weedicide. It is somewhat difficult to suggest
reasons for these relationships, for the negative attitudes to village behavior
apparently did not affect the desire to devote time to the village nor the no
tion that villages could be improved if everyone tried, but such individual
behavior as the use of fertilizer and weeding techniques. There are not enough
bridges across other attitudes and behaviors to point to convincing reasons for
these associations.
During the summer preceding the administration of this questionnaire, some
peasants attended brief Saemaul classes. Factor 9 provides some associations
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with this particiilar experience:

FACTOR 9
NEWSPAPR
RESPAUTH
ROOF
SAESCHL

Saemaul School
(0.21+)

(-0.28)
0.53

0.6U

Once again it is apparent that the significant findings related to attendance
in Saemaul summer classes are disappointing. Why didn't these persons, scoring
higher on this factor, also have some strong notions about the materials and
teachings imparted by the Saemaul movement? There were no tendencies to assess
the movement as successful in imparting any particular form of information. It
may be recalled that all of these items appeared on factors unassociated with
other items. Moreover, no behaviors seemed to have been affected by this ex
perience. We find that this pattern was related only to the attitude that dis
agreed with the proposition that the respect for authority is the best lesson
that may be conveyed to children.
The item on the nature of the roof suggests that the peasants attending the
schools may have been among the more well-to-do in the villages. This may be
a good sign, although it had not yet led to any further results by the winter
of 1972-1973, because it broke with a long tradition common to many rural com
munities throughout the less developed agricultural societies. There governmentsponsored functions have usually been attended by those pressured by their vil
lages to attend, while the more influential and wealthier opt out of what is
most often interpreted as an unpleasant situation. For the same reasOn villages
had donated the labor of the least conseguential of the peasants to the old pre
colonial and colonial corvees. Further evidence that Korea broke with this
tradition is fo+ind in a tendency, albeit slight, to read the news. These were
certainly not the least capable villagers denoted in this pattern. Still, there
is little doubt that the Saemaul movement had so far failed to effect some of
the changes that it had aimed to produce among individuals in the villages.
Perhaps it was still too early to discern ultimate changes in the villages and
the peasant was still testing the sincerity of the government and the continuity
of the new program.

FACTOR 10
PARCELS
HIRE
THRESHER
PLOW

Equipment
-0.31
0.32
0.69
0.57

Insofar as the pattern in Factor 10 may be interpreted, it suggests that the
consolidation of land parcels made possible the use of machinery, such as the
mechanical plow, but that the total size of holdings was not involved in the
decision to purchase machinery. In other words, it was consolidation and not
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size that was the crucial feature of farmland. The use of equipment apparently
related to the occasional hiring of farm laborers to help out in the fields,
but it did not relate to any Increases in yields nor to any other form of in
novation or innovative attitudes and behavior. Perhaps it only served to reduce
the peasant's labor.
While several attitudes were aligned on Factor 15, there were no relation
ships to other attributes. Overall, attitudes and behaviors, whether innovative
or not, did not turn out to be closely related in these results. While we have
discovered in the last section that attitudes provided some interesting insights
about the peasants, the real interest in them must be in their effect on be
havior. The results in the factor analysis were disappointing. Factor l6 con
tained a few items associated with the major loading item, ownership of a working
oxen. Although very slight, there was some correlation between the ownership of
a working oxen and the planting of Tongil.

FACTOR IT

Decision

DECISION
IMPROVE
MOREINFL
IWSCTCID

0.71

0.31
0.56
(0.28)

This factor portrays peasants who wished to make the decisions in a group,
who would have liked more influence than they had and who thought that villages
could be improved, provided that peasants cooperated. Since the factor also
contains an aspect of innovative behavior, namely the use of insecticides,^^
these peasants might also have had some notion of modern farm techniques. These
somewhat more aggressive persons with no official capacities or experience in
holding organizational positions might be expected to have been younger peasants,
but age did not load on this factor. In fact, age did not figure prominently
in any important findings except marriage and numbers of children. The younger
generation did not appear to be any more or less innovative than older practic
ing peasants. While it might be conjectured that modern Korean education, as
the common texts used in the elementary and higher schools suggested, emphasized
values that relate to achievement and modernization, these were unlikely to have
affected the young people's practices and attitudes toward farming. It may
therefore be conjectured that so far as farming was concerned, Korean education
had not implanted any new values, for if it had, the factor analysis woiild have
uncovered at least some relationships between age, education, and innovative
attitudes and behavior. This is, however, not an uncommon situation in other
agricultural and less developed nations in which education does not relate di
rectly to the peasants' way of life.^^ Education is an urban influence geared
to urban life styles. It had always been so in Korea, although the old sodang,
village schools that taught basic literacy and the Chinese classics, might have
implanted a basic respect for agriculture.^^
The results in this study, together with the large number of attributes and
attitudes assessed, cannot support Galtung'sstatement that "we would not be
willing to use a measure of modernism that did not show consistent increase with
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are several reasons why it might not be for Korea. First, Korea has been sub
jected to innovation propaganda for a long time, ever since the period under
Japanese colonialism. Second, what Korean children learn in school concerning
modernization is likely to be transmitted to the home. Third, in a literate
society with an active press and radio espousing modernization, few peasants
are likely to escape the proselytization of new ways. Fourth, the peasants in
this survey had attended Saemaul schools where innovative farming techniques
were taught. Fifth, in a growing market economy other factors, such as return
on investment, are likely to outweigh variables associated with age. Given the
large number of possible relationships to age, it is unlikely that none of the
attributes and attitudes entered into this analysis were indicators of moderniza
tion.

FACTOR 20
MEMBER
VILLOOK
COMCROP
DEBT
TONGIL
COOPNEIG
COMPETE

Competition
0.3i+

(-0.27)

0.56
0.1+3

(0.27)
(0.22)
0.55

An individual responding to this type of pattern belonged to a village that
competed in some ways with other neighboring villages. Although the relation
ship is very slight, this competition also led to some degree of cooperation
between the villages and apparently induced an increased concern about the ap
pearance of the villages. Two kinds of innovative behavior were also displayed
through this pattern, the planting of commercial crops and of the new rice
strain. This suggests that innovativeness was not simply associated with rais
ing commercial crops, but that it was related to them in a more complex way.
In addition, there was a tendency to disagree that villagers do not care how
their village looks, which was a possible further outgrowth of competing with
other villages. Membership in organizations also tended to be somewhat higher
among individuals exhibiting high scores on this pattern. Debt may not figure
as an inhibiting factor but may be associated with the relatively innovative
behavior of such a pattern. It does cost some money to set up a new system of
commercial crops, and it does require some outlay in funds to take on the grow
ing of a new rice strain. While competition of this sort is not unknown else
where, socialist systems tend to use it more widely, with competitions between
communes or worker brigades encouraged in order to increase production. Com
petition did not result in Increased output in Korea, but there is evidence
that it contributed to a style of behavior that may ultimately result in in
creased production. The initial failures with the new rice strain in 1972 will
presumably be followed by increases in productivity. The nature of the factor
suggests that competition between villages deserves to be analyzed further.
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FACTOR 21

Shun Cooperation

FARMDRDG
SHUNCOOP
CANTINFL
LESSED
PLANS
WHOLECOM
MINDBUS

(0.22)
0.65
0.3U
0.36
-O.3I+
(-0.25)
(-0.28)

Factor 21 is a series of attitudes that depict a negative view of fanning,
alienation from the community, and a feeling of powerlessness to influence
events and to plan one's life. For the purpose of this section the major sig
nificance of this pattern was the lack of relationship to any other aspect of
"behavior or attribute that might have been related to innovation or cooperation.
The attitudes appeared to be inimical to any form of cooperative or innovative
behavior, and yet not to have any effect on them, positive or negative.in
Factors 22 and 23, on the other hand, there is at least some evidence of inter
relationship between attitudes and specific behaviors and farm practices.

FACTOR 22

Conservatism

RELLYWORK
POLITE
INSCTCID

0.T8
(0.26)
-0.33

FACTOR 23

Authoritarianism

VILADVN
RESPAUTH
TOOEDUC
MINDBUS
LEADAFRD
WEED
INSCTCID

(0.27)
0.36
0.58

(0.29)
0.59

(-0.26)
(-O.2U)

Factor 22 suggests a slight relationship between a relatively conservative
attitude toward change and the nonuse of insecticides before plants were af
fected or total nonuse. A more emphatic relationship is shown in the next factor
between a series of attitudes, all of which might have related to an authoritar
ian cast of mind, and two innovative practices. This pattern related to the non
use of weedicide and the tendency, albeit slight, against the use of insecticide,
or at least prior to insect damage to the plants. In the national sample, this
is the only satisfactory evidence so far that identifiable authoritarianism may
have existed in the villages and related negatively with some innovative practices.
This factor seems to corroborate Hagen's thesis about authoritarianism at the
very basic level of peasant behavior. It is also well to note that the authori
tarian factor did not relate these attitudes to the actual holding of any office
or position. Persons with these attitudes would be expected to make difficult
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leaders, but there is no evidence that the pattern related in any way with the
holding of office. It could be assumed that such Individuals were not popular
with other villagers. Yet there is also no indication that the attitudinal set
either prevented or encouraged cooperation and the donation of time for village
projects.
FACTOR 2h

Visits to Town

DURRES
TOWWVIST
WEWSPAPR
AGLISTEN
MEMBER
WHOLECOM

(0.27)
0.58

0.31
-0.35

(O.2U)
(O.2U)

Factor 2h tells us little of innovative behavior or farm practices. It seems
to relate in a pattern several items suggesting an orientation away from the
farm and toward the town. Very slightly, possibly as a result of the somewhat
higher newspaper readership, there was a notion that the whole community could
indeed work together to improve things for the village.26 However, this opinion
was not necessarily associated with behavior.
FACTOR 25
POLITE
TOOEDUC
GOODLUCK
INSCTCID
UREA
COOPWEIG
COMPETE

Good Luck
0.52

(0.21;)
0.69

(0.25)
(-0.27)
0.38

(0.25)

The relationships on Factor 25 are not easy to grasp. The attitudes indicated
some amount of attachment to the village, together with a somewhat traditional
attitude toward fortune, e.g., the feeling that young persons were too educated
and a belief in good luck. But their relationship to the use of insecticide
prior to insect attacks and to village competition was not evident. Once again
we find competition among villagers associated with cooperation between them.
For the present it may be best to leave this factor uninterpreted. The addition
of other items in the questionnaire may possibly suggest a bridge between these
seemingly unrelated items. Perhaps there are some untested questions that ought
to have been included in this research, but it is difficult to guess what these
might have been. The fact that other patterns seemed to be readily interpretable
suggests the idea that this factor, too, might make some sense if new items were
entered into the analysis.
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FACTOR 26
IMPROVE
MOREINFL
NATIONAL
FARMDRDG
CANTINFL
INSCTCID

News
(-0.26)
(O.2U)
0.58

(0.22)
(-0.29)
(-0.29)

Several tendencies are related on Factor 26 that are not easily explained.
This pattern suggests a major interest in following national news but does not
positively relate the notion that the village community can be improved. A
very slight relationship with a negative attitude toward farming ("farming is
drudgery") and a negative behavior (the use of insecticide, with its negative
relationship) in farm practice might reveal a pattern of behaviors and opinions
that oriented a peasant scoring high on this factor to the national political
world rather than to the local level. Such a peasant might have believed, e.g.,
that he could affect politics and society and enhance his own influence by re
moving himself from the village sphere. If this conjecture is correct, this
pattern does not indicate any consequent loss to village leadership, coopera
tion, or modernization.
FACTOR 27
ENERGY
FARMDRDG
FARMSTNG
MEETPEOP
AGSCHOOL

Farmers' Standing
(0.2lt)
-0.30
-0.73

(-0.26)

(0.28)

One of several disappointing results in this analysis was the lack of associa
tion of physical energy with other items of interest, with the exception of the
result in Factor 27 and the obvious result on another pattern that energetic
feelings were also associated with absence of sickness.27 But there is a slight
relationship between energy and three items of attitude that suggested a positive
orientation to farming as an occupation. The sole result, however, aside from a
psychological one, was the propensity to send boys to agricultural school. It
might also be expected that such a pattern would include some tendency to inno
vate and accept new practices, but this is not supported.
The last factor contains the sole item of last-name, or clan, villages (O.8O),
unassociated with any other variable. This is in itself a somewhat revealing
result, for it shows that in villages where most persons had the same name, there
was neither more nor less Innovation nor a greater degree of cooperation. Some
sources suggest that last-name villages might in fact be less ready to innovate
because they are more likely to be steeped in tradition, but that is not borne
out by this analysis.28 it might also be posited that such villages would have
higher morale or a higher degree of cooperation, but that did not prove to be
the case either. Respondents from last-name villages were no different from any
other peasants, except that they were from last-name villages.
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Having discussed the separate factorial results, we may now attempt to syn
thesize their major lessons. It should be repeated that these findings pertain
only to a group of Korean peasant respondents in 1973, and that under other cir
cumstances or at another time they may have turned out differently. For in
stance, the Saemaul movement was new, and its potential contribution to the
countryside would not yet necessarily have been evident. While some hypotheses
have been supported in the findings discussed in this section, the most notable
result is that these patterns contain a good deal of amorphousness. A definite
pattern of leadership emerged, and it combined concern with village problems,
donations of time to village projects, influence, position, and so forth, but
it did not bring into the relationship any of the more tangible innovative be
haviors practiced by peasants nor any relationship with the Saemaul movement.
Contact with the media did figure into the leadership pattern to the extent that
agricultural programs were heard over the radio and pamphlets were read. These
were very specific contacts with media, indicating a concern with farm problems
rather than a diffuse interest in the media as such.
On this and many other patterns, the general conclusion must be that attitudes
as such did not play a vital role in agricultural leadership on innovation.
The minor exceptions to this seemed to involve the tendency to regard an agri
cultural education as desirable for children and some tendency for an authori
tarian frame of mind to slightly inhibit certain new farm practices. If these
data are analyzed in order to discern the antecedents of agricultural modernity,
there are few salient hints as to how this might be accomplished. However, it
would seem, unspectacularly, that the size of the wetland holdings had some
thing to do with a large output per majigi, regardless of the attitudes or
energy of the peasant himself. It also seems to be the case that competition
between villages helped as much as any other condition in contributing to such
practices as planting the new rice strain and commercial crops.
In the Korean farm context, what with holdings of limited size, type of crops
planted, and so forth, the consolidation of parcels might have contributed to
the use of farm machinery, but there is no evidence that it increased output.
Some attitudinal questions indirectly asked whether it reduced the peasants'
workload, but peasants using machinery apparently did not regard farm work as
more or less of a drudgery than peasants making less use of machinery.
The results seem
to lead to the conclusionthat attitudes and practices had
generally little to
do with increased output. There is also little evidence
that attitudes and practices affected income which could be determined by the
nature of the roof,whether tiled or not, and
by the amount of debt. Further
more, the. results show that the overall structure ofthe economy did not bring
out the patterns that might have been anticipated if the peasants had in fact
been innovating and reaping the rewards of their innovations. Leadership pat
terns were distinctly present in the population, innovative practices were made
use of and, as clearly demonstrated in the previous section, there was good
village morale and a positive attitude toward farming, but these disparate pat
terns were not drawn into a network that provided positive feedback to peasants.
Positive feedback would have combined, say, attitudes and practices into patterns
of behavior contributing, if at all possible given the state of the land and
economy, to increased output which, in turn, would have rewarded innovative be
havior and drawn into the pattern more attitudes of morale and leadership, until
a pattern emerged that combined all of the salient attributes of modernization.
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For such a positive feedback system to be established, however, there would
have to be ample tangible rewards for the peasants, and at a rate sufficiently
large and fast to increase and elaborate such behavior. Needless to say, there
had been long periods of negative feedback, a historical training in non
innovation and resignation, particularly during the Japanese occupation
and
following the military government's decision in the 1960s to channel income in
to the cities at the expense of the countryside. The results of this decision
may quite possibly still prevail in the countryside. If there are modernizing
tendencies present, and some of the patterns indicate that these existed in
1973, they are just beginning to develop. Indeed, Lee Man-Gap says that farm
ers lost productive incentives because of the low grain price policy in effect
until recently tl973].''3° Time and future efforts will determne whether a con
dition of rewards to peasants for Improved techniques ("positive feedback ) can
be established in the Korean agricultural sector. This is a common problem of
the countryside well summarized on the other side of the world in a statement
made to Jean-Pierre Peroncel-Hugoz by an old Egyptian farmer, "Why do they buy
cotton from us at so much lower a price than they get for it abroad? I agreed
to let the cooperative help me, which resulted in my product going up a third.
But what's the point?"31 This is the classic case of unrewarded change ( neg
ative feedback") in the agricultural sector. It is the age-old tradition, con
temptuous of the peasant, of mobilizing the wealth of the countryside for the
benefit of the city, a practice that Nash likens to the practices of the ancient
irrigation empires of the Khmer, the Maya, the Aztec and Pharaonic Egypt.
One of the questions allied to attitudes toward farming, whether to send sons
to an agricultural high school, turned up on several factors although it was not
salient on any one of them. Certain variables are occasionally associated with
a great many separate patterns and factors, bridging all of them because of some
central importance; e.g., in factoring forms of international conflict, the
variable "threats" is associated with the separate (orthogonal) patterns of war,
diplomacy, and belligerency, because it plays an important role in all of them.
This may also have been the case with sending son's to agricultural high school.
Since attitudes toward farming were a critical hypothesis—they were thought to
be of intrinsic importance to innovation, output, and cooperation it seemed
advisable to assess further the desire of peasants to send their sons to an
agricultural high school. The results of this specific analysis are the sub
ject of Chapter k.

Chapter k
I WANT MY SON TO BE A PEASANT: THE IMPACT OF PEASANT
ATTITUDES TOWARD FARMING ON INNOVATION
AND VILLAGE IMPROVEMENT

A major motive in conducting this survey was to determine whether peasant
attitudes toward farming explained any considerable proportion of the variance
in decisions to implement certain innovations or to cooperate in village proj
ects.
Evidence offered in the preceding chapter in support of this hypothesis
has not been overwhelming. Some alternative hypotheses were tried, relating
innovation and cooperativeness to religion, physical energy, age, and other
factors, but none of these provided adequately positive results. Was it pos
sible that the peasant's attitude toward his daily work did not make a percep
tible difference in his behavior? Table 3.1 showed that there was some dif
ference of opinion about farming as an occupation; attitudes in the countryside
were by no means unanimous concerning the nature of farmwork.
Although a peasant might not dislike his work and might even think of it as
interesting, he might also recognize that there is little or no futxire to be
gleaned from the soil for himself and his family. Especially when in a rapidly
developing economy, like Korea's since the 1960s, the status of agriculture tends
to remain stagnant despite steadily increasing output, peasants might easily come
to believe that they occupied a backwater in the stream of change in their coun
try.^ Thus regardless of their like or dislike of farming, there is another
subtly associated perception that might be critical to the peasants' attitudinal
outlook and behavior, namely the perception whether farming had a viable future
or not. Fortunately there was one question that related to this issue: "Would
you prefer your son (or sons) to attend agricultural high school or a nonagricultural high school?" To interpret an answer to this question somewhat
broadly, it might be suggested that a peasant who preferred the agricultural
school for his sons was likely to perceive some future in the occupation of
farming, while those who did not prefer to send their sons to an agricultural
school may have had some doubts about the future of agricultiire in Korea, opting
for a possible urban occupation for their sons. Alternative interpretations
might also exist depending, e.g., on the availability of scholarships, but these
cannot be assessed with the present data. Most peasants seemed to have a neg
ative attitude toward the future of agriculture; 60.2 percent of the respondents
did not want their sons to attend an agricultural school, against 39-8 percent
who did. Seventy-one persons did not respond to this question, some because
they read the question literally and had no sons as yet. As in the case of
comparing the peasant's standard of living with that of other Koreans, a sizable
percentage of the peasants may have doubted the future of the agricultural sec
tor and thus may not have wanted their sons to attend farm schools.
If the responses to this question are interpreted as signifying faith, or
lack of faith, in the future of agriculture, the resulting cross-tabulation of
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this attitude and other attitudes and behaviors is suggestive and interesting.
The preceding chapter showed that sending sons to agricultural schools did load
on a number of factors, making it of intrinsic interest as a possible key con
cept. As a first step, the relationship of the choice to the strong pattern
among the other questions regarding attitude toward farming was determined.
Not surprisingly, a close relationship was uncovered, as shown in Table U.l.
Peasant attitudes toward fanning formed a distinct pattern and were generally
unassociated with other attitudes, such as village morale. Since sending
sons to agricultural school was associated with such a pattern, the following
analysis uses it as an individual indicator, assuming that it contains some
meaning associated with the other attitudes in Table 4.1 as well as some var
iance (association with other variables and attributes) that is unique to it
self.
Table 4.1
Desire to Send Sons to an Agricultural High School
and the Attitudes Toward Farming*

FAEMDRDG
STANDING
ENJOY
DISADVTG
MOVECITY
UNINTST
FARMRINT
AGSCHOOL

-0.6T
-0.55
0.4t
-0.46
-0.42
-0.59
(0.28)
0.45

*The factor reported in this table is the result of an orthogonal,
Varimax rotation of a complete factoring of the national sample
of attitudes. Attitudes toward farming were the most salient
result, attesting to the reliability and possible validity of
this dimension.

In the first place, there was some difference between those who would send
their sons to agricultural schools—we will call these peasants the agschoolers
and those who would not in terms of their influence and of their desire to have
more influence. The former also seemed to admit to being more energetic, but
both groups showed the same high preference for making the decisions of a group
Why the tendency for the agschoolers to feel more energetic? Unfortunately,
there were no data supporting a guess that these peasants were healthier. This
may possibly have been not only a physical characteristic but also a psycho
logical attribute. Since the agschoolers were also those who tended to like
farming, it might have been somewhat easier for them to carry out their agri
cultural work with greater verve. This explanation becomes more probable as
further relationships appear with this attitude.
Attitudinally the agschoolers also appeared to be those for whom farming was
a more compatible occupation. While a single percentaged table is reproduced
(see Table 4.3), the other attributes characterizing the set of attitudes
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toward farming were also related to this attribute, as shown in Table i;.l, and
strongly indicated that peasants with some faith in the future of agricultiire
were among those who liked their occupation best. While in a general sense
both groups of peasants believed that people do not shun cooperation, the agschoolers were more specific in their attitudes concerning village morale. It
can be seen that they generally got along better within their village milieu
than did others. This pattern of relationships was fairly consistent and was
related to a series of questions presented earlier on the questionnaire. The
agschoolers were somewhat more likely to believe that there was opportunity
to improve the villages through mutual cooperation. More importantly, they
had been among those who tended to donate more time to such village improve
ments in the past and, above all, they appeared to be most willing to donate
time in the future. A possible conclusion is that if village Improvement proj
ects are to be successful in raising the quality of life in the countryside, it
is essential that peasants be assured that agriculture has a bright future. It
was among these persons who believed in the future of agriculture that the
readiest village workers were found. It was among these individuals that the
greater percentage was found of peasants who listened to agricultural radio
programs. With this evidence, in addition to the evidence that these peasants
had probably donated more time in the past to village projects, it becomes ap
parent that some attitudes might really be critical to the behavior of peasants,
a possibility that is most heartening and that has so far received little sup
port in the analysis of this survey.
There is no evidence that these peasants found it any easier than others to
express their opinions, which is consonant with the finding that the groups
did not differ in their participation in group decisions. However, the ag
schoolers tended to feel more efficacious. This is a particularly interesting
result, given the evidence in Table ii.2 that the agschoolers as a group were
somewhat less educated than their counterparts.
Turning to the crucial innovative behaviors, we get mixed results, but where
differences existed between the agschoolers and other peasants, they corroborate
the hypothesis of the Impact of this attitude most encouragingly. The two
groups did not differ in the use of weedicide nor in the percentage raising the
new rice strain nor was there any indication that the agschoolers might have
introduced the new rice earlier. But agschoolers did seem to be more modern in
their use of insecticide and in the introduction of commercial crops, and they
also reported an increase in the yield of their rice crops, possibly as a re
sult of somewhat better farming techniques.
With the distinction between the agschoolers and other peasants there was
also some indication at last that the Saemaul movement may have had a differ
ential impact. The agschoolers tended to be those peasants who had attended
Saemaul schools, probably in the summer of 1972. To be sure, this is a slight
relationship. As seen by the tables, there were no differences between the
groups in some of the aspects of the Saemaul message—both suggested aspects
of the Saemaul movement that stressed psychological benefits provided to peas
ants and methods of management. However, there was a slight difference in
opinion concerning the movement's message in terms of economic improvements
for peasants. Moreover, the two groups differed strongly over the public use
fulness of the movement—the tendency to mention this aspect of the program
might have been related to the agschoolers' greater degree of village morale—
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Tatle

.2

Some Attributes Associated ■with the Desire
to Send Sons to Agricultural School
(Unless otherwise indicated, the results reported
are statistically significant using
a chi-square criterion)

DECISION

Agschool
Yes
No

Myself
%

Others
%

82.6

17.U

T9.2

20.8

ENERGY

Agschool
Yes
No

Energetic
%

Often tired, or varies
%

37.6
2k.3

62.lt

75.7

INFLUENCE

Agschool
Yes
No

A great deal, or
more than most
%

Average, or
less
%

56.9

lt3.1
lt9.9

50.1

DESIRE FOR MORE INFLUENCE

Agschool
Yes
No

Want more
%

Satisfied
%

8U.T
76.8

15.3
23.2

EDUCATION

Agschool
Yes
No

Elementary
school
%

Junior
High
%

Senior
High
%

Higher
Education
%

28.0
18.8

27.5
19.8

33.lt
lt3.3

11.1
18.0
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Table k.2

Some Attributes, continued
DEBT INCREASE

Agschool
Yes
No

Increase
/o

Same
7

Decrease
7

10,8

18.2
21+.6

71.0
60.2

15.2

HELD POSITION IN ORGANIZATION
(but not government official)

Agschool
Yes
No

Yes*
/o

No*
7

1+9.8
35.8

21.0,
28.9

*The remaining percentage were not members of organizations arid a small percentage did not reply.

Table 1+. 3
Desire to Send Sons to Agricultural School
and Association with Selected Attitudes
DONTCARE
Agree
%
Agschool
Yes
No

29.3
31.3

Uncertain
%
19.3
28.0

Disagree
%
51.1+
1+0.6

p. < .0001
ABLE
Agschool
Yes
No

85.7
78.9

6.5

7.8

10.5

10.6

1+.8

73.3
51+-9

p. < .01
FARMDRDG
Agschool
Yes
No

21.9
37.3

7.8

81+
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Table i+.U
Desire to Send Sons to Agricultural School
and Village Attitudes and Cooperativeness
CONCERN
Agschool
Yes
No

Agschool
Yes
No

Little (%)

Often (%)

35.7

6U.3

l+lt.5

55.5

PROBDISC
Often (%)

Not Often (%)
1*7.0

52.9
38.1

61.7

IMPROVE
Agschool
Yes
No

Yes (%)

No, or Don't Know (%)

93.1

6.9
15.6

8U.4
DONATE

Agschool
Yes
No

Yes (%)

No, or Don't Know (%)

80.6

19.1*

60.1*

39.6

PASTDNTE
Agschool
Yes
No

Yes (%)

No (%)

76.7
63.7

23.1
36.3

WHOLECOM
Agree (%)
Agschool
Yes
No

Uncertain (%)
1*.U
6.3

80.8

81*. 2

Disagree (%)
ll*.8
9.6

p < .01
AGLISTEM

Agschool
Yes
No

Often (%)

Sometimes, Seldom,
and Never (%)

58.6

1*1.1*
56.3

1*3.7
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Village Attitudes and Cooperativeness, continued.
VILLAGE PEACEFUL
Agree (%)

Agschool
Yes
No

Uncertain (%)
13.8
19.8

55.3
1+2.9

Disagree (%)
30.9
37.3

VILLAGE COOPERATIVE
Agree (%)
Agschool
Yes
No

Uncertain (%)
6.9
13.6

79.0

61*.8

Disagree (%)
ll+.l
21.6

Table 1+. 5
Some Innovative Behaviors Associated with the Desire
to Send Sons to Agricultural School
INSECTICIDE
Before, or Both (%)
Agschool
Yes
No

92.7

81*.9
COMMERCIAL CROP
Yes (%)

Agschool
Yes
No

5l*.9
1+8.3

After (%)
7.3
15.1

No (%)
1+1+.8
51.6

YIELD INCREASE
Increase (%)
Agschool
Yes
No

Same, or
Decrease (%)

81.5

18.5

70.8

29.2

and the improvement of the local environment. Given these results, it is pos
sible to conjecture that the greatest impact of the Saemaul movement up to
1973 had been among peasants who were convinced of the future of farming.
Un
fortunately it is impossible to ascertain whether the movement itself had con
vinced them that agriculture was to enjoy a more respectable future in Korea or
whether they had had this attitude prior to their contact with the movement.
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Finally, there was a very strong relationship between the two groups on the
question whether they woiild move from the country into the city, provided that
they were assured of a somewhat higher income. The evidence here suggests that
it was not necessarily the most productive, energetic, or progressive individ
uals who tended to leave the farms, but those who were less able to succeed.
It points to the "push" rather than the "pull" factors, lack of success in and
dissatisfaction with farming rather than the attractiveness of urban life that
had the greatest effect on who would move from the farm to the city. This evi
dence corroborates the pattern shown on Table U.6, but it is also limited since
many potential leaders might already have left their farms before the survey
was taken.

Table h.6
Saemaul School Experience and Desire
to Send Sons to Agricultural School
Attended Saemaul School, Summer
Agschool
Yes
No

Yes (%)

No (%)

71.3
6U.8

28.5
3U.8

Helps the Environment
Mentioned (%)
Agschool
Yes
No

63.2
U8.2

Not Mentioned (%)
36.2
51.6

Increases Public Benefits
Mentioned (%)
Agschool
Yes
No

60.1
50.0

Not Mentioned (%)
39.3
U9.8

Economic Improvements for Farmers
Mentioned (%)
Agschool
Yes
No

70.2
62.2

Not Mentioned (%)
29.2
37.6

What was the nature of the agschoolers’ optimism about the future? On the
attitude concerning the expectations of youth in the future, no differences oc
curred between agschoolers and others. Both groups showed a high level of
positive affect toward a young man’s expectations about the future. Unfortu
nately this perception did not focus attention on a young man's expectations

I Want My

Son to he a Peasant

87

about the future as a peasant, -which distinction had not occurred to us when
devising the questionnaire. However, to anticipate the village data to he re
ported in Chapter 5, several evaluations were made in that expanded question
naire using Cantril's ladder technique. The village data, presented in Table
U.8 show that village agschoolers had higher expectations about the future.
Given the nature of the ladder assessments, it is likely that villagers did
have farming in mind when they evaluated the past, present, and future. As a
group, village agschoolers seemed more sanguine about the present and future.
The relationship of the village results to the national sample is, of course,
moot, but it is interesting that the percentage of village peasants who wanted
their sons to attend an agricultural school was about the same for the national
sample. They, too, were a minority.

Table U.T
Desire to Send Sons to Agricultural School and Willingness
to Move to City for Economic Reasons
MOVECITY

Agschool
Yes
No

Agree (%)

Uncertain (%)

Disagree (%)

39.1
62.9

8.7
10.it

52.2
26.7

Table i+.8
Assessments of Past, Present, and Future by Village
Agschoolers and Others, Using Cantril's Ladder
Past
Agschool
(N=37)

Present

Future

h.6

6.1

8.5

Nonagschool
(N=11T)

k.h

5.1

7.1

t-tests

NS

p < . 01

p < .003

As an addendum to this analysis, it might be interesting to determine whether
the agschoolers had more or less self-esteem than their counterparts. We have
already mentioned that both men and women seemed to score low on some of the
questions intended for this attitude. Both were assessing themselves as peas
ants rather than distinguishing themselves by sex; if there was an invidious
comparison, it was between themselves as peasants against urbanites. Ag
schoolers and nonagschoolers gave almost identical responses to the statement,
"l feel I do not have much to be proud of," agreeing 6h.O and 65.3 percent,
respectively. Behind the agschoolers' apparent optimism there seemed to lurk
the shadow of a humble self-evaluation.
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Although many hypotheses were tested to determine which peasant attitudes or
attributes were the most critical in relating attitudes to cooperation and in
novative practices, none provided the consistent predicted relationship of the
decision to send sons to agricultural school. This was indeed a critical at
tribute that seemed to underlie many disparate patterns of behavior and frames
of mind. While it is not clear exactly what the choice of an agricultural
school for one's sons might have signified, it would seem appropriate to sur
mise that it indicated at least a faith in the future of agriculture as an
occupation. That a minority of peasants seemed to believe this contributes to
the realism of this conjecture. A transitional society such as Korea probably
provides ample reason to lose faith in the possibility of an adequate quality
of life in the countryside. It is the urban environment, changing more rapidly
than the countryside, that seems to hold more promise for the future. But it
is among peasants most optimistic about the future of farming who are most like
the innovators the village programs are trying to produce. If farming is to
have a constructive future, it will be to some degree because of this minority
among the rural population.
Both groups seemed able to perceive in the Saemaul movement an effort to
affect the peasant's psychology and the adequacy of his farm management, but it
was the agschoolers who tended to perceive the movement's potential impact on
their rural environment, on the peasants as a group, and on the farm economy.
This faith in the future was not simply an isolated mental attitude but, as
shown in the foregoing analysis, apparently translated itself into actual ef
forts at improving conditions in the village and in personal efforts at adopt
ing more innovative techniques.
It would seem obvious that such a faith in the future of agriculture must
be stim\jlated by more than slogans. The peasants must enjoy the reality of an
increasing quality of life, and their efforts, such as the agschoolers seemed
already to have contributed in projects and personal farm improvements, must
receive and be perceived as receiving some rewards. The distinction between
those peasants having faith in the future of agriculture (some one-third) and
those that were more doubtful (the remaining two-thirds) is very eloquent evi
dence of where things stood in Korea in 1973. The Saemaul movement had a good
deal of resistance to overcome, a large degree of proof to offer the peasants,
but a fair potential for success in the future.

THE VILLAGE SURVEY

Chapter 5
WO KOREAN VILLAGES^

Description and Hypotheses
In addition to the national sample reported in the preceding chapters, a sur
vey was made of heads of households in two Korean villages. With the exception
of a few families that had reportedly moved from one of the villages in the re
cent past, this survey was complete. These two villages were selected from
among the 3^,665 that are scattered throughout the countryside, surrounded hy
more or less fertile fields of rice or barley. Like individuals, each village
has its unique personality and just as the soils on every field must differ
somewhat from the soil on every other cultivated field, each village differs
from all the others.
However, we did not want to choose just any two villages at random but to
select two villages that were somehow representative insofar as any villages
could be. Thus fishing villages were not selected because comparisons were to
be made to a national sample of peasants. Villages that were too close to major
population centers, particularly to Seoul, Taegu, or Pusan, were ruled out be
cause some peasants would have probably become industrial workers in these areas,
and we wanted to sample full-time peasants. Villages in the region of President
Park Chiing Hee's birthplace were ruled out as being possibly too supportive of
the Saemaul movement. Villages in areas that had particularly good soils and
climate as well as villages that were situated in arid or too moiontainous regions
were ruled out as possibly unrepresentative of the elusive "norm" of Korean vil
lages. We wanted neither to study exemplary villages nor to focus on the worst
possible cases.
With all of these criteria in mind, suggestions were elicited from Korean
scholars, and a central region of the country was selected within which to choose
two villages. The region had the reputation of being neither progressive nor
backward. Innovations had sometimes been introduced here, with the idea that if
they worked out well in such a representative region, they ought to succeed else
where in Korea. The region is relatively mountainous and drained by the Kum and
Han rivers. The major crops were rice and barley, but considerable amounts of
tobacco, silk cocoons and, in one village, ginseng for the government monopoly
were also raised. The nearest city was a collection center for rice, tobacco,
soybeans, and other commodities, and its major industry was food processing and
textiles.
Having selected the region, we then determined that of the two villages, one
was to be relatively progressive in terms of the projects it was able to com
plete within the Saemaul movement, while the other was to be a more backward
village. Both villages were to be in the same county so as to assure that farm
ing conditions were similar. By assuring the same climatic conditions and, with
the advice of the myonjang, the same soil conditions, we hoped to control some
extraneous conditions, so that those attributes and attitudes of Interest in the
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national study would tie the most relevant remaining factors in explaining the
difference between the villages in their innovative progress.2 The final selec
tion of villages was made on the recommendation of the deputy myonjang, a county
official familiar with the villages within the region, who quickly selected the
appropriate villages from the county map. A visit to the villages and discus
sions with the village heads corroborated the choices as most appropriate in
terms of the requisite criteria.
We will call the progressive village Nae-il and the backward village Oje.
They are located some thirty miles from the nearest urban area which is one of
the smaller cities of Korea. Seoul, with over seven million inhabitants, is the
major urban center, but lanlike Thailand where Bangkok dominates any other com
peting urban area, or the Philippines where Manila and its environs is the pre
dominant urban area, there are several urban concentrations throughout Korea with
most villages within an hour's ride by bus. This is not to deny, of course, that
Seoul is the cultural and administrative lodestone of the nation. As large and
bustling as other Korean cities might be, they still have a provincial flavor,
reflecting an urbanity and culture generated elsewhere. Yet these other Korean
cities—Taegu, Taewon, Kyongju, Pusan, Kwangju, and Ch'ongju—are cities in their
own right.
The city nearest our two villages was not the chief service center of the
coiinty. The market center and county seat, with some 3,000 inhabitants, had
been the closest and most convenient source of entertainment, political discus
sion, and supplies. Until shortly before our survey, such towns had indeed
been market towns, with market days at specified times each month, bringing to
gether villagers from the surrounding countryside to sell produce, to purchase
necessities and a few luxuries of late, to drink and gamble, and converse with
friends. These market days, however, had been officially discontinued just prior
to the survey tak:en in Wae-il and 5je, but too recently to have Included ques
tions eliciting peasant opinions on this official .decree.
It was also not possible to ascertain the opinions of villagers concerning
another restrictive law that had come to affect their lives, namely the law
limiting expenditures on funerals, wedaings, and other ceremonies. According
to several sources, these celebrations used to deplete the peasants' resources
for they had become socially competitive, and the burial of one's parents had
been a matter of such importance that no family wanted to be regarded as unfilial, an attitude not unknown in other cultures. While some peasants may
have felt relieved that they could now conserve their meager resources without
social disapproval, others may have been resentful at the official tampering
with a long-observed custom.3 These laws that stringently regiilated tradition
al expenditures were passed shortly after these interviews in Nae-il and 5je
were conducted. Thus a most opportune occasion was lost to determine attitudes
toward governmental regulation. Political opinions were elicited, however, and
these will be reported later in the chapter.
The maps of Nae-il and Oje on pp. 90-91 show their differences in physical
characteristics and cultivation. Both were predominantly rice villages, but
they also grew some commercial crops. The shed for drying tobacco was the most
salient structure in Oje, while the new community center and the presence of
more tiled roofs distinguished Nae-il. The number of households at the time of
the survey in Nae-il was 79; Oje was slightly larger with 92 households. The
survey was conducted by student interviewers from a nearby agricultural college.

Two Korean Villages

93

Most of these Intervievers were from the same region as the villages surveyed.
Since the first three months of the year are slack months in the Korean country
side, an effort was made to conduct the interviews before the heavy labors of
field preparation and transplanting in April, May, and June. Unfortunately,
this was not possible, so that a brief interim period just prior to transplant
ing in May had to be designated for the interviews. May is a very busy month,
what with barley and wheat harvesting, rice transplanting, and silkworm rais
ing, 5 but the interviews were successfully conducted and all household heads
were surveyed.
For some of the underlying attribute and attitudinal differences between the
villages, several hypotheses will be presented that would seem to appropriately
demarcate potential differences expected between an innovative village and one
that is much less innovative. These hypotheses are of two kinds, one aiming at
substantial differences in traits and attributes, and the other at attitudinal
dimensions characterizing individuals in each type of village. In addition to
these anticipated differences, a more general approach will attempt to amalga
mate the two groups of hypotheses in the next section. Since these hypotheses
have already been discussed in connection with the national survey, they will
be only very briefly touched on here.
The hypothesis that education has a major effect on innovative behavior may
seem generally appropriate but not in a society like Korea where the literacy
rate was well over 90 percent. Indeed, as seen earlier in this book, the na
tional survey showed that education played little or no role in peasant atti
tudes or behavior. Educational differences do not relate importantly to dif
ferences in modern beliefs because, as has been suggested earlier, schools do
not necessarily teach or inculcate those beliefs that might be appropriate for
innovative behavior among a farm population.6 Even if schools raised through
textbooks the level of aspirations, this may contribute only to aspirations
toward urban goals. Textbooks used by ghetto children in other countries may
very well raise the level of their aspirations, but if no appropriate social
clues for the realization of these aspirations are provided, they may lead to
effects on belief systems different than initially intended. In fact, the real
effect of education may not be to convey substantive content or to develop a
modern pattern of attitudes affecting behavior, but to open the media to the
newly-educated. Thus if differences are created through education, it may be
that these exist between the educated at any level and those receiving no ed
ucation at all, a situation no longer common in Korea.
With these reservations in mind, we would still expect the young to be more
innovative than the middle-aged and the old, partly because they are receiving
more education. The young might innovate regardless of the rewards society
gives for successful innovation, because they have not yet directly experienced
any sense of frustration at unrewarded increases in output. As society changes
from a primary-producing economy to an industrialized nation, we would expect
the transmission of the more modern attitudes supposedly accompanying such
changes to be more frequent among the younger than the older peasants. The
results of the national survey, however, suggest that age may not have been a
vital attribute in terms of innovation.
Media contact had greatly increased in Korea, and it was a rare peasant who
did not have his own radio. In addition, there were many newspapers, over a
dozen published in Seoul alone. The Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture also
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made use of other media materials, including movies, slides, and pamphlets. It
is assumed that as contact with the media increases, so do modern outlooks and
innovative and cooperative behaviors. Attendance at meetings where farm prob
lems are discussed should also increase innovative behavior.
Holding some position, official or Informal, in an organization ought to
contribute to innovative behavior, but some village 'organizations might not in
duce innovation. Thus there is no immediate reason why some kyes should be con
ducive to innovative behavior, although other types of kyes have long been
associated with village innovation. There are other indications that in single
name villages, strong organizations of this type may even afford barriers to
innovating behavior.T Nevertheless, the point here is that any position of
leadership, through the experience and responsibility it imparts, is conducive
to innovative behavior. A village in which individuals have better opportunities
to attain some office will tend to be more innovative than a village in which
they have fewer opportunities. While the leadership pattern in the national
sample was a complex association of leadership traits and village activities
and Interest, no major evidence of innovative behavior with respect to farming
was associated with this factor, as will be recalled. This dampens the expec
tations concerning this hypothesis.
We would expect a somewhat superior incidence of ego-strength, personal
morale, orientation toward change, village morale, and a positive attitude to
ward farming in the progressive village and somewhat stronger traditionalism,
family orientation, and authoritarianism in the less progressive village.
Among these attitudes, those toward farming may be regarded as potentially quite
important. Despite their expected impact on the villages, education, the media,
and governmental exhortation were deemed less likely to produce any perceptible
innovative behavior in peasants if they failed to motivate them to improve their
farming, a motivation that would appear associated with a positive attitude to
ward farming as an occupation. Without such a positive attitude, it would even
be more likely that the stimulation of innovative attitudes induces a peasant
to move to the city. Even given the potential to innovate, as evidenced by the
existence of "right attitudes" or receptive attitudes, there must be some feel
ing of attachment to the occupation of farming in order to tie these attitudes
to innovative behavior. Thus it was assumed that the progressive village would
harbor more positive attitudes toward farming than the more backward village.
These hypotheses will be explicitly analyzed in the next section.
As in the national sample of responses, innovative individual behavior was
determined by the responses to questions concerning such matters as the use of
insecticide and weedicide, the growing of a commercial crop, the planting of
Tongil and the nature of the roof on one's home. It is, of course, possible
though unlikely that individual innovative behavior might be entirely unrelated
to behavior of the kind that would provide evidence that an entire village was
innovative. For instance, villagers might join in group projects, such as
building a community center or constructing bridges, but not personally innovate
in their farming techniques. This division in Innovative and cooperative be
havior between village and individual was, however, not anticipated.
Nae-il appeared to be the better organized village, and the physical evidence
suggested that it had almost fulfilled its community projects for the first year
of the Saemaul movement; it was on the verge of being redesignated a selfsufficient village. A drainage system through the center of the village, a new
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road that ran down to the nearhy stream (some villagers had had to donate a
small portion of land to this project!), and an impressive community building
attested to the labor that had been expended for the benefit of the village.
No bridge had as yet been built over the stream to the peasants' fields, but
expectations seemed high that it would be shortly completed. The community
building had a small hall that was used for gatherings, some of which pertained
to innovation and the Saemaul movement—the brother of the lijang was the move
ment leader in the village—but another room housed a wine shop which undoubtedly
raised village conviviality while contributing little to the Saemaul spirit.
Sje, by contrast, had no such projects in evidence. It seemed to be a vil
lage at rest. These obvious physical differences indicated that one village
was indeed progressive, while the other, like most Korean villages at the time
of the survey, was still correctly categorized as "self-preparatory," or back
ward.^ This physical evidence was buttressed by organizational differences,
with 5je being relatively less organized in a formal sense and its ligang im
parting less positive leadership to village affairs.
Although the national categorization of Nae-il and 5je indicated that these
villages indeed differed in their level of modernization, the modern village
might possibly not have harbored innovative practices among its members. Fig
ures on several farm practices, however, showed that the overall progressive
ness of Nae-il was reflected in the practices of individual peasants. Most
peasants throughout Korea used insecticides, and this turned out to be also
the case in both Nae-il and Oje. The two villages did, however, differ in their
use of weedicide which was not so widely used in Korea. Weedicide was used
more commonly in Nae-il where only 39.2 percent of the peasants weeded by hand
only, while 39-2 percent used weedicide and 11.U percent made use of both tech
niques. In 5je some 73.9 percent of the peasants still weeded by hand only,
while 17.^ percent used weedicide. The use of urea and phosphate fertilizers
was both common and similar in the villages, but calcium cyanamide was some
what more heavily used in Oje.
Rogers found that subsistence farmers have lower rates of achievement motiva
tion than commercial farmers living in the same village.9 While nearly all
Korean peasants are closely tied to the commercial marketing system through
rice agriculture, there are other varieties of crops, such as tobacco or gin
seng, classified specifically as commercial crops which are grown solely for
the market. Almost half the peasants in Nae-il grew these commercial crops,
while somewhat less than a third did so in Oje.
The tile roof is a symbol of departure from tradition and penury and marks
the use of resources to somewhat improve the standard of living. In villages
along the major superhighway that connects Seoul with Pusan, tile roofs may
also be indicative of a government intervention to improve the landscape for
the benefit of urban travelers and tourists, but in Nae-il and 5je, lying as
they did far from main thoroughfares, the nature of the roof represented a
personal choice. It was a matter of pride with the tijang of Nae-il that over
half the houses (57 percent) had tile roofs, with only 19.0 percent of straw
and 2U.1 percent of slate or corrugated. In 5je this home improvement was
less perceptible, with 22.8 percent of the houses tiled, 39-1 percent of straw,
and 38 percent of slate or corrugated.
While a few more persons in Nae-il used a mechanical plow (11.U percent to
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2.2 percent in Oje), the percentage of individuals owning certain farm imple
ments such as plows, winnowers, threshers, wagons, hand sprays and water pumps
was slightly higher in Sje. Power sprays and power plows were present in Nae-il,
although few were in use. Table 5.1 shows the quantity of various capital re
sources in both villages. For most items, Oje was as well as or better off
than Nae-il. It must be remembered, however, that Oje had a larger population.

Table 5.1
Village Capital, in Absolute Numbers
Nae-il
Clocks
Sewing machines
Radios
Bicycles
Working oxen
Non-working oxen
Mechanical plows
Carts
Winnowers
Threshing machines
Hand wagons
Hand sprays
Power sprays
V7ater pumps
Power plows

Oje

51

52

30

1+0
83

71

31
38
17

31
11
19

2k
k3
31
7
12
1*

29
52
18

1+7
9
31

33
62

1+7
none
21+
none

Tongil, the new rice strain, has been described previously; it is the govern
ment's eventual goal to stimulate its growth wherever appropriate. In the 1972
harvest season, some 200,000 acres were sown to Tongil, making it still experi
mental and somewhat risky to use. Tongil rice was introduced in 1972 in both
Nae-il and Sje, but in keeping with their somewhat more progressive stance,
13.9 percent of the peasants in Nae-il had planted Tongil while only 3.3 per
cent had planted it in Oje.
With some reservations, induced by the somewhat higher incidence of ownership
of certain farm implements in Oje, we many conclude that the categorization of
Nae-il as a self-sufficient village also generally reflected certain innovative
practices on a sub-village level. Nae-il seemed to be a more innovative village
inhabited by somewhat more innovative peasants. It may be interesting to review
some other differences between the two villages to see whether they support
hypotheses advanced earlier.
The two villages differed greatly with regard to debts. Some 63 percent of
the respondents in Oje, compared to only 26.6 percent in Nae-il, admitted to
being in debt. Among those in debt, some 26.1 percent of the respondents in
Oje said that their debts were increasing, while the figure for Nae-il was 6.3
percent. This may be a major reason why some U3.5 percent of the respondents
in Oje said that they would like to move to the city, compared to the somewhat
smaller figure of 35-^ percent of the respondents in Nae-il. These figures for
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both villages were low compared to the national sample where to a somewhat dif
ferently worded question 53 percent responded that they would move to the city
for financial advantage. When asked why the^ would like to move, only nine
persons in Nae-il but thirty-one persons in Oje gave financial reasons or "a
better life." The peasants of Nae-il cited educational expenses and the small
size of the farms as the chief reasons for being in debt. Other reasons in
cluded the low price of farm products. In Qje, too, educational expenses and
farm size were highest on the list of reasons for debt, but unspecified "other"
reasons were also mentioned frequently. It was obvious that peasants in both
villages did not regard ceremonial expenses as among their major problems.
Among other basic differences between the two villages was age. There were
almost twice as many respondents in Oje than in Wae-il between sixteen and twentyfive years of age, but only about half as many were twenty-six to twenty-nine
years old. The older age bracket was somewhat underrepresented in both villages,
possibly because of the draft which recruits men in this age grouping. Thus
some young men, who would otherwise be heads of households, may have been absent
from the villages. No immediate reason was apparent, however, for differences
between the two villages in representation in the various age categories. 5je
seemed to be underrepresented (li+ percent to 26.6 percent) in the 30-39 year
group, but slightly more represented in the 60-year-and-over group (19-6 percent
to 8.9 percent). While it might be thought that age differences could be part
of the explanation of some of the differences between the progressiveness of one
village and the relative backwardness of the other, it should be borne in mind
that in the national analysis age turned out to be a category indifferent to
modernity.
While nearly all questions were answered by most interviewees, many peasants
did not respond to either the education or religion questions. Those who did
respond to the education question had mainly elementary school training.Al
though not differing greatly from 5je, Nae-il had somewhat more respondents with
at least a junior high school education. Small as the villages were, there were
a few persons who had attended college, and most of them were in Nae-il, as
expected if education is to have some part in explaining village progressive
ness. In view of the results on the national analysis, however, it would be
difficult to see education as an important factor in village differences.
Birth control, being generally accepted throughout Korea, did not have an
appreciable correlation with change, morale, or attitudes toward farming in the
national sirrvey; most Koreans apparently agreed at least verbally with the prac
tice of birth control. While agreement with the attitude was similar in both
villages, the mode (the category with the highest figure, as distinguished from
the average) for the number of children was four in Nae-il and five in 5je.
This may bear a relationship to some of the age difference, although it was
Nae-il that had a higher representation of persons between thirty and thirtynine years of age. It might also be conjectured that the number of children
may have contributed somewhat to the relative difference in debt between the
two villages.
Age differences between the two villages may also explain why over half of
the respondents in Nae-il had military service but only 29.3 percent in Sje.
Military service would be expected to expand the peasants' cultural and social
horizons, although it is no longer difficult to travel extensively and quite
cheaply as a civilian in Korea. To the degree that military service might have
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contributed to innovative attitudes and behavior, Kae-il was once again favored.
However, the analysis in the national returns did not suggest any contribution
of military service to innovation.
Dryland holdings were rather alike, the mode being 1,501 to 3,000 py'6ng for
both villages, but wetland holdings tended to be somewhat larger in Nae-il where
the mode was six to eight majigi as compared to three to five in Oje. This dif
ference may be one reason for Oje’s greater incidence of debt. The villages also
differed markedly in yields of rice. While the mode for 5je was only five sok
per majigt, that for Nae-il was 11 to 20 sok. This big difference suggests that
there may have been a significant relationship between innovativeness and farm
output. To be sure, Rogers comments on the difficulty of relating innovative
ness to output because it is very difficult to obtain output figures directly
from peasants. In the case of Korea, however, peasants may be better aware of
their outputs and maintain more adequate records; they certainly do so in the
case of family finances.H That the rice yields were higher in Nae-il was also
indicated by the answers to another question, to which 67.1 percent of Nae-il
respondents said that their yields had increased, while 2U.1 percent claimed
that their yields had not changed. In Oje some i+5-2 percent said that their
yields had increased, while 31.5 percent stated they had remained the same.
Thirteen percent claimed a decrease in Oje but none in Nae-il.
Possibly as a result of the somewhat higher educational level in Nae-il,
22.8 percent of its peasants read a newspaper daily, as compared to a mere
10.9 percent in Oje, and for those who read once a week it was triple, 15.2 per
cent. Some 81.5 percent of the respondents in Oje, in fact, claimed to read a
paper seldom, while in Nae-il this figure was a little over 50 percent. We can
assume from these figures that peasants attending Saemaul winter schools were
somewhat more sophisticated that the average peasant, and the "no responses" on
educational level seem to support this assumption. Unlike many of the newly
independent nations, Korea is a highly homogeneous culture, with no important
ethnic or linguistic minorities. The vital role of radio in producing a national
consensus may therefore not be as important as in other countries, even though
radios and radio-listening are ubiquitous in Korea. This fact was evident both
in a national sample and in the two villages. Nae-il surpassed 5je in contacts
with media other than radio. More persons in Nae-il listened to agricultural
programs on the radio, and many more of them had seen movies or slides, a quanti
tative difference that was quite striking. Some 57 percent of the villagers in
Nae-il claimed a subscription to an agricultural magazine compared to 21.7 per
cent in Sje. Even discussion of village problems was more frequent, according
to the respondents, with some 50.6 percent of persons in Nae-il saying that they
often discussed village problems as against only 30.percent in Oje. Many more
persons in Nae-il attended meetings, and many more read pamphlets distributed
by the Ministry of Agriculture. It is indicative of the stronger and more im
mediate influence of the media in Nae-il that 12.7 percent of these respondents
claimed to have heard first of the Saemaul movement by way of the newspaper,
70.9 percent on the radio, and 2.5 percent through pamphlets.
By contrast,
5.U percent of the respondents in Oje said that they had first heard of it through
the radio, and none that they had first read of it in pamphlets. Some 7.6 per
cent had heard of it through friends, but only 2.7 percent in Nae-il, and 3^.8
percent had learned of it through officials, compared to 10.1 percent in Nae-il.
It is apparent that in Nae-il villagers were more media-oriented than their
neighbors in Oje. In seeking advice about farming, both villages indicated that
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the popular sources of information were the bangang (a head of a neighborhood),
the lijang, and the farm village guide. The same persons and the leader of the
Saemaul movement served as sources of advice for problems concerning both vil
lages .
Besides being more involved in media contact, more persons in Nae-il belonged
to organizations; in fact the percentage was double that of Sje, with some 35*^
percent as against l6.3 percent being members of at least one organization. To
gether with this greater involvement in organizations, more persons in Nae-il had
some experience in officering organizations, with some 2k.1 percent having held
an official position of some kind, while only 7.6 percent had in Cje. There was
apparently more opportunity or more motivation to attain some degree of leadership
in the progressive village. This may have led to a greater communicativeness
about village problems, with 10 percent more peasants stating concern for their
village problems and discussing these problems with others.
Thus some real differences in backgrounds and some forms of behavior seemed
to exist between the two villages, and these differences can be seen in all
cases to support the expectations suggested by the innovation and cooperation
hypothesis. However, peasants in both villages overwhelmingly agreed that some
thing could be done to improve their respective villages and, although somewhat
less overwhelmingly, that they would personally be willing to donate time to the
improvement of their village. While it may have been somewhat naive to ask a
question of this nature, the response was more favorable in the two villages than
in the national sample. These differences suggest the existence of a village
ciilture that distinguished Nae-il from 5je, creating a more media-oriented and
communicative village population. In addition to the major distinction between
the Great Culture and the Little Culture, the urban and the rural, there were
sufficient distinctions among the two villages that made each of these an unique
cultural environment. This quality of uniqueness in village life has obviously
not been overlooked by the anthropologists who first posited the Great and Little
cultures, but it is well to acknowledge here the individuality of villages.
More contact with the media and greater communicativeness may explain the sig
nificantly greater knowledge of political leaders in Nae-il, including those
representing the district in which these villages were located. Table 5.2 shows
that villagers in Nae-il were considerably better informed than those in Oje.
We might also point out in passing that they were also better informed than
Americans. A typical Gallup poll, taken in 1967, showed that fewer than 31 per
cent of Americans could name their senator, although they did better in naming
the mayor (57 percent in ages 21-29, 72 percent in ages 30-U9 and 73 percent in
ages 50 and over).^2 These figures indicate that the villagers in Nae-il were
well attuned to the political system.
On the other hand, it is puzzling to find that the notion that it is the of
ficials' duty to serve the public, as opposed to performing favors, received over
whelming support from the villagers of Oje. Studies of civic cultures have shown
that persons who regard themselves as citizens are usually better informed, partic
ipate more at all levels and are generally more capable than those who regard them
selves as subjects.13 One explanation for the surprising finding in Table 5.3
is that increasing political efficacy and more infonnatlon in the Korean po
litical context resulted in the realistic assessment that the peasant was, in
fact, a subject who operated politically not by stressing his rights but by
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Table 5.2
Percentage of Correct Responses
on Political Leaders
Qje
(%)

Nae-il
(%)

98.7

3k.8
Ih.l
75.0

93.7

71.1

51.9
65.8

lU.l
i6.3

Ik.l

American president
Japanese premier
President of Korea
District representative
(Min Ki-Shick, DRP)
District representative
(Lee Min-Woo, NDP)
Myonjang

obtaining favors. If this were true, we would expect that aside from having
more political information, the villagers of Nae-il also regarded themselves as
more efficacious politically than their neighbors in 5je. According to Table
5.^ this was certainly the case. In a peasant culture political efficacy is
dependent on playing with the right rules of the political game. Apparently
the political culture of the village dictated that officials be regarded as
extending favors rather than according villagers their rights. Whether this
perception was objectively accurate or not, many of those who held it regarded
themselves as more politically effective. Any hypothesis based on these vil
lage results would be that the Korean political culture is subject-dominated.
Table 5.3
Is it the duty of public officials to provide services
to people like myself, or is it a personal favor?

Nae-il
5je

Duty
(%)

Favor
(%)

36.7
63.0

k6.8
30.k

Table 5.^
Perceptions of Political Efficacy
Agree
(%)
A. An ability to influence
government decisions
Nae-il
Sje
B. Government and politics
seem too complicated
Nae-il
5je

Uncertain
(%)

Disagree
(%)

60.8

24.1

27.2

37.0

13.9
35.9

49.U

25.3
13.0

25.3
19.6

67.4
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Finally, to prelude the findings of the next section, some 32-9 percent of
the villagers of Nae-il, the progressive village, preferred to send their sons
to an agricultural high school, which compared favorably with the results in the
national sample. In Oje, however, this figure dropped to a meager 12 percent.
This difference on a question that the national survey results showed to be so
critical is quite interesting.
Responses to questions on energy and illness were in keeping with the hypoth
eses presented on the national sample. Forty and one-half percent of the vil
lagers in Nae-il reported they were "often tired" as compared to 53.3 percent in
Sje, while only 7.6 percent were "sick often" as compared to 22.8 percent in 5je.
This difference between the progressive and backward villages was anticipated.
It is unfortunate that these perceptual findings could not have been supplemented
with direct medical evidence, but experience in the area suggests that one cause
for the difference might have been parasitical infection. Another cause may have
been the larger percentage of persons over 60 in 5je.
We have discovered that in the progressive village, existing differences were
generally in the direction hypothesized, and it would seem safe to conclude that
these differences had a bearing on innovativeness. Although this in itself does
not establish that these factors, such as newspaper readership or membership
in organizations, aaused villagers to be more progressive, our hypotheses
have not been refuted. There were certainly more clearcut distinctions here than
among the patterns of the national sample. While not denying the thesis that vil
lage progress must ultimately rely on a supra-village level of organization,!^
these reults tentatively indicate that the village environment itself can con
tribute significantly to village progress and innovativeness.
Finally, the lijang's vigor and pride in the accomplishments of his village
must be noted. He and his brother, head of the Saemaul movement in Nae-il, un
doubtedly contributed much to the community spirit.

Discriminating Between Two Korean Villages
The purpose of this section is to determine those characteristics of Nae-il
and Oje that best discriminated between them. Discriminate functions analysis
uses independent variables to allocate individuals, in accordance with their
scores on these variables, into two or more groups. This technique helps us to
ascertain whether the variables pertinent to innovation and cooperativeness are
in fact salient discriminators, as they ought to be, between the progressive and
the backward village. If a variable were a perfect discriminator, it would in
fallibly predict whether a person was from one village or the other. Thus the
single attribute "race" could easily allocate individuals into an African village
on the one hand and a Korean village on the other, although this would hardly be
an interesting result and would certainly not assess those attributes germane to
developmental progress that are of theoretical interest. Since we tried through
choice of villages to control for what might be such extraneous affects, our
allocation through discriminate functions ought to be more interesting than
this.

Some sixty-six attitudinal responses collected from the heads of households
in Nae-il and Oje have already been reviewed in several ways. Some of the
responses may, as these analyses suggest, distinguish more readily than others
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on the basis of differences of means between the responses aggregated for each
village. A process of elimination was employed to obtain the ten best attitudinal
discriminators from among the attitude schedule. The success of these discrim
inators was not impressive, but a degree of discrimination was achieved that
would have been statistically significant if the assumptions of a significance
test had been met.l^ The confusion matrix in Table 5-5 shows that discrimina
tion was achieved. The attributes of individual villagers differed sufficiently
to allow their allocation into the progressive or the backward village with a
fair degree of accirracy.

Table 5•5
Discrimination Among Villagers of Nae-il and Oje
on the Basis of Ten Attitudinal Responses
Actual Villagers
Nae-il
Oje

Predicted, Villagers
Total
Oje
Nae-il
63
______________ 12________

l6
73

79
__22_

Percent of correctly classified villagers: 79-5
Chi-square with ten degrees of freedom, p < .001
The "confusion matrix" shows that of the 79 villagers from Nae-il, 63,
on the basis of their attributes, were correctly designated as from
Nae-il, while l6 were mistakenly allocated to 8je.

As hypothesized, there were some differences in the attitudinal climate of
both villages, and most of these differences, shown in Table 5-6, were in the
predicted direction. A major difference between the two villages, and one in
which there should be some interest, was in the category of attitudes toward
farming, which were more positive in Nae-il than in 5je. The evidence on per
sonal efficacy and personal morale was somewhat more ambiguous than the attitudes
toward farming. There are several items in which Nae-il seemed to evidence a
higher degree of personal morale (pride, efficacy in politics, efficacy against
those richer, and finding friends), while 5je did not tend toward personal iso
lation and "resignation." The cause of these attitudes is unascertainable
through this analysis alone, but it might be conjectured that the differences
in personal morale were related in some degree to attitudes toward farming,
which could have been the chief difference between the villages. Certainly a
peasant’s disaffection with farming means a dissatisfaction with the major role
in his life and, as we will see, has ramifications in other critical area? of
attitudes and behavior.
It is also interesting that there was generally a more positive attitude to
ward education in Sje than in Nae-il. There may be some cogent reasons for this
result which is contrary to the original hypothesis. For instance, education
might have been viewed in Oje as an opportunity for youth to escape the village
for better opportunities elsewhere, while peasants in Nae-il may have felt that
remaining in the village still afforded good prospects for their young. Indeed,
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as noted before, the educational systems of most lesser developed countries
provided, for historical and social reasons, little or nothing in the way of
practical instruction in farming techniques. In Korea, as in other countries
affected by the Confucian tradition, education was not an accompaniment to an
agricultural career but was looked on as an escape from the village into the
city. It is possible that peasants actually perceived the irrelevance of much
education to their immediate interests as peasants. The previous section made
the point that many more peasants in Nae-il than in 5je preferred to send their
sons to an agricultural high school, which tends to support the argument here.

Table 5.6
w

Some Major Attitudinal Differences Between Nae-il and Oje'^
Farm work is drudgery.

Nae-il disagrees
(more than 5je)

Farming reduces one's social standing.

Nae-il disagrees

I feel I do not have much to be proud of.

Nae-il disagrees

No one else cares much what happens to you.

Nae-il agrees

Farming deprives one's children of an adequate education.

Nae-il disagrees

The average citizen like me can have an important in
fluence on government decisions.

Nae-il agrees

Persons like myself have little chance of protecting our
personal interests when they conflict with people who
are richer.

Nae-il disagrees

The secret of happiness is not to expect too much out of
life and to be content with what comes your way.

Nae-il agrees

Most young people are getting too much education.

Nae-il agrees

Real friends are as easy to find today as they ever were.

Nae-il agrees

*It might be of interest to provide here the standardized discriminant function
coefficients which distinguish villagers from the two villages. In this pre
dictor function a minus sign indicates attitudes on which Nae-il inhabitants
are in more agreement than are villagers living in Sje. The positive coeffi
cients occur when Nae-ilians tend to disagree.
FARMDRDG
STANDING
PROUD
CARES
DEPRIVED
INFGOV
PROTECT
CONTENT
TOOEDUC
FINDFRND

0.18

0.17
0.26

-0.U3
0.19
-0.32
0.20
-0.21
-0.25
-0.19
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Ten attitudes generated a discriminate equation, shown in the note to Table
which distinguished villagers sufficiently to attain a result that would
have been statistically significant were these respondents a sample from a pop
ulation. While not spectacular, the results are nonetheless encouraging in sug
gesting the possible pertinence of attitudes, a pertinence that has not always
emerged clearly from other studies of the factors contributing to modernization
5.6,

in villages.
But while a fair power of discrimination may be attained by means of peasant
attitudes, it is also of interest to compare the efficacy of these variables to
other distinctions that existed among individual peasant attributes, for which
purpose another discriminate function analysis was carried out. Beginning with
thirty-three variables, we gradually eliminated those less capable of discrim
inating the two groups until we had eight discriminators that allocated the vil
lagers according to Table 5-T* The result was somewhat superior to the use of
attitudinal variables alone insofar as fewer predictors distinguished equally
well among the villagers. Once again a statistical test indicated a sizable
relationship, significant if the respondents had been a true population sample.
The salient discriminatory variables are shown in Table 5-8
Table 5-T
Second Discrimination Among Villagers of Nae-il and Oje on the Basis
of Eight Attitudinal and Other Individual Responses_____________
Actual Villagers

Predicted Villagers
Mae-ilOjeTotal
58
21

Rae-il
0.1 e
10829^
Percent of correctly classified cases: 8l.9
Chi-square is IO6.8 for eight degrees of freedom, p < .001

T9

Table 5•8
Eight Discriminating Variables that Distinguish Between Nae-il and Oje
How many children do you have'

Somewhat higher for Nae-il

How many times during the past year have you seen
a government movie or slides on agriculture?

Greater for Nae-il

Besides the 4-H Club and the farmer’s cooperative,
do you belong to any other organizations?

Greater for Naei-il

Farm work is drudgery.

Greater for Oje

Persons like myself have little chance of protect
ing our personal interests when they conflict
with people who are richer.
Are you in debt?
Would you prefer your son (or sons) to attend ag
ricultural high school or a non-agricultural
high school?

Higher for 5je
Much higher for Oje

Higher for Nae-il
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TaMe 5*8—continued
The average citizen like me can have an important
influence on government decisions.

Higher for Nae-il

*As in Table T-2, the standardized discriminant function coefficients are
shown.
CHILD
-0.10
0.60
MOVIE
0.26
MEMBER
FARMDRDG
0.10
PROTECT
0.27
DEBT
0.27
AGSCHOOL
-0.13
INFGOV
-0.21

In the complex network of relationships, causing morale to be higher in Nae-11
than in Oje, the smaller families in the progressive village may have played an
indirect role. Two behavioral variables were in the hypothesized direction:
one, that villagers in Nae-il seemed to belong to more organizations other than
those to which all villagers belonged, such as the agricultural cooperative;
and the other, that they had also been more exposed to government slide and
movie presentations on farming, which may indicate that the government's efforts
had had some effect. Three attitudinal variables were also in the direction
hypothesized for the more progressive village: Nae-il had more peasants who
were efficacious, who liked farming more, and who saw enough future in farming
to send their sons to an agricultural high school.
It is quite remarkable that far more villagers in OJe than in Nae-il reported
being in debt. The higher mode for children in 5je might have been partially
responsible for some of this debt. Other reasons most frequently cited by
villagers in both 5je and Nae-il were educational expenses and insufficient
farm size. An effort to reduce the problem of rural debt was made a month fol
lowing these interviews. The government passed Draconian measures against
spending on ceremonial or funeral occasions. Unfortunately, it was not possible
to determine the villagers' attitudes concerning this law, which affected rioral
customs of long standing, or to determine whether the law had any effect. While
there were some respondents attesting to the effect of such customs on their
financial resources, they were not numerous in either village, possibly because
some ceremonial expenses occurred only rarely and some villagers may have for
gotten their impact.
The results of the discriminant function analysis have by and large vindicated
many of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 and in the previous section of this
chapter. Certain distinctions hypothesized there have served to distinguish
peasants of a progressive village from those living in a more backward village.
The individual attributes of villagers did differ predictably within villages
categorized according to overall progressiveness. Oje was certainly closer to
the classic backward peasant village as portrayed by Rogers, Foster, and others.
Evidence for this backwardness did not lie in the lack of farm machinery—Oje
was as well off as Nae-il in this respect—but rather in the apparent lack of
cooperation in village projects.

io6
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Could the roots of this problem have lain in the attitudes of the villagers
of Oje? Let us examine this possibility more closely. One striking aspect
about 5je was that its inhabitants seemed to be more withdrawn from the course
of national events. This conclusion is supported by the numbers of visits to
town made in the previous year: while seventeen peasants in Nae-il reported
ten or fewer visits into town, fifty-five Oje villagers so reported, and while
thirty-two of the peasants in Nae-il made over fifty such trips, only nine vil
lagers in Oje made as many visits. Other support comes from the answers to two
attitudinal questions. Whereas U5.6 percent of the Nae-il peasants found it
:
difficult to meet people on the farm (38.0 percent disagreed), 67.^ percent of
|
the villagers in Oje found this difficult (21.7 percent disagreed). Likewise,
|
asked whether it was just as easy to make friends as it used to be, peasants in
Nae-il agreed 57 percent, those in Oje only 37 percent, with 25.3 percent and
i+5-7 percent, respectively, disagreeing. Still further support for this conclusion
is found in the Oje peasants' fewer media contacts, their lesser interest in
national and international events and their lower level of political knowledge.
This lack of knowledge apparently extended even to the myonjong—fewer of the
;
Oje villagers knew his name. This suggests fewer contacts with public officials
]
at any political level, even though the officials were chiefly responsible for
conveying knowledge of the Saemaul movement to the villagers. It is as though
the knowledge of the new movement had to seek them out. The peasants of Nae-il
may have been more aggressive in their contacts with government officials, which
might explain the somewhat odd result that they regarded an official's acts as
a favor—they knew how the system worked.
What was the source of this difference among peasants of a progressive and
a more backward village? A possible explanation might lie in the striking dif
ference in self-esteem. When asked whether farming reduced one's social stand
ing, 29.1 percent of the peasants of Nae-il agreed (55-7 percent disagreed),
while as many as 55.^ percent of the peasants of Oje agreed to this (23.9 per
cent disagreed). Moreover, 5^.5 percent of the inhabitants of Nae-il believed
they did not have much to be proud of (somewhat less than the 63-8 percent of
the national sample), while 73.9 of the peasants in Oje agreed to this item of
self-esteem, well above the national sample results.
An additional difference between the two villages probably affecting the
attitudes and behaviors was the larger debt in Oje. While the evidence is not
enough for anything but a plausible hypothesis, it is possible that both villages
had originally been quite similar; after all, they had been selected because
they were close to one another and equally accessible to the adjoining market
town. We might further assume that while both villages had been backward at
some time in the past, the peasants of Nae-il had broken away from this pattern.
Helping them to accomplish this was a somewhat greater tendency to seek con
tacts with the world beyond their village, while the peasants of Oje remained
withdrawn. This may have increased the self-esteem of the peasants in the pro
gressive village, and such attitudes enabled them to break the constriction of
backwardness and improve their village, which in turn reacted to increase their
self-esteem. One or two successes would probably have added to the momentum of
progress, further supported self-esteem, and increased contact with the rapidly
changing world of Korea. Thus Sje's relative backwardness might be explained
through such a highly complex interaction in which debt is likely to have played
some exacerbating role. To untangle the true causal relationships would demand

I^
;
'
,
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a study of representative villages over a fairly long period of time. The most
appropriate recorder of the events conducive to change or backwardness would be
a Korean peasant charged with the fruitful task of compiling a detailed village
history.
As was done in the national survey, a factor analysis was run on attributes
and variables involving I7I peasants in the two villages. Included in the fac
toring was the distinction between villages (Ll) which was to distinguish those
factors, if any, that were particularly descriptive of one village or the other
The 27-factor matrix was rotated to a Varimax solution which, like the result
in the national survey, was not parsimonious. Variance tended to be scattered
over a large number of uncorrelated factors,1'?' some of which will now be inter
preted.

FACTOR 1

Education, Leai

EDUCATE
TOWNLIVE
DECISION
NEWSPAPR
PAMPHLET
MEMBER
POSITION
INFLUNCE
MOREINFL
NATIONAL
MINDBUS
AGSCHOOL
DEBT
TONGIL
SAESCHL

0.61**

0.U8
0.U6
0.6ij
0.53
0.60
0.69
0.60
0.32
0.75

-0.30
0.39
(-0.28)
(0.26)
(0.29)

**As in the factor results for the national sample,
some correlation signs have been changed to con
form with the interpretation.

This factor contained limited evidence that attendance at a Saemaul school
contributed to a modernizing set of attributes. Since education obviously pre
ceded attendance at a Saemaul school, it is uncertain whether this experience
affected any other attributes, such as a desire for more influence. It is more
likely that individuals attending the Saemaul schools tended to be the more in
fluential members of these villages in the first place. In any case, it was
probably education that "caused" exposure, as shown here, to certain media through
reading of newspapers and pamphlets, and interest in national affairs. Accord
ing to the loadings of variables on this factor, these individuals likely con
sidered sending their sons to an agricultural school; it was not necessarily
the more influential peasants who wanted their sons to quit farming. There is
evidence, albeit rather slight, that these individuals were not in debt and
that they may have had some tendency to adopt the new rice strain Tongil. As
members of organizations other than the
clubs, these persons may well have
felt that they had some Influence in the village, and they desired more. They
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had also the experience of holding some sort of leadership position within these
organizations. One remarkable aspect of this factor is the relative absence of
any attitudinal variables. While it might be assumed that these persons were
doers and had influence, we cannot assume anything concerning their attitudes
toward farming, modernization, or their villages. There was only a slight ten
dency to believe that persons ought not simply to mind their own business. The
first factor contains some of the attributes that marked the leadership factor
in the national sample.

FACTOR 2

Land

WETLAND
DRYLAND
YIELD
PARCELS
COMCROP
ROOF
OX
PLOW
THRESHER
DEBT

0.87
0.56
0.81

0.37
(0.29)
-0.h2
0.37
0.31
0.59

-0.1+3

The associations in Factor 2, Land, seemed to have something to do with rel
ative wealth, although there had been no great disparity in the Korean country
side since the land reform of 1950. Peasants with larger land holdings, in this
case mainly wetland (although apparently also correlated with holdings of dry
land), seemed to obtain a larger yield from their farms. These larger yields
did not seem to have much to do with peasant attitudes since no salient attitude
was related to this pattern. Possibly because these persons had larger land
holdings, they also had more farm machinery, like plows and threshers, as well
as oxen. They were not in debt and had somewhat better dwellings, as suggested
by the nature of the roofs. This was a well-to-do type of pattern, but it did
not apparently combine any modernizing attitudes nor did it provide evidence of
any great interest or activity within the village. Commercial crops might be
an aspect of modernizing attitudes, although in this survey they appeared uncon
nected with any modernizing outlook, perhaps as evidence of relative village
opulence. It is interesting to note that the number of parcels tended to be
greater than usual, which is probably explained by the size of the land holdings
and by the holdings in both wet and dry land. It will be recalled that this was
also the case in the national results. It does not appear, therefore, that land
fragmentation inhibited yields, although without fragmentation these peasants
might have fiorther increased their yields. Fragmentation seems to serve a func
tion in Korean villages in that it increases the probability of some land being
fertile; a single parcel might be very fertile or it might be quite barren.
Fragmentation also provides the obvious possibility of a peasant's expanding
production into certain commercial crops while remaining fundamentally a rice
grower. In the national sample yield was also associated with the size of hold
ings, but that sample showed no evidence that greater mechanization was induced.
The village results are more complex and more encouraging from a theoretical
standpoint.
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FACTOR 3

LI

LI
TWEVISIT
MOVIE
MEETING
CARES
WEED
YIELDINC
OX

-0.63
0.73

O.5U

(0.28)
-0.70
O.UO
-o.Uo

(0.28)

Factor 3, LI, is most clearly related in the factor analysis to one or the
other village. It indicates that peasants in Nae-il tended to visit the town
(probably the nearby market town and county seat) more often, suggesting that
they were more cosmopolitan, i.e., more attimed to supra-village affairs, and
that they saw more movies or slide presentations about agriculture. There is
slight evidence of more attendance at meetings. There was the jarring note
that "no one else cares much what happens to you," a salient attitude that has
been difficult to interpret in the discriminatory analysis. Insofar as innova
tion is concerned, there was the peasant's tendency to use weedicide and to
perceive an increase in their farm yields.

FACTOR U
DECISION
AGLISTEN
DISCUSS
MEETING
PROBDISC
INFLUNCE
COMCROP
SAESCHL

Verbalization
0.33

0.34
0.80
0.39

O.I13

0.3it
0.30

0.3it

Factor U, Verbalization, is interesting because of the nature of the attri
butes that it contains. Persons with high factor scores on such a pattern
seemed to be verbally active, discussing issues and listening to agricultural
radio programs. They felt that they exercised some influence and liked to make
decisions when possible, although there is no direct evidence here that these
respondents were influential either through wealth or official position. It is
not fully evident how much of an impact this communication might have had on
innovations, although commercial crops do load slightly on this factor. The
articulateness of these individuals and their perception of influence and par
ticipation in decisions may have explained their tendency to have attended
Saemaul schools. Peasants attending these schools may hve served as conduits
of information, as well as patriotic symbols, to those peasants who did not
attend the schools.
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FACTOR 5

Debt Increase

DECISION
CONCERN
DONATE
MOREINFL
FARMDRDG
DEBTINC

-0.32
0.57
(-0.28)
-0.6l
0.1+3
0.78

Factor 5> Debt Increase, seemed to be a somewhat debilitating pattern indi
cating a sense of powerlessness and a lack of participation in the making of
decisions, although concern about village matters was expressed. Moreover, the
general attitude was that farming as an occupation is drudgery. These peasants
might have been the same individuals who evinced a desire to leave the village,
but there is no proof of this. This factor is somewhat akin to the concept of
fatalism, analyzed by Rogers and others. Except for a slight tendency not to
want to donate time to village projects, there was no evidence that this pattern
was inimical to innovation.

FACTOR 7
AGE
POLITE
CANTINF
GOODLUCK
SAESCHL

Luck
(-0.29)
0.1+1+
0.1+0
0.8l
-0.36

Factor 7, Luck, suggested a slight association with youth and with a lack of
influence on the government, which may have also been associated with youth.
These peasants apparently had little desire to attend the Saemaul schools. The
failure of age to be of vital importance to modernization has been puzzling in
both the national and village surveys which yielded quite comparable results.
Since an ample number of variables and attributes were provided in the analysis,
the unimportance of age, which seems to refute common sense is particularly dis
tressing. Can Korea be an unique case, or are these results also found among
peasants in other countries as far along in development as Korea?

FACTOR 10
IMPROVE
DONATE
RELLYWOR
TOOEDUC
YIELDINC

Yield Increase
0.79
0.1+2
0.1+3
(-0.27)
0.1+3

A somewhat odd pattern emerged in Factor 10, relating some attributes indica
ting an interest in village improvement and a willingness to donate time for
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village Improvement with a tendency to perceive an increase in crop yield.
There was also a touch of conservatism in the notion that new things should he
tried only when one is fairly sure that they will work; was this possibly why
these peasants did not turn to Tongil? The slight loading by the education at
titude takes issue with the idea that children received too much education. By
itself this pattern would indicate that attitudes had something to do with in
creasing yields, but it is nowhere evident how this came about.
Factors 11 and 21 were Interesting only because they contained assessments
of the Saemaul movement. They indicated that the movement had failed to capture
the imagination of the modernizers or those who had obtained increased crop
yields. The movement had had only a light effect by 1973 and seemed to be per
ceived by most peasants as disembodied slogans, unassimilated as yet with any
other pattern of attributes. Factor 12 had the attitude of moving to the city,
but it was unrelated to any other salient attitude. It did not even seem to
correlate with debt or with the notion that farm work was drudgery! This prob
ably means that migration to urban areas is a complex and highly individual set
of motivations.

FACTOR 13

Official

OFFICIAL
COMCROP
AGSCHOOL
YIELDINC

0.71
0.35
-0.30
0.3U

Factor 13, Official, is a small factor that suggests that officials tended to
innovate insofar as they had turned to some commercial crops. They also per
ceived an increase in their crop yields. At the same time, they evinced a
slight tendency to steer their sons through education into occupations other than
farming. An official or former official may have had aspirations for his sons
that extended beyond the villages. Factor l6 related membership in a U-H club
to age but not to any innovation variables nor did it seem to predispose former
members to participate more than others in village improvement. This is another
result that corroborated the national findings.

FACTOR 19
AGE
MILITARY
ENERGY
SICK
PAMPHLET
DONATE

Military
-0.67

0.66
0.66
-0.38
0.U2
(0.28)

Factor 19, Military, is interesting not only for what it says but what it does
not say. Military experience, which under certain circumstances enhances mod
ernizing attitudes, apparently did not have that particular effect in Korea.
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While these peasants were not more attuned to most media than others, they did
tend to read more pamphlets. The attribute of energy might have been an aspect
of youth, but it might also suggest that better hygienic habits were taught in
the military service. One result hypothesized earlier did show up slightly here:
former soldiers were slightly more willing to donate their time to the improve
ment of the village.

FACTOR 25

Aglisten

DRYLAND
PARCELS
AGLISTEN
UREA
THRESHER

-0.31
-0.56
0.1+2
0.?!^
(0.28)

Finally, in Factor 25, there is a hint that listening to agricultural broad
casts may have predisposed peasants to make greater use of fertilizers. They
owned few parcels, but this may have been related to the small amount of dry
land held by these persons, for dryland is separated from the wetland for rice
farming.
Considering the results of the various predictions that have been made about
Nae-il and Oje, it is probable that the peasants of Nae-il rated the present
and future somewhat higher than did the peasants in Oje. To test this hypoth
esis, a ladder, with rungs numbered from 0 (lowest) through 10 (highest), was
shown to each respondent, and it was explained that "this ladder represents
levels in life. The position marked 'O' shows the worst possible level you
could imagine yourself to be on. The position marked '10' shows the best pos
sible position you could imagine. Wow, looking back about five years, where
would you place yourself on this ladder? .... Where on this ladder do you
think you are today? .... Where on this ladder do you expect to be about
five years from now?"l®
As anticipated and as shown in Table 5.9, peasants in Nae-il rated the pres
ent and the future perceptibly higher than did villagers in Oje. This is an
important result because it signifies that the progressive peasants anticipated
returns for their modernity. They had made many of the contributions called for
by the government through the Saemaul movement, and the time had come to fulfill
their expectations of an improved quality of life. It is also probable, in
light of such evidence, that the efforts to make Nae-il a progressive village
were offered voluntarily for the purpose of a brighter future. In addition, as
other studies have shown, it is the progressive villages, not the more back
ward ones, that have higher hopes and greater optimism in the face of change.
This ladder technique was also used by Hadley Cantril in his cross-national
survey among persons of several nations, and it is of some interest to compare
our results with his (see Tables 5.9 a-nd 5.10) even though the two are not en
tirely comparable. The Koreans were certainly not as depressed in their assess
ment of the past and present as peasants in the Dominican Republic, and they
were certainly much more sanguine about the future, both in Nae-il and Oje,
than rural Indians. Nae-il came closest in the assessment of well-being to
rural persons in Egypt. The very slight distinction made in 5je between the
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past and the present and the relatively moderate expectations for the future
resembled rural responses in the Philippines and Panama. Neither village rated
the past and the present as high as farmers in the United States, but Nae-il
certainly had higher expectations for the future. These results seem to fit
rough and impressionistic assessments of conditions in these various countries
at the time of the survey, with Egypt experiencing under the impact of a modern
izing leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the kindling of hopes for further improvements,
while conditions in the Philippines did not seem quite so fortunate or rewarding
for the future to peasants. This seems to make some sense and helps to place
Oje and Nae-il in an international context.

Table 5.9
An Assessment of Personal Well-being on Cantril's
Ladder Scale of 0 to 10, Nae-il and Oje
5 years ago

Present

5 years hence

5.8
h.2
8.0
Nae-il
6.9
h.6
U.T
0,1 e
The differences between Nae-il and Oje for the present and the future are
statistically significant according to t-tests.

Table 5.10
Assessment of Personal Well-being on the Ladder
Scale in Several Nations
(Rural Respondents)*
5 years ago
Brazil
Dominican Republic
Egypt
India
Philippines
United States
Nigeria
Panama

Present

5 years hence

3.9

4.3

6.8

l.lt
h.-J

1.3
5.4
3.6

8.0

4.8

6.6

6.5
4.7

7.7
7.4

3.3

4.8
6.3
2.8

5.7
4.9

4.4

__________________ _______

______ ______

*From Cantril, Pattern of Himan Concernsj Appendix D, pp. 365-375j rural
respondents only.

Chapter 6
CONCLUSION:
THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY

Before generalizing from the conclusions reached in the course of our anal
ysis, it would be well to dispose of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2.
There were twenty-three of these specifically enumerated, although not all of
the propositions subsequently presented and analyzed were included.
(1) Age was not related to either innovativeness or cooperativeness.
(2) Education was not correlated with innovativeness nor cooperativeness but
was present on factors related to leadership qualities.
(3) Religion bore no relationship to innovativeness nor cooperativeness.
(k) Military service was not associated with personal innovativeness and only
slightly associated with cooperativeness.
(5) Contact with urban environments was not associated with personal innova
tiveness nor with cooperativeness. The village result, however, had a small
relationship with innovativeness, and a lack of such contact seemed to mark the
backward village.
(6) The amount of land farmed was associated with yield and, to a small degree,
with innovativeness. Commercial crops were also associated with the size of
dryland holdings. Fragmentation was not important, although fewer parcels did
relate to the increased use of farm machinery.
(7) Health did not relate to innovativeness nor to cooperativeness.
(8) Contact with the media did not relate in any important way with innova
tiveness nor cooperativeness.
(9) In the national survey, memberships, meetings, and official positions did
not generally relate to innovativeness nor to cooperativeness, although these,
along with media contact, were related to leadership factors. In the village
survey, however, the progressive village showed more organizational activity than
the backward village. Most disappointing was the lack of relationship of It-H
membership with any Important attribute or attitude.
(10) Influence and the desire for more influence did not make individuals more
likely to cooperate.
(11) A positive attitude toward farming was not itself of major importance.
However, the closely related decision to send sons to agricultural high school
seemed critical, certainly to cooperativeness but in many ways to innovativeness
as well.
(l2-20) Attitudinal hypotheses fared poorly in the analysis of the national
data. The village analysis, however, indicated some evidence that personal ef
ficacy and village and personal morale distinguished the progressive from the
backward village. Authoritarianism and conservatism may have slightly inhibited
innovativeness. On the whole, propensity to change, trust, alienation, and
future orientation were not strikingly related to cooperativeness and innovative
ness. There was important evidence in the village data, however, that optimism
about the future was much higher in the progressive village.
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(21) Peasants in the progressive village seemed to have a more positive at
titude toward government, in the sense of effectiveness, although they also had
a subject orientation. Otherwise, these attitudes were only slightly related
to cooperativeness and innovativeness.
(22) Debt did not figure importantly in the national data but emerged as an
important distinction in the two villages, with the progressive one reporting
less debt.
(23) Clan villages had no effect on innovativeness nor cooperativeness.
Finally, the Saemaul movement seemed to have little or no direct effect. It
did, however, figure in a relationship with the decision to send sons to agricultioral high schools, which in turn was an important attitude.
That age and education were not important factors in the modernization of
Korea is indeed an imanticipated result. The relationship of attitudes to in
novativeness and cooperativeness was generally disappointing in the national
sample but received more striking verification in the village study. Perhaps
peasants do not tend to interrelate their attitudes and behaviors, except in
special circumstances to which the two-village study supplied a clue. It is
also possible that the relationships of attitudes to the various kinds of in
novation are so complex that each innovation might merit its own separate study.
Thus the causal relationships of attributes and attitudes to concomitant innova
tions might be different for each innovation.
The study also disproved the assumption that some behaviors, such as birth
control and religion, might be crucial in the sense that once such change is
accepted, other innovative behavior would be more readily adopted. Peasants
seemed to think and act in segregated categories, and mental bridges were not
always apparent. We might thus conclude that changes in one category of be
havior did not easily affect other categories of behavior. This compartmentalization of behavior was possibly a defensive mechanism developed over the long cen
turies of peasant history. The peasant is a person with few resources, likely
to encounter innumerable obstacles to any consistent pattern of behavior that he
adopts, so that success in one behavioral area does not easily suggest to him
the possibility of change and ensuing success in another behavioral area. How
a peasant woiild behave if he were to be consistently rewarded for his efforts
cannot be fully answered here, but the progressive village provided a good hint
as to what might happen in such an event.
While the formal and logical constructions of modernization theory had mixed
results, there were some encouraging notes in the Korean rural scene. Neither
the national sample nor the village study provided general evidence that at this
important time in Korean history, the period approaching the take-off toward an
industrial society, the peasant occupied a demoralized backwater within the his
torical flow of events. The results showed that some peasants were capable of
optimism, cooperativeness, and innovativeness, and that village competitions
seemed to have stimulated their concern with village conditions. The latter
point should be of some interest to those involved in community development.
Many peasants were more closely in touch with national politics than had been
anticipated. In fact, as the village study showed, inhabitants of the progres
sive village were well attuned to the media and rather optimistic about the
peasant's future in Korea. There seemed to be no lack of personal efficacy among
the peasants; as shown in Chapter 3, a large majority of them generally felt as
able as others in the population.
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At the same time, self-esteem was generally low. It was apparently not the
result of any other discernihle characteristic. A number of separate analyses
^
were made of several other attributes; e.g., men were compared with women, and
both seemed to have equally low self-esteem. Nor did self-esteem seem to be
strongly associated with education, debt, age, or personal efficacy. It must be
concluded that its lack was a general attribute of the peasant as peasant, yei
cause he was probably not comparing himself to other peasants within his village, j
but to all other Koreans who were not peasants. In this comparison he found
himself at the lower end of the scale of social prestige. Moreover, as the al5
most unanimous response to the relevant question strikingly demonstrated, the^
peasant knew that his low prestige was based, at least in part, on the objectively
lower quality of rural life.
This ambiguity in our results points to a major lesson to be learned from
this study. Like most questionnaire surveys, our study was largely focused on
the individual. This level of analysis is evidently not fully sufficient for^
transitional and rapidly modernizing societies such as Korea. In such societies,
every effort should be exerted to tie the individual aspects of attitude and be
havior to more general Institutional structures and relationships at the provin
cial and national levels. Illustrative of the type of question that might
accomplish this connection between the individual and his structural environment
is the question asked in our village survey as to whether officials provide serv
ices as a favor or as a duty. Mattel Dogan and others have shown that a suf
ficiently extensive questionnaire can do the job of supplying situational and
structural variables which, in turn, could bridge the kind of gaps among attitudes
and behavior so frequently noted in o;zr study.^ It is also true, however, that
such an extended questionnaire technique is adaptable only to a democratic polity
in which expressions of political discontent carry no punishment. Even if the
questionnaire were circiilated and the usual anonymity honored, a major problem
in the present Korean polity would be the acquiescence to certain sensitive items.
In the remainder of this chapter I would like to say a few words about the
implications that Some of the results of this study have for the peasant's future
in Korea. The proper starting point for this speculative excursion lies with the
peasants’ rising hopes and expectations, as repeatedly demonstrated in this study.
In 1973 village morale was generally high and attitudes toward farming generally
positive. The crucial test of social commitment, however, seemed to be whether
or not the peasants would want their sons to attend an agricultural school.
Those who did were among those who in several other ways espoused innovation,
village morale, and cooperativeness. If there was any single factor that con
tributed to the optimistic and modernistic outlook of these peasants, it was this
particular attitude. Thus Chapter 4 was a veritable vindication of hypotheses
of community cooperation and innovativeness, all of them correlated in some way
with the decision to send sons to agricultural schools. This decision was evi
dently more crucial than a positive attitude toward farming alone. It also,
incidentally, pointed to the need for more research on its causes and ramifica
tions .
Hopes were probably greatest among those peasants who were the most innovative
and who had contributed to the progress of their villages. Judging from the
national results, in which attitudes played a very minimal role in causal re
lationships with cooperativeness and innovation, such relationships might not
develop as easily through individual efforts as in the context of a community
enterprise. As they improve, whole communities may well raise further the hopes
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and expectations of their inhabitants. In 1973, such concatenations of pro
gressiveness and expectations for the future were probably present here and
there, scattered like islands across the countryside. These islands of optimism
may well expand, but they might also disappear from the face of Korea because,
as the factor results have revealed, there are other, negative tendencies present
in rural Korea. The outcome of the contest between these two tendencies will
rest to some degree in the hands of the planners of the Saemaul movement which
will not easily be forgotten by peasants who have once again decided to opt for
a better life through their own efforts.
It will probably require a number of years of continuity, consistent planning
and, above all, rewards in the form of higher prices for farm products and an
increased ability for the peasant to enjoy some fruits of his labors before the
Saemaul movement can begin to generate enthusiasm and become a direct causal
factor in innovation and cooperativeness. At the time of our study there was
not yet any direct evidence tying the movement to progressive attitudes, but the
factor analysis and the resiilts in Chapter 3 seemed to show that there is ample
opportunity for it to catch on and, ultimately, to transform the countryside.
There were already obvious physical improvements, many of which could be attrib
uted to the Saemaul movement, and the Korean peasant's living standard has con
tinued to improve.
But the peasant will also increasingly feel a need for participation in public
decisions that affect him, as was already noted in the national survey. The
media contacts of peasants in Nae-il, their interest and knowledge of national
events, showed that the peasant, much more than in the past, had become a member
of the nation as well as of his own village. This extension of his sphere of
interest is both affected by and affects his heightened expectations for the
fut\ire. Thus, wherever attitudes can be translated into behaviors that provide
material and psychological rewards, there is likely to develop some increased
connection between attitudes and behaviors. Since our study showed this con
nection to be tenuous at best in 1973, the structures and institutions of society
had probably not yet provided such rewards in a systematic way, but there is a
possibility that with the kind of continuity and consistency noted earlier, the
Saemaul movement could eventually effect such a connection. A key requirement
for success, however, is that the political system becomes increasingly partic
ipatory. The Saemaul movement at the time of its initiation was patently au
thoritarian and if it does not fundamentally change, the peasant's attitudes and
behaviors toward the political system will tend to remain inchoate.
Aristotle held that the constitution of a state must fit the history and tra
ditions of a people, and Rousseau and many other political philosphers have
accepted this notion for centuries. But it is also appropriate to posit desirable
changes and goals for a polity changing from one constitutional form to another
and its people developing new skills, new strengths and new p\irposes. Samuel
Huntington has delineated with clarity and insight the tremendous difficulty of
accomplishing this transition, and it might be well to quote one of his apt pas
sages that seems to fit closely recent Korean political experience;
The distinctive social aspect of radical praetorianism is the divorce
of the city from the countryside: politics is combat among middle-class
urban groups, no one of which has reason to promote social consensus or
political order. The social precondition for the establishment of stabil
ity is the appearance in politics of the social forces dominant in the
countryside. The intelligentsia has the brains; the military have the
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guns; liut the peasants have the numbers, and the votes. Political stahility requires a coalition between at least two of these social forces.
Given the hostility which usually develops between the two most politic!cally articulate elements of the middle class, a coalition of brains and
guns against numbers is rare indeed. If it does come into existence, as

1

j
J
|
|

in Turkey during the Ataturk period, it provides only a temporary and
1
fragile stability; eventually it is overwhelmed by the entry of the rural
1
masses into politics. A coalition between the intelligentsia and the
I
peasants, in contrast, usually involves revolution: the destruction of
the existing system as a prerequisite to the creation of a new, more sta
ble one. The third route to stable government is by the coalescence of
guns and numbers against brains. It is this possibility which offers the
;
military in a radical praetorian society the opportunity to move their
society from praetorianlsm to civic order.2
The problem of the Korean government, therefore, is to accept new social forces
and new personnel without sacrificing institutional integrity.3 It should also
be noted in passing that the revolutionary coalition of middle-class intellec
tuals with the peasantry has often resulted in the elevation of the power demands
of a segment of the middle class at the expense of the natural desires of the
peasant.
The Saemaul movement, if successful, will inevitably increase the Korean peas
ant's expectations of political influence. But as I see it, the Yushin consti
tution does not seem likely to meet the new demands growing out of a successful
J
Saemaul movement. The nature of this movement and the personal qualities that it j
intends to engender are contradicted by the logical effects of the constitutional j
changes of 1972. This may well be another reason why in 1973 the Saemaul move■
ment had not yet interrelated itself with progressive attitudes and behaviors.
,
Self-direction and voluntary motivation toward self-help may not develop easily
in an unfavorable political climate.
If genuine political initiative were to remain closed to increasingly progres
sive and nationally oriented peasants, intense dissatisfaction is likely to
develop in direct proportion to the degree of success of the Saemaul movement.
Insofar as the movement and the constitutional reforms of 1972 accomplish their
manifest but contradictory objectives, a situation of potential turmoil might be
a predictable outcome. Huntington posits as a necessity for political change in
countries such as Korea the broadening of political participation which, as he
clearly shows, need not be in the form of Western-style democracy. While rec
ognizing that the road to an increasingly participatory political system is a
rough one—and Korea has had little or no experience with such a system through
its long history—I also believe that a variant of political democracy in the
Western sense would seem the appropriate ultimate goal of the personal autonomy
that modernization and progressiveness produce.

j
j
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Much remains, therefore, for the future to determine. Our study of the Korean
peasant has sketched the situation as of 1973. The peasant's hopes and accomplish
ments have been delineated and, to some degree, fitted into a context of hypoth
eses about modernization and innovation. It is important, however, that the
|
reader be left with the idea that these industrious peasants, rarely favored by
history, are capable of great accomplishment, largely through their own industry
and with some small aid from the government and the urban elite. Above all,
they deserve a future that provides more material abundance and the opportunity

;
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to enrich their cultural existence. In spite of centuries of experience with
oppression and insincerity, many peasants are willing to try again. It is
depressing to conjecture what might happen if their expectations for a more re
warding future were to be disappointed again.

Appendix A (l)
SOME BRIEF INSTRUCTIONS TO THE (SAEMAUL) INSTRUCTOR

The purpose of this questionnaire is a scholarly one. There are for most of
the question no "right" or "wrong" answers, and the farmer should fill out the
questionnaire by himself. If a (Saemaul) student should ask the meaning of a
question, of course the instructor may explain it to him. But no indication
shovild be given as to which is the "correct" answer. This would defeat the pur
pose of the study.
An effort has been made to design this questionnaire so that it may be answered
in an hour or less. In fact, the more rapidly it is filled out, the better.
Most questions can be answered by checking an appropriate phrase. For example,
question 23 on a farmer's land parcels might be checked as follows:
23. Are these parcels
far apart____
not so far apart
/
near one another_____
adjacent to one another_____
A few questions require a brief list, and these should be answered, again,
as quickly as possible. Only questions 57 and 58 require an answer that is
really "right" or "wrong," and the farmer should answer these, of coiirse, with
out help.
The section of statements for agreement and disagreement has three possible
choices for each answer. If a farmer feels that there is no reason he can think
of to disagree with a statement, he will want to choose the "agree" response.
If there seem to be as many reasons for disagreeing with a statement as for
agreeing with it, the "uncertain" choice would be appropriate. Thus, if a farmer
believes that farm work is not drudgery, but he can also think of a number of
tasks that he really does not like to do, he might answer question one as fol
lows :
Agree
Uncertain Disagree
1. Farm work is drudgery.
_________
/
_________
Thank you for helping to administer this questionnaire. We hope that the
results of this study will in some way contribute to improving the life of farm
ers in Korea.
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NATIONAL SAMPLE OF KOREAN FARMERS

Part I

We would like to ask you a few questions about yourself and how you feel
about certain things. Don't spend too much time on any of these questions, but
answer them as rapidly as you can.
Please do not put your name on the questionnaire.
farmers in general feel about things.

We want to know how Korean

Thank you for your cooperation.
Male

SEX

1. Are you

SIZERES

2. Where do you live?

AGE

3. What is your age?

Female

Gun
Myon
(eup)
l6-25
26-29

30-39

itO-1+9
50-59
EDUCATE

What is the highest school grade which you completed?
Element ary
Middle school
High school
College
Post graduate

MARITAL

5.

Are you single
married
divorced
wi dowe d?

CHILDBOY
CHILDGIRL
CHILDTOT

6. How many children do you have?

RELIGION

7. What would you say is your religion?

Boys__________

Confucian
Buddhist_
Confucian and Buddhist
Protestant
Catholic
Ch'ondokyo
Other (specify)
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Girls
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How important is religion in your life?
Extremely important
Very important
Important
Not very important
Not important at all

MILITARY

9* Have you served in the military?
Yes________

DURRES

No

10. How many years have you lived in your present village?

TOWNLIVE 11. Have you ever lived in a large town or a city, say larger than
an eup?
Yes________
DURTOWN

No

12. If you have lived in a large town or city, how long were you there?

TWNVISIT 13. In the past year, how many times have you gone to a large town or
city?
WETLAND
DRYLAND

lU. What is the approximate size of your farm, or the farm that you
work on?
Wetland
ma,1 igi
Drylandpyong
15.

YIELD

In your village, how large is a majigi?
pyong
16. What is the average yield in rice of your majigi?
_______
sok

PARCELS

17.

How many parcels is your land divided into?_

DISTPAR

18.

Are these parcels
an hour or more walk apart
between a half an hour and an hour apart
less than a half an hour walk apart
adjacent to one another

OTHERINC 19. About what percent of your income last season would you say came
from farm output other than your rice crop?
Aboutp ere ent
ENERGY

20. Do you generally feel energetic when you begin to work in the morn
ing, or do you feel somewhat tired?
Energetic
Often tired
It varies
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SICK

21. About how often would you say you were sick?
I am sick fairly often
Sick seldom in a year
Almost never sick

OFFICIAL

22. Have you ever been a local official or held any official position
in the village, li, myon (such as myongjang, lijang, or myon
sogi)?
Yes________

DECISION

23. When you are in a group, do you prefer to make the decisions
yourself, or do you prefer to have others make them?
Myself________

NEWSPAPR

No

Others

2k. Do you read a newspaper?
Daily
At least once a week
About once a month
Seldom

RADIO

25.

Do you own your radio?
No

Yes
AGLISTEN

MOVIE

DISCUSS

26.

How often do you listen to radio programs on agricultural or rural
development ?
Often_
Sometime s_
Seldom_
Never

27.

How many times during the past year have you seen a government
movie or slides on agriculture?

28.

How often in the last year would you say you entered into a dis
cussion with other farmers on ways to improve your farming?
Often
Occasionally
A few times

MEETING

29.

How many times have you attended a meeting about agriculture by
the department of agriculture or the farmer's cooperative in the
past year?

PAMPHLET

30.

How many times have you read a pamphlet by the government on farm
ing in the past year?

FOURH

31.

Were you (or are you) a member of the 4-H Club?
Yes

____

No
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32. Besides the ii-H Club and the farmer's cooperative, do you belong
to any other organizations?
No________

Yes , one other
Yes, two others
Yes, more than two others

POSITION

33. Have you held any office in these organizations?

CONCERN

3^. How often do you think about community problems in your daily
life?

Yes________

No

Not at all
Not often
Once in a while
Often
Very often
PROBDISC

35- How often have you seriously discussed local community problems
during the past year with people?
Oft en
Once in a while
Not at all

IMPROVE

36. Do you think it is possible for people to come together to do
something to improve the village or area in which you live?
Yes_________

DONATE

38.

No

Maybe

Have you done so in the past?
Yes_________

INFLUNCE

Don't know

37- Would you be willing to give four or five hours a week to do
something to improve your village?
Yes_________

PASTDNTE

No______

No

39- In your village, would you say that you have a lot of Influence,
about average influence, or very little Influence?
A great deal of Influence
More influence than most people
About an average amount of influence
Less influence than most people

MOREINFL

UO. V/ould you like to be able to have more influence in village
affairs than you now have?
Would like more influence
Satisfied with present influence

RATIONAL

Ul. Some people seem to follow what is going on in politics all of
the time; others have less interest. How often do you follow
what is going on in national politics?
Most of the time_
Some of the time
Now and then
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k2. And how often do you follow what is going on in international
affairs?
Most of the time
Some of the time
Now and then
Hardly at all

AMERPRES

U3. Can you write down the name of the present President of the
United States?

PREMJAP

itU. Can you write down the name of the present Japanese Prime
Minister?

PRESKOR

45.

Can you write down the full name of the present President of the
Republic of Korea?

Part II
The following are a list of statements that a person might agree or disagree
with. Go through the statements as rapidly as you can, and check whether you
agree, are uncertain, or disagree with the statements.
FARMDRDG

1. Farm work is drudgery.

AGREE

UNCERTAIN

DISAGREE

FARMSTNG

2. The standard of living of farmers is below that of most other
persons in Korea.

RELLYWOR

3.

FRNDADVT

4. It is not good to let your friends know too much about your life,
for they might take advantage of you.

LUCK

5.

VILPEACE

6. My village is very peaceful and orderly.

SHUNCOOP

T. It is only human nature to be reluctant about cooperating.

WORRY

8. A farmer has more worries than do persons who do other kinds of
work.

STANDING

9.

I'd want to know that something would really work before I'd be
willing to try it.

Success is more dependent on luck than on real ability.

Farming reduces one's social standing.

CHANGE

10. If you start trying to change things, you usually make them worse

PROUD

11. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.

CARES

12. No one else cares much what happens to you.

POLITE

13- Almost everyone in my village is polite and courteous.

DISAGREE

l4. Sometimes children should be allowed to disagree with their
parents.

ENJOY

15.

Work on the farm is really enjoyable.
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DEPRIVE

16.

HELPLESS

IT. I feel helpless in the face of what happens in the world today.

ABLE

18.

ADVAMCE

19. There is little chance for advancement in life unless a man knows
the right people.

VILADVN

20.
21.
22.
23.

WIFEOBEY
DISADVTG
MOVECITY

C
V
I

CANTINFL

Farming deprives one's children of an adequate education.

I am ahle to do things as well as most other people.

Everyone in my village tries to take advantage of you.
A good wife is one who always obeys her husband.
The disadvantages of farming outweigh its advantages.
1 woiild move to the city if I knew for sure that I could earn
more money there.
It is only wishful thinking to believe that one can really in
fluence what happens in society.

FAILURE

25. I'm sometimes inclined to feel that I'm a failure.

EXPECT

26.
CM

VILCOOP

The young man of today can expect much of the future.
People in my village work together to get things done for the
village.

RESPAUTH

28.

LESSED

29. Farming requires less education than most other work.

KNOWALL

30. Life is better in villages where you know everybody.

INFGOV

31. The average citizen like me can have an important influence on
government decisions.

RESPECT

32. I wish I could have more respect for myself.

LERNWORK

33. A person can learn more^by working three years than by going to
high school.

ATHOME

3U. I feel very much "at home" in my village.

BRTHCONT

35. Parents should limit the number of children they have.

UNINTST

36. Farming is uninteresting work.

CITYCOLD

37. People in big cities are cold and impersonal.
friends there.

PROTECT

38. Persons like myself have little chance of protecting our personal
interests when they conflict with people who are richer.

CONTENT

39. The secret of happiness is not to expect too much out of life and
to be content with what comes your way.

EXPRESS

i+0. I find it easy to express my ideas to others.

VILCRIT

1+1.
1+2.

FAMILY

Obedience and respect for authority are the most important things
for children to learn.

It is hard to make

People in my village are too critical of others.
A person should always consider the needs of his family as a whole
more important than his own.
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BESTPLCE

U3. The farm is the best place for children.

LEADRARE

UU. A good leader rarely has to talk to others when he is making a
decision.
45. I believe that most public officials don’t care what people like

DONTCARE
PLANS
EDENJOY
PROMOTE

me think.
46. It is important to make plans for one’s life and not just accept
what happens.
4T. The more education a man has the more he is able to enjoy life.
48. A person should be expected to join only those organizations that
will promote his own interests.
ON

Farming offers little opportunity for meeting other people.

MEETPEOP
LEADFIND

50.

A good leader tries to find out what all the members of a group
think before he makes a decision.

HONEST

51.

Most people are honest.

COMPLEX

52.

Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a
person like myself can’t really understand what’s going on.

TOOEDUC

53.

Most young people are getting too much education.

WHOLECOM

54.

Each of us can make real progress only when the community as a
whole makes progress.

55.

I think that farmers are an interesting group of people.

LEADSHAR

56.

The good leader tries to share his responsibility with the other
members of a group.

INGRAT
GOODLUCK

5T. Most people will repay your kindndss with ingratitude.
I am the kind of person who gets his share of good luck.

LACKLEAD

59.

My village lacks real leaders.

MINDBUS

60.

A community would get along better if each person would mind his
own business.

TRUSTKNO

61.

You can only trust people whom you know well.

FINDFRND

62.

Real friends are as easy to find today as they ever were.

VILLOOK

63.

No one seems to care much how my village looks.

PUTOWN
LEADFRD
FAMCNTRL

00

FARMRINT

64. One of the important lessons of life is that people put their own
interests first.
A
leader is a better leader if his men are somewhat afraid of him.
65.

66.

The family should have the right to control the behavior of its
members completely.
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Part III
HIRE

1. Did you hire people to work for you last year?
Yes________

WEED

No

2. Last season did you weed hy hand or did you use weedicide?
By hand________

Weedicide

IKSCTCID

3. Did you use an insecticide "before or after your plants were
attacked?
Before________
After

UREA
PHOSPHT
CALCCYN

U. What kind of artificial fertilizer did you use last season?
(Check more than one if it applies.)

COMCROP

5. Have you engaged in growing a commercial crop?

Urea
Fused phosphate
Calcium cyanamide

Yes________
THRESHER

ROOF

6.

No

Do you use a motor-powered thresher?
Yes________ No

T- Is your house tiled, straw-thatched, slate-covered, or corrugated?
Tile
Straw-thatched
Corrugated
(or slate)

AGSCHOOL

8.

Would
your son (orhigh
sons)school?
to attend agricultural high
schoolyou
or prefer
a non-agricultural
Agricultural high school
Non-agricultural high school

MUDAWG

9. Do you call in a mudang or a medical doctor in case of serious
illness in your household?
Kut________

Doctor________

Both

YIELDING

10. Would you say your rice yields have been increasing or decreasing
over the last five years or so?

OTHRWORK

11. About what percent of your family income came from work other than
farming last year?

Increasing________

DecreasingAbout the same

Aboutpercent
OX
PLOW

12. If you own an ox, how old is the ox?
13. Do you use a mechanical plow?
Yes

No
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DEBT

lU. Are you in debt?

DEBTINC

15.

16.

No

Is your debt increasing, decreasing, or about the same over the
last five years or so?
Increasing________

TOKGIL

Yes________

Decreasing________

No change

Did you plant Tongil rice last season?
Yes________

No

TONGILYR

17.

In what year did you first plant Tongil rice?

LASTNAME

18.

Is your village mostly composed of same-last-name families?
Yes________

No

COOPNEIG

19.

Does your village cooperate with a neighboring village in any
way having to do with farming?
Yes________
No

COMPETE

20. Does your village compete with neighboring villages in the
quantity and quality of output sponsored by an official insti
tution?
Yes________
No

SAESCHL

21. Did you attend a Saemaul school this s\mimer?
Yes________

ERNSAE

No

22. How did you first learn about the Saemaul movement?
Newspaper
Radio
Pamphlet
From a friend
From a government official
Other

SAEPSYC
SAEENYR
SAEPUBUT
SAEFARM
SAEMNGMT

23.

What are the most important problems in your village you think
the Saemaul movement will help solve? Would you please list
these;

This is the end of the questionnaire.
answering it.

Thank you.

We hope that you have enjoyed
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APPENDIX A (4)
ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ON THE VILLAGE QUESTIONNAIRE

In Part I
lUa. Was there any change in the area of farmland which you have farmed during
the last five years?
No
Increased
Decreased
lUb. Would you like to farm more land than you do now?
Yes
No
New 25. Do you subscribe to an agricultural magazine?
Yes
No

25a. Which of the following do you own?
Clock
Sewing machine
Radio
Bicycle
35a- Which two or three persons do you actually ask when you want advice about
the type or amount of fertilizer, insecticide, or new types of rice to use
in your field?
(Please specify their position or relationship to you.)

36b. Which two or three persons do you actually see if you wanted to talk over
what should be done with regard to problems in the village?

36c. Have you recently advised anyone about improving his farming?
Yes
No
3Td. Have you recently advised anyone concerning village problems?
Yes
No
3Te. How much do city people know about the problems of farmers?
A lot
A moderate amount
Very little
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U2a. In your opinion, which of the following statements is correct?
check the correct one.)

h6.

It is the duty of public officials to
provide services to people like myself.

__________

It is a personal favor when public officials
provide services to people like myself.

__________

(Please

Can you name the representative from your district in the National Assembly?
Can you name the my^njangl

In Part III
7a. Does your dwelling have electricity?
Yes__
No__
7b. What do you usually use for fuel?
Wood
Charcoal briquets
Kerosene
Other (specify)
15a. What do you think are the reasons for your debt?
Farm prices are too low
Too many ceremonial expenses (weddings, funerals, and so
on)
Educational expenses
Illness
Cost of farm improvements
Farm size is too small
Other (specify)
15b. Would you move away from your village and into a city if you had the chance?
Yes__________
15c.

(if "yes" to previous question.)
leave, if you could?

No

What would be the main reasons you would

13a. Which farm tools and equipment do you own?
Plow
Carts
Winnower
Threshing machine
Hand wagon
Hand spray
Power spray
Water pump
Power plow

Additional Questions

lk3

A New Part IV
The first question in this new Part IV was a semantic differential based on
the concept SAEMAUL.
It was not reported on in this book.
2.

This ladder represents levels in life.
The position marked ”0" shows
the worst possible level you could imagine for yourself. The position
marked "lO" shows the best possible position you could imagine.
Now, looking back about five years into the past, where would
you place yourself on this ladder?

3.

Where on this ladder do you think you are today?

--------1*.

Where on this ladder do you expect to be about five years
from now? __________

10_
9

8
7

6
5

s'
2
1

o'

Appendix B
A KEY TO CONCEPTS IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The questionnaire which is reproduced in Appendix A is an extensive instru
ment intended to tap a multitudinous attitudinal and behavioral space for each
of the respondents. Aside from the usual socio-economic background variables,
which are generally a part of all questionnaires, the concepts intended to be
tapped by this questionnaire are as follows:
Part I
Demographic backgroiand questions:
Sex (item l)
Size of residence (item 2)
Age (item 3)
Education (item U)
Marital status (item 5)
Number of children (item 6)
Religion (item 7)
Military service (item 9)
Duration of residence (item 10)
Economic status
Wetland, Dryland (item l4)
Number of parcels (item 17)
Distance of parcels (item l8)
Other Income (item 19)
(the following items are from Part III of the questionnaire):
Hire (item l)
Roof type (item 7)
Other work (item 11)
Ox (working) (item 12)
Debt (item lU)
Debt increase (item 15)
Urban contact (items 11, 12, 13)
Media contact (items 2h, 25, 26, 27, 30)
Political interest (items Ul, k2)
Political knowledge (items U3,
^5)
Concern with farm problems (items 28, 29, 3^, 35)
Memberships and leadership (items 22, 23, 31, 32, 33)
Health (items 20, 21)
Influence (items 39, ^O)

Part II
Attitude toward farming (items 1, 2, 8, 9, 15, 16, 22, 23, 26, 29, ks, h9, 55;
and from Part III, item 8)

lU^

A Key to Concepts
ll*5
Propensity to change (items 3, 10, 33, 35, 39, U6)
Trust (items h, 20, 51, 57, 6l, 6U)
Personal efficacy (items 5, 17, l8, 19, 2k, 27, 31, 38, itO, 1*5, 1*7, 52)
Village morale (items 6, 13, 20, 23, 27, 30, 3I*, 1*1, 59, 63)
Cooperativeness (items 7, 12, 1*0, 5^+, 60, and from Part I, items 36, 37, 38)
Personal morale (items 17, I8, 25, 32, 1*0, 58, 62)
Alienation (items 12, 23, 37, ^0, 1*8, 60)
Authoritarianism (items 21, 2l*, 28, 1*1*, 50, 53, 56, 65, 66)
Future orientation (items 5, 17, 25, 26, 1*6)
Familism (items 21, 2k, 28, 35, 1*2, 66)
Attitude toward government (items 2l*, 28, 31, 1*5, 52)

Part III
Output, yield (in Part I, item I6; Part III, item 10)
Innovation (items 2, 3, 1*, 5, 6, 13, 16, 17)
Clan village (item I8)
Saemaul movement (items 21, 22, 23, 2l*, 25, 26, 27)

Appendix C
A BRIEF NOTE ON FACTOR ANALYSIS

Seventy-eight variables and attributes entered the factor analysis, consisting
of all the items chosen to depict modernizing behavior, items indicating exposure
to the media, items pertaining to the Saemaul program and opinions about it, and
the major attitudinal items that loaded most highly on orthogonal (uncorrelated)
dimensions of attitudes. This factor analysis of the sixty-six attitudinal items
alone is not reported here.l The technique chosen for this multivariate analysis
was factoring. The seventy-eight items were recoded in order to reduce ambiguities
such as extraneous categories. A component factor analysis was chosen^ and the
factor matrix obtained was then rotated in accordance with the Varimax criterion,
so that an orthogonal factor matrix of twenty-eight dimensions was derived, each
factor uncorrelated with the others.3 To readers not familiar with the statisti
cal technique of factoring the process may appear complicated.
However, factor
ing can greatly simplify an analysis of innumerable attributes and variables.
From the J8 x 78 matrix of correlations, the mathematical technique operates,
first, to select those variables with the largest degree of combined variance (or
variance in common) to depict the first factor, deriving successively the un
correlated (orthogonal) patterns or factors with the next largest degree of com
mon variance, and so on until a cutoff point is reached at which no factor will
contain more variance than might be contributed by a single variable; second,
to rotate this structure to provide the clearest possible patterns, on which a
variable will tend to correlate highly with no more than one or a few of these
factors.
To interpret the loadings of variables or attributes on each factor,
these may be treated as correlations between the attribute and its factor. The
squared loading times 100 will indicate roughly the percent of variance con
tributed to the factor by the attribute. The ease of interpreting possible
patterns among a large number of interrelated variables is the chief contribution
of factor analysis.^

WEIGHTS AHD MEASURES

ohongho

3,000 py'6ng

992,h.l square meters

2.kbl acres

kok

10 tu

1U7.627 liters

39 gallons

majigi

a field wide enough to be planted with one mal of seeds

mal

1.6 bushels

15.03 gallons

pyong

3.306 square meters

3.9^5 square yards

sok

176.206 liters

^6.55 gallons

5 bushels

tu

10 hop

1^1.76 liters

3.9 gallons

tanbo

10 ohbngbo

GLOSSARY*

I. Historical Persons Mentioned in Text
Cho Pong-am

'i: t

Chong Cho

%
n

Chong Yag-yong
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rr-iS if

Ho Pu
Kang Younghill
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Kim 11 Sung
Kim Yiik
Kim Yun-sik
Kojong, King
Park Chiuig Hee
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Rhee Syngman

^

Sejo, King

■ff

Sejong, King
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Songjong, King
Tan-Gun (-wanggom)
Yi Kyu-gyong
Yi Song-gye
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II. other Proper Names

-fe
iJl

banJ ang
changwon
Cheju Province

At ^

*I am deeply indebted to Professors Jong-Hae Yoo and Suk R. Hwang for their
assistance in the preparation of this glossary.
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Ch'ongju
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Ch’ungchong, North
Ch'ungchong, South
Han River
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Kangwon Province
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Ti K-l

Kimje
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Koryo Dynasty
Kum River
kunsu
kut
Kwaj on-pop
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Kwangju
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kye
kyol
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Kyonggi Province
Kyongju
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Kyongsang, North

^A

Kyongsang, South
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majigi

xjy
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myon
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myonjang
nongjang
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Nongsajipsol
p' il
pujok

%^%ih
i&

-T

7

pum-asi
%■ iM

Pusan
pyong
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P'yongyang
Saemaul Undong
Seoul
sijok
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Silla Dynasty
sodang
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sok
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Suwon

t

tatang
lel 5^

Taedong-bop
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Taegu
cH

^
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Tonghak
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won

tfl

wu kye
yangban
6\
Yi Dynasty
Yushin

4r

0^

NOTES

Chapter 1
1. The contrihution of agriculture to the development of Japan is well de
scribed by Thomas C. Smith, The Agrarian Origins of Modem Japan. An interesting
account of Japan’s peasant rebellions, making constructive use of systems theory,
is Hee Chae Chung, "Politics, strains, and structural changes: the Meiji Restor
ation case."
2. Hereafter the term Korea will refer to the Republic of Korea, or South
Korea.
3. Han Woo-Keun, The History of Korea, p. 10.
The sixth century B.C. seems
too early.
Hatada Takashi, A History of Korea, p. T, calls attention to the
Kumhae mounds which, with coins from the Wang Mang period, contain rice grains.
Cornelius Osgood, The Koreans and Their Culture, pp. 21^-215, citing the story
of Tan Gun, agrees that millet, at least, was introduced from China diming Korea's
Neolithic period.
U. Wanne J. Joe, Traditional Korea, p. 72.
5. Joe, pp. lT3-lTi+.
6. Hatada, p. i+3.
7. William E. Henthorn, A History of Korea, p. 129.
8. Hatada, p. 67.
9. Han, p. 291, and Henthorn, pp. lUO-lUl.
10. This section, with the accompanying translation on conditions at the time
of Kim Yuk, is taken from Ching Young Choe, "Kim.Yuk (158O-I658) and the Taedongbop reform," Journal of Asian Studies 23 (1963), PP. 21-3511. James B.Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, pp. 68-29. The
rural upper classes were of course also taxed, but they used influence and bribes
to keep their lands off the tax registers, shifting the tax burden all the more
onto the peasantry; Palais, pp. 58-5912. Palais, pp. 100, 232-233Some attempt at reform followed this rebellion.
The grain loan system, which was rationalized as a means of increasing the wel
fare of the peasants but which had really become a means of fleecing the peas
antry, was reformed.
But nothing basic changed; Palais, p. 132.
13. Joe, pp. 422-U23. This decrease in population is also recorded by Hoon K.
Lee, Land Utilization and Rural Economy in Korea, p. Ul who provides a figure
of 6^+7,580 for the decrease in population from I807 to 1852. From I852 to 190U.
the population dwindled about 13 percent, a condition attributed to maladministra
tion, epidemics, and famine.
However, Palais, p. 6U, seems to disagree on the
decline of population.
lU. M. Heydrich, Koreanische Landwirtschaft:

Beitrdge zur Volkerkunde von

Korea, pp. 12-13.
15. H. A. C. Bonar, "Notes on the capital of Korea," Transactions of the
Asiatic Society of Japan 11 (1883), p. 25716. Benjamin Weems, Reform, Rebellion, and the Heavenly Way, p. 38. A thoughtfiii philosophical and anthropological explanation of the nature of such peasant
rebellions is given by Mehmet Beguraj, Peasantry in Revolution.
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17. While Japan became a colonizing power, China's position relative to Korea,
Vietnam, and other bordering states was more difficult for the Westerner to in
terpret. See Melvin Frederick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia.
18. Some insight into what Japanese colonization meant to the Koreans may be
gleaned in Younghill Kang, The Grass Roof, especially Chapter XI.
19. Lee, Land Utilization, p. 256.
20. Ibid., pp. 127-129.
21. Ibid., p. 38.
22. Ibid., p. 51.
23. Ibid. , p. 56, Table 19.
2h. Edmund de Schweinitz Brunner, Rural Korea, p. 17.
25. Brunner, p. 21.
26. iBe, Land Utilization, pp. 3^ and 256.

Over 80 percent of Korea's total
trad^ was with Japan.
27. Ibid. , p. 288.
28. Brunner, p. 25.
29. Moon Hwan Choi, "A review of Korea's land reform," Koreana Quarterly 1:3
(i960), p. 55See also Brunner, p. 23.
30. Lee, Land Utilization, p. 268.
31. Ibid. , p. 137.
32. Ibid. , p. 270.
33. Brunner, p. 25.
3^. Brunner, pp. 26-29.
35- Lee, Land Utilization, p. 171.

36. Hatada, p. 126.
37- George M. McCune, Korea Today, p. 122.

38. Ibid., pp. 126-127.
39. There is some Indication that most of the fertilizer used by Korean peas
ants was not artificial fertilizer but the traditional night soil, manure, wood
ashes, and compost. Fish and seaweed were used where available, while green
manure and mud were preferred for the rice fields.
The effective use of legumes
was long known in Korea, and soy beans were plowed under in dry fields.
See
Heydrich, p. h2. Fertilizer was often applied to the individual plant rather
than to the soil generally.
Osgood found in early post-World War II Korea that
ammonium nitrate was generally not liked, for too much would biirn up the crop,
while tricalcium phosphate "recjulres too much time." Ammonium sulphate was not
readily available after commerce with the North ceased in the 19UOS.
Osgood,
pp. 76-77- Artificial fertilizers are now known and used everywhere.
itO. Everett M. Rogers, "Motivations, values, and attitudes of subsistence
farmers: Toward a subculture of peasantry," in Subsistence Agriculture and Eco
nomic Development, p. 115.
Ul. Gerrit Huitzer, "'Resistance to change and radical peasant mobilization,'
Foster and Erasmus reconsidered," Human Organization 29 (1970), p. 317.
k2. Ibid., p. 305.
h3. John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 195.
Uit. Joel S. Migdal, Peasants, Politics, and Revolution, pp. h6-hj. This is a
major theme of Migdal's book.
^5. Geographical details of the Korean peninsula may be found in the excel
lent coverage by Patricia M. Bartz, South Korea.
h6. Young-Mo Kim, "Consciousness structure of Korea farmers," Korea Observer
3:3 (1971), p. 17. A more rapid decline occurred more recently.
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kj. Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People's Demooratia Republia.
i+8. This is the assessment of Joungwon A. Kim, "The ’peak of socialism' in
North Korea: The five and seven year plans," Asian Survey 5 (1965), p. 26l.
U9. Specific information on these reforms is from McCune, pp. 128-139.
The ■
assessment on success must he subject to some reservations, for some lands were
exempted from the three ahbngho maximum, for example, in cases of special crops,
such as orchards or mulberry trees. Moreover, there is some surreptitious
tenancy making a reappearance in the countryside, although its extent is dif
ficult to determine. The interpretation of the effect of the land reform is
therefore controversial. One assessment by the Land Economics Research Insti
tute revealed 28.U percent of farms had reverted to tenancy by 1965j either in
whole or in part. See Bartz, p. 66; also Young Bok Koh, "A review of post-war
social change in Korea," Asian Paoifia Quarterly 3:2 (1971), p. 12.
50. Bartz, p. 70.
51. George E. Rossmiller et al., Korean Agricultural Sector Analysis and
Recommended Development Strategies, 1971-1985, p. 10.
52. United Nations Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East 23:1 (1972),
p. 38.
53. David C. Cole and Princeton N. Lyman, Korean Development, p. 198.
5^. Kae H. Chung, "Industrial progress in South Korea," Asian Survey lU
(197^)5 p. ^51; Economic Survey, 1971, p. 15; Young Bok Koh, "Post-war social
change," p. lli, attributes farm stagnation in this period partly to massive
American foreign aid. American cotton completely took over the farmers' market.
There is also evidence that the Rhee government underreported agricultural out
put during these years in order to attract foreign aid.
55- Rossmiller, p. Ul.
56. Bartz, p. 59.
57- Parvez Kazan, Korea, pp. 53-5^ and 109.
58. Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East 23:1 (1972), p. 4l.
59. Kazan, p. 207.
It was about 17.3 percent by 1976, in spite of the annual
growth rate of the sector of about 7 percent.
See Korea Annual, 1977, p. llt6.
60. Chung, "industrial progress," p. U50, provides a statement of this classic
situation.
61. Cole and Lyman, p. 39.
62. Ibid. , p. 95.
63. Voting studies for the United States done at the University of Michigan
suggest the generally slight knowledge and interest of American voters.
I heard
some peasants' assessments about their vote that are at least as sophisticated
as many in urban America:
"in Nae-il we voted for former General XXX, thinking
that through knowing the president personally, he could improve conditions for
our county."
6h. Rossmiller, p. 100.
65. Kazan, p. 53. Kazan points out that the dramatic rise of the world price
of rice in 1973 almost eliminated the difference with Korea's domestic price.
66. Korea Annual 1977, p. IU5. The purchase price of barley was also in
creased by 18.5 percent over the previous year.
67. Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East 23:1 (1972), p. 56.
68. Economic Survey, 1971, p. 17.
69. For a description of this, see Cole and Lyman, p. 209.
70. Economic Survey, 1971, p. 37.
71. Korea Annual, 1977, p. ll+6.
72. Popular Participation in Development: Emerging Trends on Community Develop
ment, p. 265.
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73. Cole and Lyman, p. 167.
7^. Joungwon Kim, "The 'peak of socialism,"' p. 259.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People's Demooratio Repubtia^ pp. UG-hj.
Kim II Sung, Theses on the Sooialist Agrarian Question in Korea, p. 2.
Edgar Owens and Robert Shaw, Development Reconsidered, Chapter 1+ and p. 86.
Ibid., p. 110.
Popular Participation in Development, p. 9.
Bartz, p. 76.
Korea has lately been the world's largest exporter of silk
products.
81. Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan, 1972-1976, p. 2.
82. Rossmiller, p. 102.
83. Economic Survey, 1971, p. 12, and Rossmiller, p. 16. There were 2,U88,000
rural households in 1970 and a rural population of 15,589,000, a decline of 7.U
percent from the previous year, according to the Economic Survey, p. 37.
By the
end of 1973 there were 2,336,000 rural households with an estimated farm popula
tion of 12,785,000; see Korea Annual, 1977, p. li;6.
8i;. Tongil, "new rice," is one of the results of the experiments at Los Banos
in the Philippines. The goal of the experiments in Korea was to introduce a highyield, high protein, early-maturing, short stiff-strawed, lodging resistant,
fertilizer-responsive rice variety.
In addition to these characteristics Tongil,
IR 667, was also intended to have resistance to cold, disease (blast), and insects
such as the leaf hopper. The product of the Los Banos "miracle rices" crossed
with Japanese varieties in order to adapt it to a temperate climate, IR 667 was
expected ultimately to increase yields by at least 30 percent.
In 1970-71 Tongil
was cultivated in some 500 areas under strict government supervision. These
demonstration plots provided seed for planting the new rice on some 200,000 hec
tares of the total 1.2 million hectares of riceland in Korea. This planting was
partially controlled by the government, but the disappointing results (well
documented by our data), partly a result of inclement weather and breaking and
shattering, caused the Ministry of Agriculture to make planting Tongil fully
voluntary, while strongly recommending its planting.
Some i+50,000 hectares of
riceland may ultimately be planted in Tongil. Besides the agronomical problems
encountered, Korean consumers had not yet accepted the taste characteristics of
Tongil.
Because of taste preferences, Korean peasants raise about eighty var
ieties of rice, which might surprise some Westerners for whom "rice is rice."
See Rossmiller, p. 1;3; Economic Survey, 1971, pp. U5-6; Bartz, p. 70; UN Economic
Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, p. 57; The Korea Times, January 25, 1973.
85. Jack Punsik Hahm, "The role of government in rural community development,"
p. llU.
86. Most of the foregoing information has been taken from "New Community Move
ment." Hahm, Chapter V, provides several tables showing the organization of the
program.
87. There was also some evidence of coercion. The Korea Times, April 27, 1973,
reported the arrest of a village chief and a Saemaul movement leader who had
allegedly beaten an uncooperative villager. Some fourteen other villagers were
implicated in the incident.
Saemaul savings drives required villagers to deposit
money into a savings account when purchasing motor tillers, pumps, and the like,
albeit at an annual interest of 11 percent.
See The Korea Herald, February 19,
1973.
88. Hahm, p. 168.
89. Events such as farm improvement programs are not likely to achieve the
drama necessary to penetrate the foreign news media, but one article by Richard
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Halloran, "South Korean farm wife finds her life is improving a little," New York
Times, October 15, 1973, did appear, suggesting, by detailing the life of the
village of Dabne-Ri, twenty-five miles from Seoul, that the program could show
positive effects, although conditions were still not easy for the peasants.
Into
this backward village some improvements were penetrating, and some villagers were
better off. This portrayal seems representative of many Korean villages.
90. According to Rossmiller, pp. 56-7, the Korean Electric Company served 19.6
percent of Korea's farm villages, while 1.2 percent generated their own electric
ity, although Nae-il was expecting a power line in the near future.
91. The Korea Herald, November 19, 1972 and April 19, 1973; The Korea Times,
January 6, 197392. Kim II Sung, Theses, p. 28.
93. Ibid., p. ii0.
9^. Hahm, pp. 9^-5*
95" Information on the new constitution has been checked with the text given
in Edward Reynolds Wright, ed., Korean Politics in Transition, pp. 357-383. This
book also contains a number of fine essays providing a background for Korean
politics.
96. To leap forward two years beyond the siirvey here. South Korea had achieved
self-sufficiency in rice and barley by 1975, and it did not depend in that year
on surplus U.S. grain deliveries.
See Kim Jin Hyun, "Pedalling faster in hot
pursuit of growth targets," Far Eastern Economic Review 96:20 (May 20, 1977),
p. 38.

Chapter 2
1. There are rare exceptions to this unrelieved picture. Hubert H. Tiltman,
Peasant Europe, draws a less depressing picture of the Croatian peasants between
the two world wars.
2. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, pp. 123-12U. Marx
is incorrect in stating that science cannot be applied on peasant holdings, and
anthropologists might disagree with the statement that the village offers no
variety of talent or wealth of social relationships. Nonetheless, as a broad
explanation of the political powerlessness of the peasantry as a group, the
statement is trenchant.
3. Half Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, pp. 236-238.
i*. This is not to say that this is an inevitable condition with the peasantry.
Long before modern communication systems. Buddhism spread throughout the Khmer
countryside, a genuine grass-roots movement in contrast to the official doctrine
of Hindu cosmology, through face-to-face contacts of proselytizing monks.
Anarchism was preached in certain areas of Spain in the nineteenth century by
means of itinerant speakers and was successful in raising some rural demands to
a manifest level; on this, see E. J. Hobsbawn, Primitive Rebels, pp. 88 ff.
In
Indonesia the Communist party led by D. N. Aidit articulated peasant demands,
although the party center itself was not a peasant organization, and its ultimate
goal was the aim of a collectivized agriculture, an aim seldom emanating from
the peasants themselves. This is, of course, an issue of great controversy, and
Communist regimes have always taken pains to stress the spontaneous enthusiasm
of the peasant "masses" at the prospect of collectivization. There is probably
some real support here from agricultural laborers, perhaps from some tenants,
but probably from few landowning peasants, whatever the size of their holdings.
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It is significant that collectivization as proposed, for instance, by Mao Tsetung, always proceeds through stages, the first of these generally being land
reform in the sense of land redistribution to the peasants; see Mao Tse-tung,
"Different tactics for carrying out the land law in different areas," Selected
Works, Vol. IV, pp. 193-19^•
5. Recent research conducted on monkey brains shows the effect of nutrition
on the development of the brain. The ability to conceptualize in humans is based
on areas of the brain in which cells continue to proliferate at various stages of
human growth up to about the age of eleven or twelve.
In cases of malnutrition,
the growth of these areas is stunted, resulting in a permanent mental incapacity.
The devastations wrought among Korean peasants during the annual spring famines,
described in the Introduction, must have made it appear that they were indeed in
certain generations a truly different race of mankind.
It must have been dif
ficult to imagine reforms that would raise their standard of living and cultural
accomplishments as a group.
Information on the monkey experiments is based on
personal communications.
6. "Based on my observations, the farmers in the Korean agricultural economy
are behaving in accord with the principles of economics; namely, the individual
resource holders in the Korean agriculture are trying to utilize the limited
resources for the best alternatives," according to Jin H. Park, "Effects of in
creasing commercialization on resource use in semi-subsistence farms in South
Korea," in Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Development, p. 208.
7. Guy Hunter, Modernizing Feasant Societies, p. 137, says "In discussion of
developing farm practice . . . discussion as to whether farmers are economic men
is not necessary: peasants have repeatedly proved as good or better economists
than those who advise them—and not unnaturally: their life depends on it."
8. On the whole, the questions posed on the questionnaire were not difficult
for peasants, although discussion with some of them indicated that they found
the attitudinal section to be the most difficult,.for the nature of these questions
were novel to them. This must be borne in mind as a possible disadvantage of the
questionnaire technique.
9. Vincent S. R. Brandt, A Korean Village.
10. Osgood, The Koreans and Their Culture.
11. The Ministry was asked to distribute questionnaires to winter schools
throughout Korea in "as random a fashion as possible." Evidence in the returned
questionnaires indicated that the Ministry complied with our request. However,
the sample of 1,U30 returned questionnaires cannot be considered a true, inde
pendent random sample. The reported statistics must, therefore, be regared as
only illustrative. Work with the data and comparisons with other studies convince
me that these data are representative of Korean peasants. Reservations about
representativeness are mentioned in connection with village data in Chapter 512. There is at least one cogent argument that statistical tests used in sur
veys are never technically sound.
I do not accept the full implications of such
a position, however, and am more in agreement with the rejoinder by Leslie Kish.
For this instructive interchange see Hanan C. Selvin, "A critique of tests of
significance in survey research," pp. 9^-106, and Leslie Kish, "Some statistical
problems in research design," pp. 127-1^1, in Denton E. Morrison and Ramon E.
Henkel, The Significance Test Controversy.
13. The original questions were translated with the help of Mr. Won-taek Han,
a graduate student at Yonsei University.
Several consultants were of great help
in improving this original translation, including Professors Chung-Hyun Ro, JongHae Yoo, Tae-Dong Chung, and Suk-Bum Yun. Another critic familiar with rural
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conditions and opinions was consulted with regard to the final draft of the ques
tionnaire .
lU. See Anthony V. Vandesande and Francis Y. T. Park, Myong-do's Korean, '68,
Part I, p. l^h.

15. Among several helpful general sources for questions were Ki Hyuk Pak,
Woong Bin Han, Ki Hong Lee, Jin Hwan Park, Kee Chun Han, A Study of Land Tenure
System in Korea', Clifford Kaufmann, a questionnaire for the study of lower income
respondents in Mexico City; Joseph A. Kahl, The Measurement of Modernism-, David
Horton Smith and Alex Inkeles, "The OM Scale: A comparative socio-psychological
measure of individual modernity." These authors have been quite influential in
this area of research, and their work has recently been more fully presented in
Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries-, Daniel Goldrich,
Sons of the Establishment, Frances C. Madigan, The Farmer Said No-, Public Opinion
Quarterly 22:3 (Fall 1958), the entire number of which is devoted to problems of
survey research in modernizing societies; International Social Science Journal
15:1 (1963), another volume on problems of surveys in developing countries;
E^verett M. Rogers, Modernization Among Peasants: The Impact of Communication-,
Marvin E. Shaw and Jack M. Wright, Scales for the Measurement of Attitudes-, John
Williams, a questionnaire designed to study peasant agriculture in Malaysia; and
Yasamada Kuroda, a questionnaire designed to study urban Japanese.
16. There is at least one article on this topic in political science, Robert B.
Stauffer, "The biopolitics of underdevelopment," Comparative Political Studies 2
(1969), pp. 361-387.
17- Richard Rutt, Korean Works and Days, p. h6, where a perceptive observer
of Korean village life calls attention to the importance of pharmacists and selfadministered patent medicines.
18. John C. Williams, in conducting research among villagers in Malaysia,
foiind that the peasants there preferred the three-categoiy scale rather than the
extended Likert scale. His advice on this matter is appreciated.
19. Some of these questions for village and personal morale elicit the type of
responses associated with the concept of self-esteem.
For a recent discussion of
this concept see L. Edward Wells and Gerald Marwell, Self-Esteem, Its Conceptual
ization and Measurement.
20. The conditions under which the survey was conducted made it desirable to
construct an instrument that would take approximately one hour for the respondents
to complete.
This was accomplished.
21. That village cooperativeness is also intertwined with the fabric of the
larger society must also be borne in mind in the course of the analysis.
Sociol
ogists point out that the level of activity of any group is contingent upon the
requirements and constraints of the external system, which for the peasant would
be the urban Great Society.
Studies by Homans show the disintegration of American
communities that have become "bedroom communities" or satellites of larger com
munities. As the requirements of villages decrease, that is, as more and more
services are provided by the urban sector, sociologists would predict the decline
of levels of activity, friendship, and interaction. There is little doubt that
more and more of the former functions of the village community are being provided
by the environment external to the village. For this argument, see Hubert M.
Blalock, Jr., Theory Construction, p. 137.
22. Rogers, Modernization Among Peasants, p. 227.
23. Johan Galtung, Members of Two Worlds, p. 129.
2k. Ibid., p. 132.
25. See, e.g.. The Canonical Textbook of Won Buddhism, pp. 35-36.
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26. Heydrlch, p. 6.
27. Rogers, Modernization Among Peasants, pp. 15O and 158-159.
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Like Rogers, I
have also included ample attitudinal aspects of cosmopolitanism, such as some of
the questions on village morale, and some behavioral aspects, such as media ques
tions .
28. A magigi is a field wide enough to be planted with one mat (3-9703 gallons)
of seed.
It is a common description of field size.
29. Some land rearrangement has already been carried out in Korea. An inter
esting map showing the effects of rationalizing land arrangements in the counties
of Kyungsan and Yungchun is in Shao-er Ong, "Developing the small farm economy in
Asia," in Asian Agriautturat Survey, p. 6k6.
30. Rogers, Modernizing the Peasantry, p. 181. Celia Castillo, "A critical
view of a subculture of peasantry," pp. lUO-lUl, warns that nonacceptance of in
novation may simply imply a lack of resources.
This point has been taken to
heart, and a number of resource questions, such as size of land holdings, have
been included.
31. There is docixmentation on this; see Gerald Gordon, Rote Theory and Ittness.
32. Rogers, Modernizing the Peasantry, p. 125, n. 533. Chongmyun Chung, "A sociological analysis of the Korean community," p. 6I.
3^. This point is made in Poputar Participation in Devetopment, p. 22, in
speaking of rural development, "Equally important is the revolution!zation of rural
occupations so that young people can have reason to want to engage in rural pur
suits and be proud to be so occupied." Galtung, Two Wortds, pp. I9O-I9I and
210-211, provides the argument that successful peasants are also likely to be
among the movers.
The national and village data will provide a test of this find
ing.
35. See Alonzo M. Myster, "Further validation of the Wert-Myster farming at
titude scale," Rurat Sociotogy 9 (19^^)» PP- 226-232.
The scale is reproduced in
Shaw and Wright, pp. 120-123.
36. As opportunities arise elsewhere, even Taiwanese peasants who do earn a
good living from the land want their sons to move toward other occupations,
according to Bernard Gallin, "Chinese peasant values toward the land," in Peasant
Society, p. 37^- An Italian survey, taken in 19^8, found only 1I+ percent of
Italian parents wanted their sons to be agricultural workers, Joseph Lopreato,
"How would you like to be a peasant?," in ibid., p. k-27.
37. See Rogers, Modernization Among Peasants, p. 271.
38. Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Sociat Change.
39. Celia Castillo, "A critical view of a subculture of peasantry," p. 137ij-0. Galtung, Two Wortds, p. 219- The reference to Banfield is to his wellknown The Morat Basis of a Backward Society.
1+1. Dallet, p. II+9, mentioned it in the nineteenth century. A detailed de
scription of traditional peasant cooperation, pum-asi, may be found in Kathryn
Norton, An Introduction to Vittage Korea, pp. 30-31.
1+2. Hoon Lee, p. 98.
1+3. Some items for the scale of familism were drawn from D. A. Bardis, "A
familism scale," reviewed in Shaw and Wright, pp. I+16-I+18.
1+1+. Ki Hyuk Pak and Sidney D. Gamble, Three Ctan Vittages in Korea, A Study of
Rurat Life in Transition (in manuscript, 1969) discuss several types of villages.
The questionnaire distinguished only between single-name and other villages.
1+5. Osgood, p. 39.
1+6. For comments on this point, see Michael T. Hannan, Aggregation and Dis
aggregation in Sociotogy, p. 7-
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U7. The tijang is selected by the government, but the Saemaul leaders are
popularly elected men and -women, subject to replacement by the village assembly;
William W. Boyer and Byong Man Ahn, "The New Community Movement ("Saemaul Undong")
in South Korea," p. 57.
U8. Boon Lee, Land Utilization, p. 255. Palais notes that kyes were organized
in the Yi Dynasty to equalize taxes; see Palais, pp. 99-100 and note 5 in Chapter

5.

k9. See Lee, Land Utilization, pp. 52-53.
50. Heydrich, pp. 17-l8.
51. Thus this study attempts to redress the omission mentioned by Rogers of
studying innovations rather than farm production. The problems of accuracy of
these reports remains, however.
See Rogers, Modernization Among Peasants, p. 26O,
n. 26.
52. I noted one group of Koreans awaiting a bus in Kyongju outside an antique
store that featured old coins and bills.
One of the group began to simulate a
limp, and this brought a gale of laughter from his companions.
One of the bills
had a portrait of Shigemitsu Mamoru, the Japanese minister plenipotentiary to
China, who was injured by a bomb planted by Korean revolutionaries in the 1930s.
The memory of this minor victory against Japan still elicited an enthusiastic
response over thirty-five years after the event.
53. A far cry from a 1931 survey of 1,256 farm households that found only 5.9
percent of the homes tiled and the remainder thatched. See Hoon Lee, p. 207.
It
might be thought that any program for the improvement of village homes and family
amenities was irrelevant to economic development. Arthur T. Mosher, Getting Agrioulture Moving, p. 109, argues the impact of raising the hopes of villages for
a better life on increased agricultural production.
5^. Garrett Hardin, "The cybernetics of competition: A biologist's view of
society," p. U52.
55. Sol W. Sanders, "South Korea's industrial powerhouse," p. 261. See also
Boyer and Ahn, p. 55.

Chapter 3
1. Portions of this section are based on a factor analytic study of attitudes
in Willard D. Keim, "The attitudes of Korean peasants."
2. Somewhat earlier than this research, the proportion of the peasants' crop
marketed was estimated to be 38 percent. Although profits were slight, observers
remarked on the market orientation of Korean peasants.
See Bartz, p. 66.
3. Joel S. Migdal, "Why change? Toward a new theory of change among individ
uals in the process of modernization," World Polities 26 (197^)5 PP* 189-206.
Michael Armer and Allan Schnaiberg, "Measuring individual modernity: a near myth,"
American Sooiologioal Review (1972K PP* 301-316. This is certainly one of the
reasons Mosher, p. 175j argues that planning should be directed at increasing the
profitability of farming more than at increasing production.
The economist T. W.
Schultz emphasizes economic stimuli almost to the exclusion of other social and
cultural factors. For an argument against this overemphasis, see Rogers, Modern
ization Among Peasants, pp. 312-313.
Willard D. Keim, "The attitudes of Korean peasants," pp. 65-100.
5. Myster, pp. 226-232. The scale is also provided in Shaw and Wright, Scales
for Measurement of Attitudes, pp. 120-121.
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6. Some findings from one such survey were conveyed to me hy Mr. Sang Kyu Lee,
a participant observer in a poor district of Seoul while a student at Yonsei Uni
versity.
7. Seator Analysis^ p. lU. Still, the preference for a son tended to raise
the average number of children per couple above the national family planning tar
get.
See Hyo-Chai Lee, "industrialization and the family in Korea,” ILCORKj
Working Paper 8, p. 17.
8. Galtung, Members of Two Worlds3 pp. 252-26i+.
9. Osgood, The Koreans and Their Culture.
10. Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald Stokes, .
The American Voter^ p. 517. Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society,
p. 100, Table 9, provides the following Interesting result:
Personal Impotency
Traditional
Turkey
Lebanon
Egypt
Syria
Jordan
Iran

35%

51
63
90
52
63

Transitional

Modern

33%
35
73

33%
Uo

92

37

57
100

72

51

Unfortunately, since the same q^uestions were not used in these studies and in the
Korean study, the results may not be strictly comparable.
11. Bartz, South Korea.
12. George M. Foster, "Peasant society and the image of limited good," in Peas
ant Society, pp. 300-323.

13. Relationships with some of these variables will be tested in the next sec
tion. For an interesting discussion of self-esteem, see L. Edward Wells and
Gerald Marwell, Self Esteem, especially pp. lit-35* These findings on self-esteem
are somewhat like those Brandt found among the villagers of Sokp'o; Brandt, A
Korean Village, p. 1^+.
lU. Morris Rosenberg, "Self esteem and concern with public affairs," Public
Opinion QMOjrterly 26 (1962), p. 210.
15. Quoted from a study by Herbert McClosky, in Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon
Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy, p. 15516. A major study that contains this theme is Daniel Lerner, The Passing of
Traditional Society.
Corroboration of this conclusion may be found in other
sources, such as Yosinaru Huzoka, "Rorschach test in farming villages of North
Thailand," Nature and Life in Southeast Asia, Vol. Ill, pp. 139-17^, and our own
village study, for which consult Table 5*5*
17. Readers familiar with factor analytic results may be disappointed in cor
relations at the level of 0.30. Analysis of aggregated data of a census and
economic type almost always uncovers higher correlations and more coherent pat
It is the nature of the data that makes this difference.
terns.
18. Jyung Han Rhi laments the fact that the cooperatives had to be organized,
like the Saemaul movement, from above although there seemed to be no alternative
initially.
The old agricultural cooperatives were merged into the agricultural
bank in I96I to create the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation which by
the following year had a membership of 2,197,000, or about 9^-^ percent of the
heads of farm households.
See Jyung Han Rhi, "The present and the future of the
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation of Korea," Koreana Quarterly k:2
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(1962), pp. h'o-hj. The NACF has been the largest supplier of credit in the ag
ricultural sector, and it has from time to time supplied most of the productive
inputs to the peasants, such as fertilizer and other farm chemicals. By con
trolling the prices of inputs and affecting the prices of outputs through price
support or stabilizing schemes, the NACF and the Ministry of Agriciilture have had
a strong effect on farm income and rural change.
See Cole and Lyman, p. 198;
Economio Buttetin for Asia and the Far East, p. 59; Rossmiller, Sector Analysis,
p. 33. Membership in the NACF was not assessed for it is nearly universal, as
these figures show.
19. Most peasants certainly do not regard the upper limit of three ahSngbo
as restrictive. The optimal farm size for one family may be about 27 tanho\
since 10 tanbos eq.ua! one ohbngbo, this would mean somewhat less than a three
ahSngbo holding. Ki Hyuk Pak et at., A Study of Land Tenure System in Korea,
p. i+73.
20. It had been assumed, of course, that the growing of commercial crops would
be specifically related to acceptance of innovations-, behaviorally and attitudinally. Mosher, Getting Agriculture Moving, p. 83, says that the past record of
agrlcul-tural development clearly shows that peasants accept Innovation in their
cash crops more readily than in crops grown for home consumption.
Peasants, he
suggests, are more willing to spend money for these if they are to be used in
producing a crop that brings in money. Rogers also found (see "Motivations,
Values, and Attitudes of Subsistence Farmers," in Wharton, p. 120) that subsist
ence farmers have lower rates of achievement motivation than commercial farmers
in the same villages.
But there is a blurring of these distinctions in Korea,
for while certain crops are commonly designated by the peasants as commercial
crops, rice is also grown commercially, with over a third of the crop on an
average marketed.
This may be the reason that no hypothesized findings were
strongly associated with the growing of the designated commercial crops, such as
tobacco and ginseng, in the factor analysis. However, DECISION did show a re
lationship to COMCROP in cross-tabulation results-, as follows:
COMCROP
DECISION

Yes

Myself
Others

52.3%
^5-1

No
kl.1%
5^-9

There was also a comparable relationship between raising commercial crops and
listening to agricultiiral programs on the radio, similar to the above percentages.
This indicates that the raising of commercial crops is related to some form of
prior innovative behavior, but it may not stimulate any further innovations of
itself.
Listening to agricultural radio programs also was related to growing
Tongil, with about the same strength of association in the table above.
21. This attribute was dichotomized as follows: l) Use insecticide before
plants are attacked, or both before and after; 2) use insecticide after plants
are attacked.
22. While it is hoped that this tentative conclusion is wrong, there are his
torical and social reasons that buttress it in Korea. For centuries education
was oriented to the civil service, an escape from the rural environment rather
than a factor in its improvement. This attitude is still embedded in the cur
riculum. The student who gets his lessons well may be able to attend the uni
versity and not remain a peasant.
23. For some suggestion of this, see Rutt, pp. 86-89.
2h. Two Worlds, p. 129.
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25. This may be because "fatalism" permits the possibility of innovative success
as well as failures, as Rogers suggests. Modernization Among Peasants, p. 277.
26. This factor reveals an identifiable pattern of cosmopolitanism (familiarity
with national affairs) among Korean peasants.
See Rogers, Modernization Among
Peasants, pp. I62-I63. Like Rogers, we found a relationship to exposure to mass
media, but there was no identification with other facilities of modernization.
27. More significant results concerning physical well-being will be forthcoming
in the village analysis. Chapter 5.
28. I am skeptical about some conclusions presented by Pak and Gamble, Three
Clan YiVtages, as a general principle about modernization.
29. Yet commercial fertilizer use did become almost universal as early as the
1930s under the Japanese.
The point is that innovation per se did not gain in
dignity during the colonial era.
30. Lee Man-Gap, "Socio-ciiltural aspects of the Community Development Movement
in Korea," Korea Journal 13 (1973), p. 30. Lee Man-Gap, the dean of Korean sociol
ogists, has importantly contributed to the study of rural life in The Social
Structure of Korean Villages (Seoul: Korean Research Center, i960). A brief
summary of his book may be found in Brandt, A Korean Village, p. 931. "The fellahin, salt of Egypt's earth," from Le Monde, in The Manchester
Guardian, September 19, 1976, p. 12.
32. Manning Nash, Primitive and Peasant Economic Systems, p. 33.

Chapter
1. Nash, p. 119, suggests that the vast and unnecessary upheaval in the lives
of peasants in the process of economic change is caused by just this perception of
themselves as passive agents, "as expendable material in economic plans."

Chapter 5
1. Some of the substantive material in this chapter has appeared in Willard D.
Kelm, "a survey of two Korean villages to determine the attltudinal aspects of
progressiveness," Journal of Korean Affairs 5:3 (1975), pp. 1-13.
2. While the national study had the cooperation of the Ministry of Education,
the two-village study relied on the cooperation of the Ministry of Agriculture
and Forestry.
Having learned of the area in which the villages were to be selected
the personnel of this Ministry recommended other areas as more representative and,
indeed, as more progressive in farming techniques. When these suggestions were
declined, however, no barriers were set up to prevent the free choice of villages
within the chosen region.
In fact, all the personnel of the Korean government
were most cooperative, although the interviewing and visits to the village were
made without official sponsorship. This was to prevent 'possible bias in responses
that might have been produced by the presence of a member of the bureaucracy.
3. Rutt, pp. 196-197, comments on the expense of funerals and ancestral sacri
fice.
U. The training and direction of the field interviewers were very competently
handled by Mr. Lee Kwang-Joo.
5. Aiigust is generally not so busy, but harvests run through September and
October, after which the fields must be cleared. For a clear and detailed account
of rice culture in Korea in the 1930s, which was not so different than in 1973, see
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Lee, Land Utilization, pp. 55-56.
6. This point is made hy Galtung, p. 132.
7. However, it will be recalled that in the national sample, this did not prove
to be the case, clan villages forming a pattern all to themselves. The anticipa
tions concerning clan villages are based on several sources, e.g., Pak and Gamble,
Three Clan Villages in Korea.
Since neither of the two villages was a clan vil
lage, our interest was in memberships per se.
The kye is "a pattern of experience
shared by most Koreans," according to Gerard F. Kennedy, "The Korean kye: Main
taining human scale in a modernizing society," Korean Studies 1 (1977)» PP* 201202.
The modal type of kye is the mutual aid society which assesses an equal
amount of voluntary aid at the time of a marriage or funeral among members.
In
addition, there are money making, industry (irrigation or reclamation), public
welfare (public works projects), and social or friendship kyes Kennedy, p. 2l6,
remarks that the kye is a high-risk commitment based on mutual trust.
He also
warns against accepting uncritically the official opinion that kyes are unproduc
tive.
8. The Korean Herald, November 19, 1972, provided a definition of the govern
ment's categorization of villages. The Herald, by the way, is the government's
English-language paper and should be Interpreted accordingly.
9. Rogers, "Motivations, values, and attitudes of subsistence farmers," p. 11910. Responses on education were forthcoming in the national sample, but vil
lagers seemed reluctant to respond.
Both surveys encoimtered a lack of response
to questions about religion, possibly because of the very complex religious back
ground of Korea. The interviewers for the village data were agricultural students
from the college in the nearest city.
Perhaps the villagers did not wish to re
veal a lack of education to students many of whom were younger. With this excep
tion, responses were quite complete; the students themselves, being from the same
region, had similar rural roots, and presumably were empathetic to village prob
lems .
11. Interesting case studies of family finance may be found in John E. Mills,
ed., Ethno-Soaiologioal Reports of Four Korean Villages.
12. Norval D. Glenn, "The distribution of political knowledge in the United
States," in Political Attitudes and Public Opinion, pp. 273-276.
13. This brief depiction of citizens and subjects is drawn from Almond Verba,
The Civic Culture.
lU. A point made by Owens and Shaw, p. 22.
15. Discriminant analysis has been of interest in the fields of marketing and
education.
For a clear discussion, see the articles on the technique in David A.
Aaker, ed., Multivariate Analysis in Marketing: Theory and Application, Section
C.
The program used in this chapter was the stepwise procedure of the SPSS dis
criminant program.
16. As in previous chapters, significance is used only in an illustrative way,
since these villagers were not a sample from a larger population. Moreover,
since responses, were obtained from all heads of households, we may be said to
have tapped the entire village population, so that in a sense any difference is
significant.
17. Thirty-five factors had originally been selected. The twenty-seven factors
actually used contained approximately 73 percent of the total variance and were
rotated to determine the patterns among variables.
18. This most useful device was adapted from Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of
Human Concerns.
It was not used in the national sample for fear of burdening the
Saemaul teachers with too many instructions and making the questionnaire unwieldy.
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Chapter 6
1. This is especially -well brought out in the essays contained in Mattei Dogan
and Stein Rokkan, eds.. Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences.
In addition, conversations with Mattei Dogan on a projected survey in France show
that the questionnaire survey can be more multi-leveled than is usually the case.
2. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societiespp. 2h0-2hl.
This book is one of the most astute texts on the problems of political choice in
the developing polities.
Indeed, it is my guess that advisors to the Korean gov
ernment are thoroughly familiar with its principles, and it is easy to see in this
quotation one role that the Saemaul movement was intended to fulfill.
3. Ibid., p. 22.

Appendix C
1. It is reported in detail in Willard D. Keim, "The attitudes of Korean peas
ants," pp. 65-100.
The resiilts of this analysis provided attitudinal items that
were representative of several dimensions or patterns and relatively separate, or
uncorrelated, among themselves.
2. The first step of the factor analysis is a correlation matrix. For a small
matrix of correlations among twelve or so variables, I recommend a common factor
analysis, i.e., the extraction of common variance alone rather than common to
gether with unique variance. But in a large T8 x J8 correlation matrix there is
little difference in the results of the two types of factoring.
3. The program selected for the analysis was the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences component analysis and rotation. The results were then reviewed
against a comparable analysis carried out with the BMD-XT2 program which was,
within rounding errors, very similar. The SPSS results are discussed here. An
oblique rotation, when compared to the orthogonal results, did not contribute sig
nificantly to the clarity of interpretation.
U. The best complete discussion of the technique for the social scientist is
R. J. Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis. Also good is Harry H. Harmon, Modem Fac
tor Analysis.
The logic of rotation is well explained in L. L. Thiurstone, Multi
ple Factor Analysis.
For a short introduction to interpreting factor results,
see R. J. Rummel, "Understanding factor analysis," The Journal of Conflict Reso
lution 11 (1967), pp.
A basic discussion of the number of factors to
extract is provided by R. B. Cattell, "Extracting the correct number of factors
in factor analysis," Educational and Psychological Measurement I8 (1958),
pp. 791-837. The criterion used in this analysis was the eigenvalue 1.0, a cut
off point that substantively means factor removal so long as the variance on any
single factor is at least equal to the variance expected from a single variable.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aaker, David A., ed. Multivariate Analysis in Marketing: Theory and Application.
Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture,
Princeton: Princeton
University Press, I963.
Annual Survey of Education.
Seoul: Republic of Korea, Ministry of Education,

1972.
Armer, Michael, and Allan Schnaiberg.
"Measuring individual modernity: A near
myth," American Sociological Review 37 (1972), pp. 301-316.
Banfield, Edward C. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society.
Glencoe, 111.: The
Free Press, 1958.
Bartz, Patricia M. South Korea.
Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1972.
Bequraj, Mehmet. Peasantry in Revolution.
Ithaca:
Cornell University, Center
for International Studies, I966.
Blalock, Hubert M., Jr. Theory Construction.
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1969.
Bonar, H. A. C.
"Notes on the capital of Korea," Transactions of the Asiatic So
ciety of Japan 11 (1883), pp. 2^+3-259Boyer, William W., and Byong Man Ahn.
"The New Community Movement, (Saemaul
Undong), in South Korea," Journal of Korean Affairs 6:3/^ (1976-77) > PP- ^8-62.
Brandt, Vincent S. R. A Korean Village: Between Farm and Sea.
Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1971Brunner, Edmund de Schweinitz. Rural Korea: A Preliminary Survey of Economic,
Social, and Religious Conditions.
New York:
International Missionary Council,
1928.
Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald Stokes. The
American Voter.
New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., i960.
The Canonical Textbook of Won Buddhism.
Seoul:
Kyohak-sa Publishing Company,
1971.
Cantril, Hadley. The Pattern of Hvman Concerns.
New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers
University Press, 1965Castillo, Celia.
"A critical view of a subculture of peasantry," in Subsistence
Agriculture and Economic Development, ed. by Clifton R. Wharton, Jr. (Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), PP- 136-IU2.
Cattell, R. B.
"Extracting the correct number of factors in factor analysis,"
Educational and Psychological Measurement I8 (1958), pp. 791-837Choe, Ching Young.
"Kim Yuk (158O-I658) and the Taedongbop reform," Journal of
Asian Studies 23 (1963), pp- 21-35Choi, Moon Hwan.
"A review of Korea's land reform," Koreana Quarterly 1:3 (i960),
pp. 55-63.
Chung, Chongmyun.
"A sociological analysis of the Korean community," Koreana
Quarterly 5:U (1963), pp. 56-66.
Chung, Hee Chae.
"Politics, strains, and structural changes: The Meiji Restora
tion case." Unpublished dissertation. University of Pennsylvania, 1969Chung, Kae H.
"industrial progress in South Korea." Asian Survey lU (197^)>
pp. i+39-i*55.
166

Bibliography

167

Cole, David C., and Princeton Lyman. Korean Development: The Interplay of Pol
itics and Eoonomias.
Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1971*
Dahrendorf, Half.
Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society.
Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1959Dallet, Charles. Histoire de I'Eglise de Cor^-e. Paris, 187^+.
Dewey, John. The Public and Its Problems.
Chicago; The Swallow Press, Inc.,
195i*.
Dogan, Mattel, and Stein Rokkan, eds. Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the
Social Sciences.
Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, I969.
Dye, Thomas R., and L. Harmon Zeigler. The Irony of Democracy.
Belmont, Cali
fornia: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1975Economic Survey, 1971.
Seoul: Economic Planning Board, Republic of Korea, 1971•
Foster, George M.
"Peasant society and the image of limited good," in Peasant
Society: A Reader, ed. by Jack M. Potter, May W. Diaz, and George M. Foster
(Boston;
Little, Brown and Company, I967), pp. 300-323.
Gallin, Bernard.
"Chinese peasant values toward the land," in Peasant Society:
A Reader, pp. 367-375.
Galtung, Johan. Members of Two Worlds: A Development Study of Three Villages
in Western Sicily.
New York:
Columbia University Press, 1971Glenn, Norval D.
"The distribution of political knowledge in the United States,"
in Political Attitudes and Public Opinion, edited by Dan D. Nimmo and Charles M.
Bonjean (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1972).
Goldrich, Daniel. Sons of the Establishment.
Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966.
Gordon, Gerald. Role Theory and Illness.
New Haven: College and University
Press, 1966.
Hagen, Everett E.
On the Theory of Social Change.
Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey
Press, Inc., I962.
Hahm, Jack Punsik.
"The role of government in rural community development with
special emphasis on the Saemaul Woondong in Korea." Unpublished dissertation,
Claremont Graduate School, 1976.
Halloran, Richard.
"South Korean farm wife finds her life is improving a little,"
New York Times, October 15, 1973.
Han, Woo-Keun. The History of Korea.
Seoul: Eul-Yoo Publishing Company, 1970.
Hannan, Michael T. Aggregation and Disaggregation in Sociology.
Lexington,
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1971•
Hardin, Garrett.
"The cybernetics of competition: A biologist's view of so
ciety," in Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist, edited by
Walter Buckley (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, I968), pp. kk9-h'^9‘
Harmon, Harry H. Modem Factor Analysis.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1967.
Hatada, Takashi. A History of Korea.
Translated by W. E. Smith, Jr. and B. H.
Hazard.
Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio Press, 1969*
Hazan, Parvez. Korea: Problems and Issues in a Rapidly Growing Economy.
Balti
more: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1976.
Henthorn, William E. A History of Korea.
New York: The Free Press, 1971*
Heydrich, M. Koreanische Landwirtschaft: Beitr'dge zur Volkerkunde von Korea I.
Leipzig: Druck und Kommlssionsverlag von B. G. Teubner, 1931.
(Abhandlungen
und Berichte der Museen fur Tierkunde und Volkerkunde zu Dresden, Vol. XIX.)
Hobsbawm, E. J. Primitive Rebels. Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1959.

168

Bibliography

Huitzer, Gerrit.
"’Resistance to change and radical peasant mobilization,'
Foster and Erasmus reconsidered," Human Organization 29 (19T0), pp. 303-320.
Hunter, Guy. Modernizing Peasant Societies: A Comparative Study in Asia and
Africa.
New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1969Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies.
New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1968.
Huzoka, Yosinaru.
"Rorschach test in farming villages of North Thailand," in
nature and Life in Southeast Asia, Vol. Ill (Kyoto: Fauna and Flora Research
Society, 1962), pp. 139-lT^.
International Social Science Journal 15:1 (1963). Entire issue.
Joe, Wanne J. Traditional Korea: A Culture History.
Seoul:
Chung'ang Uni
versity Press, 1972.
Kahl, Joseph A. The Measurement of Modernism. Austin: The University of Texas
Press, 1968.
Kang, Yo-unghill.
The Grass Roof.
New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931.
Keim, Willard D.
"The attitudes of Korean peasants," Journal of East and West
Studies 3:1 (19T4), pp. 65-100.
Keim, Willard D.
"A survey of two Korean villages to determine the attitudinal
aspects of progressiveness," Journal of Korean Affairs 5=3 (1975)? PP* 1-13.
Kennedy, Gerard F.
"The Korean kye: Maintaining human scale in a modernizing
society," Korean Studies 1 (1977), PP* 197-222.
Kim, II Sung. Theses on the Socialist Agrarian Question in Korea, published to
gether with H. D. Malaviya, Land Situation in India and the Korean Example.
New Delhi: Socialist Congressman Publications, 1970.
Kim, Jin Hyun.
"Pedalling faster in hot pursuit of growth targets," Far Eastern
Economic Review 96:20 (May 20, 1977), P* 38.
Kim, Joungwon A.
"The 'peak of socialism' in North Korea: The five and seven
year plans," Asian Survey 5 (1965)5 PP* 255-269*
Kim, Young-Mo.
"Consciousness structure of Korea farmers," Korea Observer 3:3
(1971), PP* 16-25.
.
Kish, Leslie.
"Some statistical problems in research design," in The Svgmfvcance
Test Controversy, edited by Denton E. Morrison and Ramon E. Henkel (Chicago:
Aldlne Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 127-l4l.
Koh, Young Bok.
"A review of post-war social change in Korea," Asian Pacific
Quarterly of Cultural and Social Affairs 3:2 (l97l), PP* 9-33*
Korea Annual, 1977.
Seoul: Hapdong News Agency, 1977*
The Korea Herald, various issues, 1972-1973*
The Korea Times, various issues, 1972-1973*
Lee, Hoon K. Land Utilization and Rural Economy in Korea.
Reprint: New York:^
Greenwood Press, I969. Originally published by University of Chicago Press in
1936.
Lee, Ho-Chai.
"industrialization and the family in Korea," ILCORK Working Paper
8.
Honolulu: University of Hawaii, Social Science Research Institute, August

1971*
Lee, Man-Gap.
"Socio-cultural aspects of the Community Development Movement in
Korea," Korea Journal 13 (1973), PP* 25-33*
Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society.
New York: The Free Press,
1958.
Lopreato, Joseph.
"How would you like to be a peasant?" in Peasant Society: A
Reader, edited by Jack M. Potter, May N. Diaz, and George M. Foster (Boston:
Little Brown and Company, I967), PP* 419-437*
Madigan, Frances C. The Farmer Said No.
Quezon City:

Community Development

Bibliography

169

Research Council, University of the Philippines, I962.
Mao Tse-tung.
"Different tactics for carrying out the land law in different
areas," Selected Works, Vol. IV (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, I961),
pp. 193-19^+.
Marx, Karl. The Eighteenth Bmmaire of Louis Bonaparte.
New York: International
Publishers, 19T5McCune, George M. Korea Today.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950.
Migdal, Joel S. Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures Toward Political
and Social Change in the Third World.
Princeton: Princeton University Press,
197^*.
Migdal, Joel S.
"Why change? Toward a new theory of change among individuals
in the process of modernization," World Politics 26 (19T^)» PP* 189-206.
Mills, John E., ed. Ethno-Sociological Reports of Four Korean Villages.
San
Francisco:
Community Development Division, U.S. Operations Mission to Korea,
i960.
Mosher, Arthur T.
Getting Agriculture Moving: Essentials for Development and
Modernization.
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.
Myster, Alonzo M.
"Further validation of the Vfert-Myster Farming Attitude Scale,"
Rural Sociology 9 (19^^), pp. 226-232.
Nash, Manning. Primitive and Peasant Economic System.
San Francisco:
Chandler,
1966.
Nelson, Melvin Frederick. Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia.
New York:
Russell and Russell, 1967"New Community Movement," Korea Policy Series 4.
Seoul: Korean Overseas Informa
tion Service, June 1972.
Norton, Kathryn. An Introduction to Village Korea.
Seoul: United States Oper
ations Mission, 1968.
Ong Shao-er.
"Developing the small farm economy in Asia," in Asian Agriculticral
Survey (Seattle: University of Washington Press, I969 ), pp. 635-679Osgood, Cornelius. The Koreans and Their Culture.
New York: The Roland Press
Company, 1951Owens, Edgar, and Robert Shaw. Development Reconsidered.
Lexington, Mass.:
D. C. Heath and Company, 1972.
Paige, Glenn D. The Korean People's Democratic Republic.
Stanford: The Hoover
Institution, I966.
Pak Ki Hyuk and Sidney D. Gamble. Three Clan Villages in Korea: A Study of Life
in Transition.
In manuscript, 1969. Published under the title The Changing
Korean Village.
Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 1978.
Pak Ki Hyuk, Wong Bin Han, Ki Hong Lee, Jin Hwan Park, and Kee Chun Han. Study
of Land Tenicre System in Korea.
Seoul:
Korea Land Economics Research Center,
1966.
Palais, James B. Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea.
Cambridge:
Harvard
University Press, 1975Park Jin H.
"Effects of increasing commercialization on resource use in semisubsistence farms in South Korea," in Subsistence Agriculture and Economic
Development, edited by Clifton R. Wharton, Jr. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing
Company, 1969), pp. 196-208.
Perconcel-Hugoz, Jean-Pierre.
"The fellahin, salt of Egypt’s earth," from Le
Monde, in The Manchester Guardian, September 19, 1976, p. 12.
Popular Participation in Development: Emerging Trends on Community Development.
New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1971-

Bibliography

170

Potter, Jack M., May N. Diaz, and George M. Foster, eds. Peasant Society: A
Reader.
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967Pubtio Opinion QuarterZy 22:3 (1968). Entire issue.
Rhi Jyung Han.
"Present and future of the National Agriciiltural Cooperative
Federation of Korea," Koreana Quarterly h:2 (1962), pp. 45-51*
Rogers, Everett M. Modernization Among Peasants: The Impact of Communication.
New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 19^9.
Rogers, Everett M.
"Motivations, values, and attitudes of subsistence farmers:
Toward a subculture of peasantry," in Subsistence Agriculture and Economic
Development, pp. 111-135.
Rosenberg, Morris.
"Self esteem and concern with public affairs," Public Opinion
Quarterly 2G (1962 ), pp. 201-211.
Rossmiller, George E. et al.
Korean Agriculture Sector Analysis and Recommended
Development Strategies, 1971-1986.
Seoul: Agricult\iral Economics Research
Institute, 1972.
Rummel, R. J. Applied Factor Analysis.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press
1970.
Rummel, R. J.
"Understanding factor analysis," The Journal of Conflict Resolu
tion 2 (1967), pp. 444-480.
Rutt, Richard. Korean Works and Days.
Rutland and Tokyo:
Charles E. Tuttle
Company, 1964.
Sanders, Sol W.
"South Korea’s industrial powerhouse," Asian Affairs 3 (1976),
pp. 254-262.
Selvin, Hanan C.
"A critique of tests of significance in survey research," in
The Significance Test Controversy, edited by Denton E. Morrison and Ramon E.
Henkel (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 94-106.
Shaw, Marvin E., and Jack W. Wright. Scales for the Measurement of Attitudes.
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, I969.
Smith, David Horton, and Alex Inkeles. Becoming Modem: Individual Change in
Six Developing Countries.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.
Smith, David Horton, and Alex Inkeles.
"The OM Scale: A comparative sociopsychological measiure of individual modernity," Sociometry 29 (1966),
pp. 353-377.
Smith, Thomas C. The Agrarian Origins of Modem Japan.

Stanford:

Stanford Uni

versity Press, 1959.
Stauffer, Robert B.
"The biopolitics of underdevelopment," Comparative Political
Studies 2 (1969), pp. 36I-387.
Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan, 1972-1976.
Seoul: Government of the
Republic of Korea, 1971.
Thurstone, L. L. Multiple Factor Analysis.
Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1947.
Tiltman, Hubert H. Peasant Europe.
London: Jarrolda, 1934.
United Nations Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East 23:1 (1972), entire
issue.
Vandesande, Anthony V., and Francis Y. T. Park. Myong-do’s Korean, '68.
Part I
Seoul: Myongdo Institute, I967.
Weems, Benjamin. Reform, Rebellion, and the Heavenly Way.
Tucson: University
of Arizona Press, 1964.
Wells, L. Edward, and Gerald Marwell. Self-Esteem: Its Conceptualization and
Measurement.
Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976.
Wharton, Clifton R., Jr., ed. Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Development.

Bibliography

Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, I969.
Wright, Edward Reynolds, ed. Korean Politics in Transition.
versity of Washington Press, 1975.

ITl

Seattle:

Uni

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Willard D. Keim was born in Fairbury, Nebraska in 1932.

His first

trip to Korea occurred in 1953-5^> in the first bleak year following
the war on that peninsula.

He received an imdergraduate degree in

political science at Northwestern University in 1958.

Following

several years as an editor in the social sciences for an encylopedia,
he received a fellowship to the Center for Cultural and Technical
Interchange between East and West from I963 to 1965*

In 19^9 he

received his Ph.D. in political science at the University of Hawaii.
Professor Keim returned to Korea in 1972-73 as a Fulbright lecturer
at Yonsei University.

He presently teaches political science at

Hilo College in Hilo, Hawaii, focusing on international relations,
foreign policy, and political analysis and methodology.
include chess and ohang'gi

.

172

His hobbies

Center for East Asian Studies
Western Washington University
Bellingham, Washington 98225

STUDIES ON EAST ASIA
(formerly Occasional Papers)

Maxims for the WelZ-Govemed HousehoZd^ by Chu Yung-ch’un, translated and with a
preface by Edvard H. Kaplan. 1971. 10 pp.
ISBN 0-9lit58U-01-U.
Out of print.
Chinese PoZiaies Towards Minorities: An Essay and DoawnentSy by Henry G. Schwarz.
1971- 200 pp., illus., bibliography.
ISBN 0-91U58U-02-2. Out of print.
The Love of Nature: Hsu Hsia-K’o and His EarZy TraveZs, by Li Chi.
illus.
ISBN 0-91^58^1-03-0.
Out of print.

1971.

13U pp.

Ikkyu Sojun: A Zen Monk and His Poetry, by Sonja Arntzen.
1973. x, 171 pp.,
illus., bibliography, index.
$1.00.
ISBN 0-91^*584-99-5. Microfiche only.
Ten Great Years: Statistics of the Economic and CuZturaZ Achievements of the
PeopZe's RepubZic of China, by the State Statistical Bureau, Peking (originally
published in i960).
Introduction by Feng-hwa Mah.
1974. xi, 154 pp.
$4.00.
ISBN 0-914584-05-7.
Workers and Commissars: Trade Union PoZicy in the PeopZe's RepubZic of China,
by Merton Don Fletcher, 1974. vi, l48 pp., tables, bibliography.
$4.00.
ISBN 0-914584-06-5.
An Economic History of China, by Chou Chin-Sheng, translated in precis and with
an introduction by Edward H. Kaplan. 1974.
ix, 273 pp., 26 illus., tables,
glossary, index.
$5.50.
ISBN 0-914584-07-3.
MongoZian Short Stories, edited and with an introductory chapter by Henry G.
Schwarz.
1974. xxv, 179 pp., illus., glossary, biographical sketches.
$5.00.
ISBN 0-914584-08-1.
Han River ChuZmuntogi: A Study of EarZy NeoZithic Korea, by Sarah M. Nelson.
1975- 176 pp.
27 illus., glossary, tables, bibliography. $5.00.
ISBN 0-914584-09-X.
A Discourse on Government: Nakae Chomin and His Sansuijin Keirin Mondb, by
Margaret B. Dardess.
1977- 109 PP-, 2 illus., glossary.
$4.00.
ISBN 0-914584-10-3.
Wu Tse-T'ien and the PoZitics of Legitimation in T'ang China, by R.W.L. Guisso.
xii, 335 PP-, illus., maps, bibliography, glossary, index.
$l6.00.
ISBN 0-914584-11-1. Hardcover only.

1978.

Bihliotheaa Mongolioa. Part I: Works in English, French, and German, compiled
by Henry G. Schwarz. 1978.
ix, 355 PP»j Ulus., index.
$18.00.
ISBN O-91U58U-I2-X. Hardcover only.
Studies on Mongolia: Proceedings of the First Forth American Conference on
Mongolian Studies, edited by Henry G. Schwarz.
1979.
iv, 138 pp., illus.,
maps.
$5.50.
ISBN 0-91^+58^-13-8.
The Korean Peasant at the Crossroads: A Study in Attitudes, by Willard D. Keim.
1979. vii, 172 pp., maps, tables, glossary, bibliography. $7-50.
ISBN 0-9l!+584-llt-6.

We accept standing orders. We will send each new title,
along with an invoice, to our standing order customers.
All other orders must be accompanied by prepayment in
U.S. funds. Add the equivalent of US$1.50 to payments
in other currencies to cover bank charges.
A free examination copy of any title in print will be
sent upon receipt of a firm order of at least 10 copies
from a university bookstore.
There is no discount for orders of up to 9 copies per
volume. We do, however, pay the book-rate charges to
all domestic and foreign destinations.
In addition, we
offer the following discounts for bulk orders:
copies per volume:

10 - 19

10%

20 - 29

20%

30 and over

30%

All sales are final.

Prices are subject to change without prior notice.

